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Title: Nature Industries: US Environmental Fictions After Fordism, 1971-2011 
 
 This dissertation recontextualizes literary, critical, and popular models of nature 
in contemporary American fiction, and argues that the transformations in the post-Fordist 
economy reframe environmental concepts and their uses in a new light. Scholars in the 
environmental humanities have long recognized that understanding changes in the 
political economy are a key way to understanding our ideas and representations of the 
natural world. These ideas serve as metaphysical models that relate individuals to society 
and to the broader world described by the sciences. However, much environmental 
criticism only goes so far as to historicize, either arguing that images of nature are wholly 
determined by structures and institutions of power, or, by privileging certain ideas of 
nature as absolute, critics lay claim to an imagined oppositional, but no less normative, 
space outside of society. Nature Industries intervenes in this dilemma by drawing on 
pragmatist and cultural studies methods to reconstruct the experience of American life in 
the aftermath of Fordism. Constructing this historical conjuncture enables interpretive 
practices which foreground the diverse political articulation of environmental figuration. 
The title is a play on Horkheimer and Adorno’s 1944 essay on “the culture 
industry,” which announced that cultural production had been subsumed into monopoly 
capitalism. Following culture, nature has undergone a similar loss of perceived 
v 
 
autonomy. From the affective to the biogenetic, informational to the atmospheric, post-
Fordist technologies and economies intervene in the world at scales that previous 
vocabularies struggle to describe without the help of fiction. Contemporary capitalism not 
only produces new natures—new combinations of nature and culture, or new “natural-
history”—but, given the ecological consequences of industrialism, environmentalists too 
are forced to intervene in ways that would give pause to previous generations of 
conservationists. Rather than announcing the “death of Nature,” as the fictionalized 
Immanuel Kant does in the final moments of Mary McCarthy’s Birds of America (1971), 
we encounter a proliferation of natures, each with their own political valence, and each 
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The world… lives on itself: its excrements are its nourishment.  
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
The more relentlessly socialization commands all moments of human and 
interhuman immediacy, the smaller the capacity of men to recall that this 
web has evolved, and the more irresistible its natural appearance.  
Theodor Adorno 
 
Certainly, for us, there has never been an alternative to the world, but 
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INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL CULTURE AFTER FORDISM 
Narrative means telling a story about something, like the world spirit, or 
Europe, man, the West, culture, freedom, class struggle. It is the story of 





What is often being argued, it seems to me, in the idea of nature is the idea 
of man; and this not only generally, or in ultimate ways, but the idea of 





Nature holds in place a multitude of conflicting, ever shifting meanings 





In his lectures on Beethoven’s 6
th
 symphony, Theodor Adorno concludes that the 
1808 pastoral was “an image, therefore, not of the world, but of an interpretation of the 
world.”
4
 This Hegelian insight—that art is an image of an interpretation, and that both the 
interpretation and its picturing are acts embedded in historical contexts—is shared by 
both the continental tradition and American pragmatism. As Nicholas Brown argues, 
apropos of the Phenomenology of Spirit, “particular meanings only subsist within the 
medium of the universal;” hence, the continual need for immanent modes of critique and 
                                                          
1
 Richard Rorty, “After Philosophy, Democracy,” Take Care of Freedom and the Truth 
will Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 34-45, 43. 
2
 Raymond Williams, “Ideas of Nature,” Culture and Materialism (New York: Verso, 
2005), 67-85, 71.  
3
 Stacey Alaimo, Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 8.  
4





 Nature, whenever it appears in literature or as literary form, always comes 
bearing a certain set of ideals or promises; it carries certain values, prescribes norms, and 
produces thought models and affective shapes which are contemporary with the given (if 
contested) movement and composition of society. It constitutes an “unstable universality” 
through which individuals and societies imagine themselves and their world.
6
 This 
project is about the differential ways that American literature has constructed this 
unstable universal during one of the most transformational periods in US history. It 
argues that contemporary interpretations of Nature (as it is variously figured as 
environment, ecology, or biology) must be understood in their historical relation to post-
Fordist production.  
Raymond Williams famously writes that “the idea of nature contains… an 
extraordinary amount of human history.” Few are surprised by the assertion that ideas of 
nature change over time, but the question of how remains: “it is not primarily ideas that 
have a history,” Williams writes, “it is societies. And then what often seem opposed ideas 
can in the end be seen as parts of a single social process.”
7
 Carolyn Merchant, whose 
1989 book, Ecological Revolutions, was a foundational text in the field of environmental 
criticism, argues that ideas about nature “arise from changes, tensions, and contradictions 
that develop between a society’s mode of production and its ecology, and between its 
                                                          
5
 Nicholas Brown, “Close Reading and the Market,” Literary Materialisms, eds. Mathaias 
Nilges and Emilio Sauri (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013),145-168, 146. 
6
 Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and Radical Politics (New 
York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). 
7
 Williams, 78. 
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modes of production and reproduction.”
8
 Her premise is correct. However, her 
prescription now contains a historical irony that Williams would appreciate. Merchant 
suggests that the mechanistic and storehouse model of the environment, which was 
dominant up through mid-twentieth century industrialism, should be replaced by a 
network-oriented model of ecology, characterized by a distribution of agency. Believing 
that by changing the organizational imaginary of social production we can bring post-
industrial society in line with ecological sustainability—and, as an added bonus, 
disalienate ourselves in our relation to the world—Merchant was unable to foresee in 
1989 how the digital and information industries of the post-Fordist “New Economy” 
would flourish in the following years by making use of horizontal and niche production 
models, as well as employing a romantic and naturalistic rhetoric of distributed, flexible, 
and creative networks. As David Brooks observes, 
Companies today, the mantra goes, have to think biologically. They have to create 
lean, decentralized, informal participatory systems. They have to tear down rigid 
structures and let a thousand flowers bloom. The machine is no longer held up as 
the standard that healthy organizations should emulate. Now it’s the ecosystem. 
It’s the ever-changing organic network that serves as the model to define a 





One might dismiss this as a green-washing of the white-collar—or what Andrew 
Ross calls the “no-collar”—workplace, but it reflects a much broader mutation in the 
dominant organization of social production.
10
 The last four decades have been defined by 
                                                          
8
 Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New 
England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989), 3. 
9
 David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There 
(New York: Touchstone, 2000), 128. 
10
 Andrew Ross, No-Collar: The Humane Workplace and its Hidden Costs (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2003). 
4 
 
the shift away from the bureaucratic, mass-production oriented, manufacturing economy 
of early-and mid-century Fordism, which was tempered by Keynesian policies between 
1930 and 1970, to the financially deregulated, informational, affective, and service-
oriented industries of post-Fordism.
11
 David Harvey describes this as a shift in capital 
from fixed to “flexible accumulation,” while Antonio Negri describes it as a move from 
“mass labor” to “swarm labor” as new forms of “immaterial” production explode the 
measurability of labor and value.
12
 Sociologically, this period has been characterized 
variously as “postmodernity,” “liquid modernity,” “risk society,” “network society,” 
“knowing capitalism,” or simply, “the new capitalism.”
13
 Each of these descriptors 
attempt to link transformations in subjectivity and culture as culture increasingly 
becomes the mode through which capitalist relations (in both production and 
consumption) are reproduced. Brooks’ colorful example illustrates how firms have 
absorbed what sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call the “artistic critique” of 
“1968” by constructing a flexible, network-based imaginary of organization whose 
mimicry of “horizontal” and “playful” ecosystems rarely leads to more sustainable or 
                                                          
11
 Moishe Postone, “Thinking the Global Crisis,” South Atlantic Quarterly 111.2 (2012): 
227-249, 228; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (New York: Basic 1990); 
Nigel Thrift, Knowing Capitalism (London: Sage, 2005). 
12
 Cesare Casarino and Antonio Negri, In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on 
Philosophy and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minenesota, 2008), 125; see also, 
Antonio Negri, The Labor of Job: The Biblical Text as Parable of Human Labor, trans. 
Matteo Mandarini (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).  
13
 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991); Zigmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (London: Polity, 2000); 
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Manuel 
Castells, The Rise of Network Society: The Information Age (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 





 The appeal of short-term, risk-mitigating, 
adaptive creativity is more often than not subsumed into the ambience of austerity and the 
romantic entrepreneurialism of middle-class knowledge workers.
15
 During the same 
period, neoliberal philosophers like Friedrich Hayek turned the frameworks of 
complexity and epistemic humility—much beloved by environmentalists—into naturalist 
justifications for unregulated markets.
16
  
This dissertation situates US literary narratives of the environment within this 
broader socio-historical context of post-Fordism. Each chapter takes up an author or a 
pair of authors who address a potential vector of recuperation: (1) the death of nature; (2) 
energy crisis; (3) chaos/deregulation; and (4) geography as the naturalized locus of 
cultural memory. Each chapter also speaks to a particular genre: bildungsroman/the novel 
of ideas, realism, science fiction, and historiographic metafiction. As Williams puts it, 
“ideas of nature,” are just as much “ideas of kinds of societies.” Rather than reading—in 
paranoid fashion—texts as symptoms or “mere” reflections of material arrangements, I 
read them as actively constituting lived imaginaries of society that are necessarily 
complicit in the arrangements they critique.
17
 Any critical gesture begins from 
                                                          
14
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Verso, 
2005); Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole 
Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
2008); Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s 1995 Mute magazine essay, “The 
Californian Ideology” (archived at imaginaryfutures.net). 
15
 Andrew Ross, “The Industrialization of Bohemia,” No-Collar: The Humane Workplace 
and its Hidden Costs (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 123-160. 
16
 Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1988).  
17
 Eve Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke, 2003), 123-152. 
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complicity, that is, from within. As the kind of societies we live in are subjected to 
internal and external pressures—for instance, under neoliberalism the environment 
becomes something internal to privatization while “disembedded” markets are projected 
outside society—the ways that nature is given narrative shape take on a new relevance in 
transforming who and what composes our society. My approach draws on the cultural 
studies practice of constructing conjunctures and the concept of articulation, which 
pragmatically links a text’s social meaning to context without reducing it to that context. 
Before discussing the methodology and outline of this project in full, this introduction 
chapter explores environmental culture of Fordism and its aftermath.  
In its post-Fordist moment, ecology risks becoming an imagined and aestheticized 
relation to what is otherwise the latest, flexible mode of self-discipline in the deregulated 
landscape of normalized contingency and precariousness. In the words of The Invisible 
Committee—the French radical group whose manifesto, The Coming Insurrection, struck 
fear into the heart of Glenn Beck and the French state: “Ecology isn’t simply the logic of 
a total economy; it’s the new morality of capital.”
18
 But perhaps even worse, ecology 
risks becoming totally emptied of content as it comes to stand in as a synonym for 
interactive organization itself—from academic conferences that have nothing to do with 
the environment to corporate branding of digital platforms. What was once an 
oppositional idea of nature has been, as Williams might argue, subsumed by the social 
process, as the emergent cultural formation becomes the dominant. This poses a 
                                                          
18
 The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 
78; the manifesto gained international attention long before the controversial arrest of the 
“Tarnac 9,” members of a rural, anarchist collective of organic farmers, on charges of 
terrorism. Cf. Alberto Toscano, “Criminalizing Dissent,” Guardian 28 January 2009, 
Web Accessed 31 May 2016.  
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challenge to eco-theorists who, like Merchant, place their hopes in mimetic and formalist 
solutions to environmental crises. On the one hand they argue that our images of nature 
are thoroughly historical and the product of class (patriarchal, racist, etc.) societies; on 
the other hand, they say we must shape our societies—and even our very thoughts—to be 
more like the new (normative) image of nature produced by current organizational 
imaginary. This is offered as a vision of the way nature “really is.” Yet these efforts at 
“denaturalizing nature” generally leave the underlying naturalist premise intact; they 
substitute a new image for the old and expect it to perform the same function.
19
 
However, the redescription of contemporary capitalism in ecological terms offers 
opportunities to emphasize the threatening and perverse—seemingly unnatural—
qualities of ecosystems themselves. Writing the same year as Merchant, Felix Guattari 
describes the neoliberal remaking of New York City by a familiar species of algae: 
Just as monstrous and mutant algae invade the lagoon of Venice, so our television 
screens are populated, saturated, by “degenerate” images and statements… men 
like Donald Trump are permitted to proliferate freely, like another species of 
algae, taking over entire districts of New York and Atlantic City; he “redevelops” 
them by raising rents, thereby driving out tens of thousands of poor families, most 
of whom are condemned to homelessness, becoming the equivalent of the dead 




The ecological similes establish a relation between real estate developers as 
“another species of algae” and tenant “dead fish.” The different processes—one 
economic and social, the other inter-species and environmental—produce similar results, 
                                                          
19
 For example, we might ask whether the existence or non-existence of “gay” penguins 
should have any relevance at all to “justifying” the existence of LGBTQ humans. Noel 
Sturgeon unpacks the implicit naturalism in moves like this in “Penguin Family Values,” 
Environmentalism in Popular Culture: Gender, Race, Sexuality, and the Politics of the 
Natural (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 2009), 120-148. 
20
 Felix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, Trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (New York: 
Continuum, 2005), 29. 
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a few winners and a lot of losers, but at some level the metaphor ends. The analogy 
terminates in a material “existential territory” in which the displaced people and financial 
calculations cease being environmental metaphors and become compositional elements 
of the material environment itself. This move from metaphor to materiality can also be 
understood as a move “beyond” postmodernism. If postmodernism in literary criticism 
signaled the disappearance of the referent and the materiality of the signifier, we 
increasingly find ourselves in a culture in which the material effects of our actions seem 
to outpace the production and exchange of meanings.
21
 At the same time, ecology as a 
normative image of “the good” (or preferable relations) is jettisoned in favor of ecology 
as a mere analogy for fluctuating relations in general—with the potential obverse effect 
of naturalizing (or rendering value-neutral) disastrous social inequalities—the 
metaphorical dead fish of those fluctuations.  
The novel of New York City’s financialized culture at the turn of the millennium 
is undoubtedly Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis.
22
 Its epigraph is taken from Polish poet 
Zbigniew Herbert’s “Report from A Besieged City,” and reads: “a rat becomes the unit of 
currency.”
23
 In the besieged city of Herbert’s poem, the representational unit of exchange 
value becomes material and temporary—ostensibly edible, given that the use value of rats 
can really only be derived from their meager source of food. The materiality of exchange 
                                                          
21
 One example here is the forty year delay between a rise in carbon dioxide levels and 
global warming. What we are witnessing today are the warming effects of carbon dioxide 
levels from the mid-1970s—prior to the rise of industrial contributors like China and 
India.  
22
 Don DeLillo, Cosmopolis (New York: Scribner, 2003).  
23
 Zbigniew Herbert, “Report From a Besieged City,” The Collected Poems, 1956-1998 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 416-8. 
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value and use value is continuously brought to the foreground as Eric Packer, a young 
billionaire and asset manager, rides across Manhattan in his limo to get a haircut. Packer 
discusses Herbert’s “rat currency” with his “chief theorist.” “Stockpiling of dead rats 
called a global health menace,” he muses, not unlike the removal of money from 
circulation. DeLillo deploys the rat to figure the contradictions of capitalism. The rat’s 
use value lies in its materiality, for better or worse, as food; its rarity lies in its finitude 
(decay). As exchange value, the rat serves as a metaphor—a carrier from context to 
context—of other values, and a carrier that fails to adequately maintain its stable form 
due to its corporeality, or, alternately, by the ability of rats to breed uncontrollably.  
Against the unstable background of biological vectors, Packer exalts the purity of 
the digital: “the eloquence of alphabets and numeric systems, now fully realized in 
electronic form, in the zero-oneness of the world, the digital imperative that defined 
every breath of the planet’s living billions. Here was the heave of the biosphere. Our 
bodies and oceans were here, knowable and whole.”
24
 The metaphysics of finance is the 
dream of pure and total representation, abstracted and de-situated from the material world 
it describes, reduced to a binary then infinitely multiplied. “All wealth has become wealth 
for its own sake,” he is later told, “Money has lost its narrative quality the way painting 
did once upon a time. Money is talking to itself.” The decoupling of the system of 
representing exchange from its ability to refer to anything other than itself is the 
speculative bubble—the Baudrillardian moment of simulation—in which, between the 
years of 1970 and 2004, the global market in derivatives went from zero to 273 trillion 
                                                          
24





 Marx, of course, went to great lengths to describe the material and chemical 
properties of different metals which made them ideal carriers of exchange value.
26
 In 
Harvey’s influential account of postmodernism, the delinking of the U.S. dollar from the 
gold standard is the material condition for postmodern culture in general. He describes a 
post-historic condition in which nothing disappears or refuses to degrade, but is rather 
endlessly recombined in the service of pure accumulation, an intensification of the 
perennial drive of capitalism toward “universal fungibility.”
27
 In this context, speculative 
attitudes are placed in the service of flexible accumulation, foreclosing an authentically 




Cosmopolis continues DeLillo’s realist explorations of the postmodern condition 
and stages a crisis in a contemporary historical consciousness stuck between the hyper-
production of new (“disruptive” products that ensure nothing actually changes) and the 
presence of the materiality through which we are bound to the past (and the planet). The 
subsumption of “the new” by market cycles was observed long ago by Walter Benjamin, 
however the neoliberal era is defined by what Mark Fisher calls “capitalist realism,” in 
which the political failure to produce an authentic new results in the popular proliferation 
                                                          
25
 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: 
Sage, 1993); for derivatives figure, see Donald Mackenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: 
How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007). 
26
 Large portions of Marx’s “The Chapter on Money” in the Grundrisse (Trans. Martin 
Nicolaus [New York: Penguin, 1973], 165-186) explicate the chemical properties of 
metals as well as the role of these properties in exchange—not just private exchange but 
colonial accumulation of mineral resources from tribal peoples. 
27
 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (New York: Basic 1990). 
28
 DeLillo, 8.  
11 
 
of apocalyptic narratives (e.g. eco-catastrophes).
29
 Fisher argues that our inability to 
imagine a different future, other than through catastrophic speculation, contributes to the 
uneven catastrophes of a present without end. For Nicole Merola, the crisis is not the 
absence of a future but rather the failure of the past to properly become past. Merola 
argues that DeLillo “instantiates a melancholy form of political ecology,” in which 
alienation from materiality—the social and ecological effects of “cyberfinance”—returns 
as the consciousness of the main character’s murderer, Benno Levin. She draws on Kate 
Sandilands’ concept of environmental melancholia as an inability to properly mourn for 
what has been lost; it operates as a “socially located embodied memory.”
30
 Like 
Sandilands, Merola understands the relation of melancholy to materiality as a relation to 
loss; however, as Levin’s character suggests (and as I argue in chapter four), the inability 
to mourn qua melancholia may also be symptomatic of the continuing presence of 
materiality. Indeed, Levin’s derangement suggests a presence of materiality in a world so 
suffocatingly interrelated that Packer is guilty—no matter what he does—on the basis of 
social location alone: 
Even if there’s a fungus living between my toes that speaks to me. Even if a 
fungus told me to kill you, even then your death is justified because of where you 
stand on the earth. Even a parasite living in my brain. Even then…Even then the 
crime is real because you’re a figure whose thoughts and acts affect everybody, 
                                                          
29
Walter Benjamin identified the bio-affective origins of “shock” and argued that 
emerging consumer society instrumentalized the feeling for commercial ends, 
transforming it into endless novelty; see “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Illuminations 
(New York: Schocken, 1968), 163; and “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” 
Reflections (New York: Schocken, 1978), 158. Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There 
No Alternative? (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009).  
30
 Nicole M. Merola, “Cosmopolis: Don DeLillo’s Melancholy Political Ecology,” 
American Literature 84.4 (2012): 827-853, 847; Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands, 
“Melancholy Natures, Queer Ecologies,” Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 331-358. 
12 
 
people, everywhere. I have history, as you call it, on my side. You have to die for 
how you think and act. For your apartment and what you paid for it. For your 
daily medical checkups. This alone. Medical checkups every day. For how much 
you had and how much you lost, equally. No less for losing it than making it. For 





There is undoubtedly something of contemporary, posthumanist, material 
ecocriticism in Levin’s rant, down to the “narrative agency” of toe fungus and brain 
parasites.
32
 A bit of derangement in one’s materialism can be a good thing. Leaving aside 
Levin’s metaphysically questionable sense of justice—he enrolls history to justify his 
crime and to obscure his own material location—the rant is an example of Bruce 
Robbins’ “sweatshop sublime” which animates many turn of the millennium biopolitical 
critiques of globalization.
33
 By aesthetically linking diverse practices, processes, objects, 
and circulations, Benno Levin collapses the gap between representation and materiality, a 
collapsing gap which Packer also recognizes. “There’s a common surface, an affinity 
between market movements and the natural world,” he says from the air conditioned back 
                                                          
31
 DeLillo, 202.  
32
 Serpil Oppermann, “From Ecological Postmodernism to Material Ecocriticism: 
Creative Materiality and Narrative Agency,” in Material Ecocriticism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2014). 
33
 Bruce Robbins, “The Sweatshop Sublime,” PMLA 117.1 (2002): 84-97, argues that this 
sublime offers an aesthetic for linking vast chains of production and consumption in the 
global economy. He cautions that “Kant’s analytic of the sublime… flattens out the 
complexity and difference of Third World society to suit a First World standard of ethical 
rationality,” citing Spivak’s argument that well-intentioned boycotts of the Bangladeshi 
garment industry “blindly protects northern jobs and markets.” For Levin, Bangladeshis 
become an anonymous third party whose abstract suffering is used as a tacit justification 
for murdering Packer who, in Levin’s imagination, is both a symbol and prime mover of 
the system; instead of destroying a social category or economic relationship, he is merely 
killing a man.  
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seat of his limo; “An aesthetics of interaction.”
34
 What Packer speculates as a new 
aesthetic, Levin experiences as a deepening material condition and as a flattening of his 
own agency. As Richard Kerridge argues, DeLillo’s writing often “polarizes the private 
terrain of the self against the vast, untraceable networks of the world,” behind which 
“lurks a sinister totality.”
35
 Cosmopolis stages two competing perspectives as a single 
moment in the present conjuncture of capitalism. The resolution terminates both in (1) a 
failed effort at aesthetic transcendence as ironic detachment—to more adequately 
represent and thus intervene in the world—on the part of the financial manager; and (2) a 
failed effort at attaining the literal consciousness of an overwhelming environmental 
materiality, one that binds or imbricates the disaffected “underground man” of the 
twenty-first century in ever more complex and deepening ways—so deep that nothing 
seems real, and that the only way “out,” or to make a difference, is through a violent 
assertion of the Real in a crime fundamentally incapable of redeeming the systemic 
criminality in which he feels himself enmeshed.
36
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For too long, postmodernism has been understood—by both its endorsers and 
critics—as breaking free from the materiality of the referent, or alternately, from the 
historical moment in which “history” itself is being rewritten. Teresa Ebert argues that 
rather than breaking free, abolishing, or losing the referent, what we find is its 
pluralization: the numbers of referents proliferate beyond the ability of the sign to contain 
it. “In place of a single referent,” Ebert writes, “a network of referents” has replaced the 
“‘Fordist’ relation of adequation between signifier and signified… suitable for early 
industrial capitalism whose main features were Taylorism in management and the 
assembly line in production.”
37
 If postmodernism was a rebellion against the reign of 
aesthetic realism and modernist abstraction, it was a challenge to representation not 
unlike the wildcat strikes of Detroit autoworkers (e.g. League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers) against official representation by UAW or the Turin autoworkers revolting 
against FIAT and “organized labor.”
38
 Informed here by readings of Marx’s Grundrisse, 
reference is understood as a material practice embedded in production.
39
 Social 
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production is recognized outside its usual locations as the Fordist-Taylorist factory gives 
way to the emerging “social factory”—in the home, on the street, and in the kitchens and 
bedroom. As knowledge, communication, and digital labor replace domestic 
manufacturing, undoing traditional separations between workplace and domestic sphere, 
and between waged productivity and creative virtuosity, the sensibilities associated with 
these forms of production assume a new economic and cultural dominance similar to the 




With the emergence of cyber-technologies—which have brought with them new 
management techniques, such as plural organization and team management, 
substituted the post-Taylorist flexible workplace for the old Taylorist 
management, and opened up the labour force to women, African-Americans, 
Latinos, and other marginalized groups—the mode of representation based on the 
adequation of the signifier to signified has become historically irrelevant. One of 
the features of the new cyber-technologies is hypertextuality and pluralization of 
the sign. The sign—which in Fordist industrialism worked to a very large extent 





Novels like DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003) and more recently, Teddy Wayne’s 
Kapitoil (2010) and Nathaniel Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow (2013), register the 
financial hegemony of New York City, bringing into relief the crises of material 
relations, referentiality, and speculation, that Guattari outlined in 1989.
42
 Pace Merchant, 
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however, Guattari does not posit a new image of nature that performs the same totalizing 
function of the old one; for Guattari, it only makes sense to speak of multiple ecologies, 
or at least three: environmental ecology, social ecology, and mental ecology. Rather than 
positing Ecology as a master signifier capable of reconciling all subordinate discourses 
(capable of realizing “good” fantasies while simultaneously eradicating “all of the 
fantasies leading to the objectification of women, immigrants, the insane, etc.”), he 
proceeds in a pragmatist, anti-representational manner, re-affirming Gregory Bateson’s 
premise that “there is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds.”
43
 In 
the context of “Integrated World Capitalism,” he argues, one must have the conceptual 
tools to recognize that the semiotic chains that enable economic dispossession bear a 
transversal relation to environmental ecologies. When the post-Fordist restructuring of 
social relations deliberately employs biological metaphors and ecological imaginaries it 
not only obscures material relations beneath a romantic aura, but actively mutates our 
conception of nature in that it begins to resemble the emergent regime of production. 
“The more relentlessly socialization commands all moments of human and interhuman 
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immediacy,” writes Adorno, “the smaller the capacity of men to recall that this web has 
evolved, and the more irresistible its natural appearance.”
44
  
Catherine Malabou identifies a post-Fordist transformation in the domain of 
cognitive neuroscience. The bureaucratic image of the brain has been replaced with a 
neuronal image of the brain, and consequently, a new image of the individual as a highly 
malleable node in a flexible network. In What Should We Do with Our Brain? Malabou 
situates the shift in descriptions of the brain within the context of post-Fordist 
organization. Drawing on Boltanski and Chiapello, she observes that “neoliberal ideology 
today itself rests on a redistribution of centers and a major relaxation of hierarchies.” In a 
period in which “the hierarchical principle is demolished” and organizations are 
restructured to maximize connections, reactivity, and singular projects, Malabou asks: 
“How could we not interrogate the parallelism between the transformation of the spirit of 
capitalism (between the sixties and the nineties) and the modification, brought about in 
approximately the same period, of our view of cerebral structures?”
45
 The brain as central 
planner is replaced by the brain as network of distributed, agential neurons, a description 
that resembles the dominant organizational imaginary of enterprising firms. “This is how 
the forms of capitalist production accede to representation in each epoch,” write 
Boltanski and Chiapello, “by mobilizing concepts and tools that were initially developed 
largely autonomously in the theoretical sphere or in the domain of basic scientific 
research. This is the case with neurology and computer science today,” they continue. “In 
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the past, it was true of such notions as system, structure, technostructure, energy, entropy, 
evolution, dynamics, and exponential growth.”
46
 This “naturalization effect” is 
accomplished through metaphors that align biological and social conceptions of the self 
with the current institutional arrangements.  
In effect, the dominant metaphors of neuroscience speak the language of 
flexibility, the forced “freedom” that Richard Sennett identifies in The Corrosion of 
Character and The Culture of the New Capitalism as the ethos of atomized individuals 
struggling to find affirmation in a period when the “discontinuous reinvention of 
institutions” leaves them without firm footings, life projects, or skilled employment.
47
 
Malabou rescues the concept of plasticity from its drift into a tacit justification of 
limitless flexibility, arguing à la Marx that we make our brains but not in the conditions 
of our own choosing; the goal should be to change the conditions of neurological 
becoming. “Plasticity, in effect, is not flexibility,” writes Marc Jeannerod, founder of the 
Institute for Cognitive Science in Lyon; “let us not forget that plasticity is a mechanism 
for adapting, while flexibility is a mechanism for submitting.”
48
 These “necessary but 
flawed metaphors,” in Joseph Tabbi’s estimation, not only bind us to particular research 
programs, they mark us as belonging to a historical moment and specific conjuncture of 
interests and imaginations. “The mind is a mirror; a projector; a computer; an economy; it 
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is a self-creating ecology, a wheat field blown by a correspondent breeze,” writes Tabbi: 
“Malabou […] knows that we are the ones who possess the minds that make metaphors.”  
The environmental historian Donald Worster traces a parallel development in the 
field of ecology. “Every generation,” Worster argues, “writes its own description of the 
natural order, which generally reveals as much about human society and its changing 
concerns as it does about nature.”
49
 Arthur Tansley’s field-defining concept of the 
ecosystem, for instance, was influenced by Freud’s theory of libidinal energies and the 
model of the electric circuit.
50
 In his 1935 article, “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational 
Concepts and Terms,” the British biologist posed the concept of the ecosystem to 
challenge the prevailing ecological descriptions such as “quasi-organisms” that emerge 
through succession into “climaxes;” he challenged the rhetoric of a “biotic community” 
that contains both plants and animals; and above all, he challenged Jan Smuts’ “holism,” 
which had projected a hierarchical colonial order into organization of the cosmos.
51
 Yet, 
Worster maintains that “Tansley’s ecosystem, unlike the Romantic style of ecology, 
dovetailed nicely with the agronomic and industrial view of nature as a storehouse of 
exploitable material resources.”
52
 Where the Romantic view combined organicism and 
Platonic ideals with the rural, “Arkadian,” ethos of home economy, the ecosystem 
emerged to rationalize descriptions of species interaction according to the logics of 
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modern industrial management. In both views, nature qua ecology is described as a 
homeostatic arrangement in which relatively stable relationships between species obtain 
within climax succession. Not unlike Freud’s subjects or electrical circuits, detours and 
disturbances of energy flows and population (biodiversity) levels would, with proper 
care, eventually return to a balance. This “central planner” vision of nature combined 
enlightenment rationalism (technocratic management) with romantic humanism (ideals of 
community), which was supplemented by writers like Aldo Leopold.
53
 These 
perspectives not only shaped conservation policy in that the balanced image provided a 
territorialized norm to strive for (or maintain), but it also corresponded with the cultural 
narratives of nature with its utopian ideals of harmony, authenticity, and reconciliation. 
These ideals complemented the Taylorist imagination of the managers and the “leisure” 
requirements of workers alike—the latter of whom desired worldly engagement un-
fragmented by the division of labor. Writers like Leopold developed aesthetic and ethical 
theories of conservation to supplement, and arguably eclipse, the bureaucratic work of 
policy in Washington D.C. Worster finds this model of ecosystem coming under attack in 
the nineteen-seventies by what he calls “the ecology of chaos.”
54
  
Rather than looking at wholistic systems, evolutionary biologists rose to 
prominence in the field bearing individualistic and species-reductionist accounts of 
environmental change. This new competitive account, which stressed that apparent 
stability was built on continuous disruption, displaced “mutualism and cooperation” as 
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the basis for understanding ecologies. The new ecologists adopted individualistic 
Darwinian outlooks. Worster quotes one who argues that “what look like community 
properties [of ecosystems] are in fact the summed results of all these bits of private 
enterprise.” What they dislike about the old model are its political implications; namely, 
the requirement of collective decision making, and social management of human land and 
resource use. If there was never anything resembling a balance or relative stability, there 
can be no baselines and thus no coherent programs for directing human efforts. “A nature 
characterized by highly individualistic associations, constant disturbance, and incessant 
change may be more ideologically satisfying,” Worster writes, in a time when an 
“entrepreneurial ideology” is on the rise. “We live, they insist, in a non-equilibrium 
world;” he continues: “Populations rise and populations fall, like stock market prices, 
auto sales, and hemlines.”
55
 Historian of science Thomas Söderqvist praises the 
mathematical sophistication of the evolutionary ecologists, who are now armed with 
chaos theory and discourses of complexity, but finds a political motivation in their 
calculation: “They are individualists,” he writes, “abhorring the idea of large-scale 
ecosystem projects. Indeed, the transition from ecosystem ecology to evolutionary 
ecology seems to reflect the generational transition from the politically conscious 
generation of the 1960s to the ‘yuppie’ generation of the 1980s.”
56
  
This articulation of free market (or “wise use”) politics with the emerging chaos-
oriented constructions of ecology produces a new idea of nature in line with the 
deregulatory fantasies of the professional-managerial class. As in Malabou’s example of 
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neuroscience, peripheral and relatively autonomous fields are capable of generating new 
descriptions, new metaphors, which become articulated to the dominant imaginaries of 
technocultural capitalism. A nature romanticism founded on stability and harmony is 
traded for a nature romanticism founded on chaos. As Heidi Scott observes, “landscapes 
are [now] thought to be composed predominantly of species mosaics wrought by chaos 
and chance rather than communities united by synergy and mutualism.”
57
 More than 
being “merely aesthetic,” these imaginaries form the terrain in which political battles 
over science, technology, and economy are waged. The discovery of “chaos,” typified by 
Edward N. Lorenz’s famous 1972 paper, “The Butterfly Effect,” struck at the heart of 
predictability as the basis of social planning and insurance under what remained of the 
welfare state.
58
 And yet the romance of the chaotic contains its own symmetry—it 
somehow always finds its way back into the mathematical order of psychedelic fractals—
which made it appealing to the libertarian-left counterculture of the sixties. While the 
prospect of a “postmodern science” offered a new basis for romantic anti-capitalism, it 
also corresponded to the emerging governmental logic of neoliberalism whose image of 
the world requires continuously active, risk-taking, and entrepreneurializing, individual 
subjects.  
This entrepreneurial image of the world prides itself on disruptive development 
while at the same time believing that free competition will produce balanced or 
harmonious markets. “Constant innovation, constant change, constant adjustment have 
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become the normal experience in this culture,” argues Worster. “We have so far forgotten 
that life can be otherwise that we have come to accept as natural much of the chaos, 
uncertainty, and disintegration we find in our institutions and communities.”
59
 Worster 
voices the perennial complaint in the maelstrom of modernity—figured by Marx, Engels, 
and, of course, the late Marshall Berman—in the phrase, “all that is solid melts into air.” 
As climate change troubles the metaphor of air as something without substance or effect, 
not even our figures of the immaterial are safe. Gilles Deleuze, for instance, describes the 
contemporary capitalist firm as gaseous in its structure, and Anna Reading argues that we 
need to bring rhetoric of the Cloud back down to earth.
60
 When the romantic ethos is 
mobilized in the interests of technocultural capital, we need to reexamine the ways in 
which ideas of nature are being materially and metaphorically transformed in the 
contemporary “changes, tensions, and contradictions” between our mode of production 
and its ecology.  
What is at stake here, is the relation between the scientific discourses of the 
environment and the environmental imagination, as the latter is culturally produced and 
circulated. Dana Phillips finds an affinity between Merchant and Worster in that both 
approach “the truth of ecology” in ways that are “romantic and literary.” Both go looking 
to find, in the natural sciences, metaphysical justifications for their critiques of society. 
“The ‘ecology movement,’ as Merchant conceives of it,” Phillips writes, “is relatively 
uninterested in the things that interest professional ecologists, such as determining the 
                                                          
59
 Worster, 179. 
60
 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October 59 (1992): 3-7; Anna 
Reading and Tanya Notley, “The Materiality of Globital Memory: Bringing the Cloud to 
Earth,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 29.4 (2015): 511-521.  
24 
 
ratio of diversity to stability in correlation with area.”
61
 He is, of course, partly correct. 
But assuming that a description of interactions between field mice and parasites is 
anything like the same thing when someone speaks about an “ecological way of being” 
(to use a cliché phrase) is to miss the whole point. The “ecology movement” is speaking 
about kinds of societies and the kinds of people who would live in those kinds of 
societies. The environmental imagination, in this sense, might be better understood 
alongside what C. Wright Mills called the sociological imagination, except that, to its 
credit, the environmental imagination includes a great deal more nonhumans in “the 
social.”
62
 Phillips’ stated target is the “naïve realism” of nature writers, as well as the 
unhelpful and caricature-driven debates between constructivists and anti-constructivists. 
His post-disciplinary language of Latourian naturecultures, while an advance in some 
ways, elides important differences that other pragmatic approaches would appreciate. 
Namely, that people may be using the vocabulary of ecology for different purposes, and 
that these purposes are part of historical conflicts both within the social over the social, 
and both within nature over nature.  
If we simply read the environment in literature as a set of representations that 
either do or do not correspond to what the natural sciences currently tell us about the 
world, it greatly diminishes what texts can tell us about our historical relations within the 
world. Adorno argues that “metaphysical categories are not merely an ideology 
concealing the social system; at the same time they express its nature, the truth about it, 
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and in their changes are precipitated those in its most central experiences.”
63
 It is central 
to how people make sense of their experience in the world. Narratives contain ideas of 
nature that bear what Guattari calls a transversal relation to how individuals understand 
themselves in society, how they imagine that society, and the relation of that society to 
the non-human (though no less historical) environment. Rather than accepting or 
rejecting certain images of nature as true or false based on their correspondence with yet 
other descriptions of the world, we may instead read them as expressing a truth about 
contemporary experience as it is articulated in the present conjuncture.  
In the twentieth century, environmentalism promised to reform societies so as to 
produce sustainable and even beneficial relations between human habitations and the 
more-than-human environment. But Ecology as a movement inherits the mantle of past 
world-historical projects that promised cosmological revolution on top of social 
transformation. One might call this a surplus reconciliation. Its adherence to what Nick 
Srnicek and Alex Williams call a “folk politics,” imagines a grand reconciliation of the 
self with the world by abolishing the complex differentiations and Weberian 
disenchantments of modernity—whether in divisions of labor, technology, knowledge, 
geography, gender, race, or desire.
64
 According to Norman Cohn’s influential study of 
late-medieval millenarian movements, Nature was figured as an egalitarian world in 
harmony with God while church-monarchic hierarchies were an unnatural aberration of 
the fall into history which eternity, brought about by revolution, would disrupt.
65
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Rousseau secularized this radical vision with his concept of natural man and, 
consequently, a romantic past (or colonized other) came to be held as a norm from which 
to critique social inequality without taking into account the incongruity of that norm with 
historical evidence. The young “romantic” Marx secularized this estrangement by 
locating the formation of the subject within in the labor process whereby the worker is 
alienated from both a coherent social experience and from the world of nature, which 
becomes alienated through the same process.
66
 Communism would be a re-integration of 
humanism and naturalism, culminating not in the end of history, but its authentic 
beginning. Western Marxists like Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School informed the 
New Left with this “humanistic” Marx in their analyses of mass culture. However, the 
countercultural longing for immediacy eventually became what Murray Bookchin terms 
“lifestylism,” which, for environmentalism, meant an anti-political retreat into various 
strains of millenarian deep ecology; at the same time, “lifestylism” provided the very 
model of niche production that would enable its recuperation as “green consumption” and 
valorized flexibility under post-Fordism.
67
  
It is a well-documented irony that up until quite recently, otherwise science-
skeptical environmentalists would only accept ecology precisely because it delivers an 
image of the world consistent with the wholistic, soft, integrated, flexible, and free model 
of society that the trans-Atlantic countercultures were struggling to create in the sixties. 
For Hannah Arendt, “an ideology differs from a simple opinion in that it claims to 
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possess either the key to history, or the solution for all the ‘riddles of the universe,’ or the 
intimate knowledge of the hidden universal laws which are supposed to rule nature and 
man.”
68
 Ecology as a metaphysics of the social and natural begins to look like other 
twentieth-century political ideologies in that it seems to promise more than it is capable 
of delivering: environmental sustainability is no guarantee of political harmony, nor is 
political harmony a guarantee of personal happiness, nor does personal fulfillment or 
political harmony guarantee sustainability.
69
 As the projections of climate change have 
begun to sink in over the last decade, these aspirations may have been tempered by more 
practical concerns like infrastructure, extraction, and justice for affected communities. To 
adapt a phrase from Stuart Hall, it is an ecology without guarantees.
70
 The millenarianism 
might be taking a back seat to more intensified and generalized political engagement. 
While this is a good thing in my opinion, it raises a question: how are critics to square the 
aspirational narrative visions of movements and literatures—narratives that build 
metaphysical images of the world, even if in grand opposition—with the deflationary 
recognition that such constructions are historically situated and composed of necessarily 
limited vocabularies? 
Richard Rorty addressed this dilemma throughout his life’s work by calling for a 
postmetaphysical culture. In his famous autobiographical essay, “Trotsky and the Wild 
Orchids,” he speaks to this tension between the institutional discourses of public 
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solidarity and the aesthetic vocabularies of private fulfillment. Growing up in the anti-
Stalinist left and democratic socialist milieu of his parent’s generation, Rorty struggled to 
square his political commitments with his private, “snobbish,” interests in the wild 
orchids of the eastern United States. He discovered in himself a troubling Platonist urge 
to, quoting Yeats, “hold reality and justice in a single vision.” By reality, Rorty means the 
“numinous” and ineffable “Wordsworthian” experiences he had in the woods; by justice, 
he means “what Norman Thomas and Trotsky both stood for, the liberation of the weak 
from the strong.”
71
 The problem with this single vision, he argues, is that it is deeply 
metaphysical and asks too much of politics, the natural sciences, and of poets. For this 
kind of Platonist it is not enough to assert one’s beliefs and values; the descriptions of the 
universe must conform to those values if it is to be acknowledged as Truth. In its place, 
Rorty argues for a postmetaphysical culture in which people no longer seek to “discover,” 
in the descriptions of the natural world, external confirmation of our tastes, values, and 
beliefs, about ourselves and society, but rather understand these descriptions—and, more 
importantly, their uses—as “made.”  
A poeticized, or postmetaphysical, culture is one in which the imperative that is 
common to religion and metaphysics—to find an ahistorical, transcultural matrix 
for one’s thinking, something into which everything can fit, independent of one’s 
time and place—has dried up and blown away. It would be a culture in which 
people thought of human beings as creating their own life-world, rather than 
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The decline of what Rorty calls “redemptive truth,” that is, “a set of beliefs which 
would end, once and for all, the process of reflection on what to do with ourselves,” must 
be accompanied by the rise of a “literary culture,” consisting in “non-cognitive relations 
with other human beings, relations mediated by human artifacts such as books and 
buildings, paintings and songs” which “provide glimpses of alternative ways of being 
human.”
73
 To call the descriptions of the natural sciences “reality” and demand that our 
literary and cultural production conform to that image, is merely to substitute one set of 
historical conventions for another. Nelson Goodman considers it a “delusive goal.” “We 
have seen that even the most realistic way of picturing amounts merely to one kind of 
conventionalization,” Goodman writes. On top of this, “the idea of making verbal 
descriptions approximate pictorial depiction loses its point when we understand that to 
turn a description into the most faithful possible picture would amount to nothing more 
than exchanging some conventions for others.”
74
 Which domain of the sciences would we 
turn to, for instance, in order to prove or disprove Walt Whitman’s democratic vision in 
Leaves of Grass? The effort would appear ridiculous. Rorty’s deflation of redemptive 
truth gives greater importance to the role of literature and the “strong poet” in democratic 
societies, while freeing the sciences to do their work without having to supply society 
with ultimate visions of reality. 
Yet many misunderstand Rorty’s neopragmatism as calling for the kind of free-
floating, disconnected, and solipsistic refusals of “reality” that accompanies other 
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caricatures of postmodernism. The reality that is referred to in all of these caricatures is 
the one described by the natural sciences through mathematics, which is of course, the 
current and most-agreed-upon, intersubjective and institutional, consensus about which 
descriptions are most useful for application and further research. Following John 
Dewey’s “weak naturalism,” Rorty writes that “the activity of uttering sentences is one of 
the things people do in order to cope with their environment,”
75
 and that our vocabularies 
“have no more of a representational relation to an intrinsic nature of things than does the 
anteater's snout or the bowerbird's skill at weaving.”
76
 This approach does not separate 
humans from the world but rather foregrounds the multi-sensory embeddedness of our 
lives in the material spaces, encounters, institutions, and affects that cultural geographers 
have termed the “non-representational.”
77
 Rorty adopts the network metaphor of 
contemporary ecology to illustrate the pragmatist point that representations are acts 
within the world they negotiate: “We need to stop thinking of words as representations 
and to start thinking of them as nodes in the causal network which binds the organism 
together with its environment.”
78
 If this sounds similar to Teresa Ebert’s Marxian account 
of the “pluralization” of the sign under post-Fordism, this is because economic 
globalization and the technoculture have foregrounded the particularity of locations and 
contexts from which people share accounts and contest descriptions of the world. A 
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Deweyan pragmatist would not have been surprised by this development, whereas a 
disappointed modernist would get the apocalyptic high of despair at the loss of the 
absolute and the loss of community recognition that accompanies it.
79
 Lawrence 
Grossberg distinguishes an engaged, and pragmatic, cultural studies from the diminished 
world and accompanying affects of much postmodern theory.  
The failure of postmodern theory is not that it has no notion of macrostructures 
but rather that it has no way of theorizing the relations between different levels of 
abstraction, between the microphysics of power and biopolitics (Foucault) or 
between the child in the bubble and the simulacrum (Baudrillard). Similarly, the 
failure of postmodern theory is not that it denies a reality behind the surfaces of 
everyday life but rather that it always forgets that there are many surfaces of 
everyday life and that reality is produced within the relations amongst these 





Rather than cultivating a detached skepticism about all frames of reference, a 
distrust of surfaces, or an equally totalizing anti-totality, cultural studies pragmatically 
uses theory to make “mattering maps,” understanding that “not all surfaces are articulated 
or present or even effective in the same ways.”
81
 As Rorty is fond of saying, no one is a 
relativist in practice. Our attachments are necessary conditions for asserting preferences 
and building critique, which performs the “negative” gesture of unmasking the 
asymmetrical power-relations in a given arrangement by exposing a text’s complicity 
within that arrangement. One must first make the map to do the work of critique. Critics 
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of critique like Rita Felski argue that critique can be as much about the critic performing 
a detached knowingness in an effort not to appear naïve. In this regard, Felski is 
prefigured in literature by David Foster Wallace’s critique of irony and its acidic effect 
on culture: cynicism is now preferable to naïve belief.
82
 Yet if we understand irony as 
simply the exploitation of a gap between meanings and critique as really just an 
exploration of limits and possibilities, there is no need to stop. This debate is primarily 
about the historical context of interpretive and humanistic practices. Bruno Latour, for 
instance, has been the major figure to eschew critique in favor of “assembling” networks. 
He astutely observes that in recent decades the “hermeneutics of suspicion” has blended 
into to a popular paranoid imagination that distrusts all authoritative claims to 
knowledge. This is especially troubling in the case of climate change. In “Why has 
Critique Run out of Steam?,” Latour singles out his own field of science studies as 
contributing to this development. He concurs with Boltanski and Chiapello that “the new 
spirit of capitalism has put to good use the artistic critique that was supposed to destroy 
it,” and pushes their argument further:  
If the dense and moralist cigar smoking reactionary bourgeois can transform him- 
or herself into a free-floating agnostic bohemian, moving opinions, capital, and 
networks from one end of the planet to the other without attachment, why would 
he or she not be able to absorb the most sophisticated tools of deconstruction, 




An excellent question, albeit a bit late. For quite some time, Marxists have argued 
that what is called postmodernism in aesthetics was the dominant cultural mode of post-
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Fordist capitalism, while critics like Peter Sloterdijk, Slavoj Zizek, and Paolo Virno, have 
analyzed the recuperation of cynical distance and the mobilization of affirmation alike.
84
 
Curiously, Latour situates “capital” alongside opinions and networks as that which can be 
moved “without attachment.” Perhaps he is engaging in hyperbole, but it is familiar hand-
waving motions like these which obscure the fact that capital is an attachment—a 
relation—not merely an object, and that one’s ability to move it is constrained by a 
variety of other institutional (shall we say) entanglements. Giving up critique does not 
free us from the conditions of intellectual (and other) labors, whether assembling or 
disassembling. We might add Latour’s own actor network theory (ANT) to the list of 
ideas and methodologies seemingly ready-made to aestheticize whatever regime of digital 
maker-culture emerges next. At the level of theory, the image of the world it produces is 
not unlike that of logistics, which sees workers, computers, materials, infrastructure, 
consumers, weather, money, and the models that represent the relation between these 
things, as equally-existing objects on a single managerial plane. However, as Ash Amin 
and Nigel Thrift argue, approaches like ANT have the benefit of expanding the 
conception of the political so that “politics is no longer limited to humans and 
incorporates the many issues to which they are attached,” and that “[passive] objects 
become [political] things… when matters of fact give way to their complicated 
entanglements and become matters of concern.”
85
 This ontological expansion of the 
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political is a necessary move for environmental critics in the pragmatist effort of “making 




Latour’s question asks us to situate the humanities’ “most sophisticated tools” 
within the contemporary moment of instrumentalized suspicion and industries of doubt. 
However, should we not do what Latour himself suggests and turn our anthropological 
lenses toward the hybrid-ontological vocabularies of these new sociologists? In Cultural 
Studies in the Future Tense, Grossberg argues that ANT “treats everything as a network 
while denying contexts.” “While ANT might be taken as a kind of hyperempiricist and 
generally depoliticized formation of cultural studies,” he writes, “I see it as an 
investigation of a set of assemblages, which has yet to locate itself conjuncturally.”
87
 In 
the same way that Latour locates the languages of “critique” within a particular historical 
context, Grossberg argues that “affirmationist” approaches like actor network theory 
must work to situate themselves within the conjuncture, both in their objects of analysis 
and their ontological description of the world. This concept of the conjuncture, in the 
Gramscian tradition of cultural studies, is not a dubious attempt to “go meta,” as Timothy 
Morton argues, but rather an effort to immanently locate particular discourses within 
institutions, and within contemporary geo-historical and cultural configurations of global 
capitalism. In one sense, the difference between historians and ontologists is an old one. 
Back in 1932, Adorno argued that ontologists (i.e. Heidegger) are always trying to escape 
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the historicity of their claims by appealing to first philosophy; one can approach history 
by way of ontology or approach ontology by way of history. To foreground both the 
historicity of natural world and the historicity of the ideas of nature in the human 
(historical) imagination, Adorno introduced the “idea of natural-history.”
88
 This 
dialectical formulation emphasizes becoming (of both terms) rather than the spatial 
“boundary-blurring” of ontologically-specific domains in the Latourian “natureculture.” 
“The ontological need,” Adorno writes, “can no more guarantee its object than the agony 
of the starving assures them of food.”
89
 
As Michael Zimmerman and others have illustrated, Heidegger’s own critique of 
“productionist metaphysics” sought to carve out a spiritually nationalist space between 
American Fordism and Soviet Communism.
90
 This helps us to locate it within the 
interwar conjuncture of Weimar conservatism and other critiques of modernism. 
Returning to our original example, Merchant seeks to update storehouse nature—with its 
bureaucratic rationalization of the environment, and spatial divisions of nature and 
culture, each mediated as much by mass-consumption as much as by concerns over 
representation and authenticity—by replacing it with network nature—in which the 
previous spatial division is collapsed into “natureculture,” as new techno-economies 
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intervene in the world at unprecedented scales, and as historical questions of description 
melt into a material-discursive ontology. This locates her within the conjuncture of 
American post-Fordism. Merchant first diagnoses this conflation of form and value 
(machine universe: bad), but then later endorses it (network universe: good). The great 
critical gesture of unmasking turns out to be the unveiling of the next big product. For 
Merchant, and many others, Nature is understood as a form that embodies the particular 
historical values and practices of a society, and conversely, values that critics believe 
societies should have. The message, unfortunately, always arrives late. 
“Material ecocriticism,” argues Hannes Bergthaller, “is not about the replacement 
of a false ontology with a true one. Rather, it offers a redescription of the world from a 
new observer position.”
91
 If we rejected every idea or representation of nature that is 
found to be somehow complicit in capitalism (or anything else we don’t like), we would 
be left with nothing. Or rather, we would be left with a theoretical “view from nowhere.” 
As Cornel West puts it: “We cannot isolate ‘the world’ from theories of the world, then 
compare these theories of the world with a theory-free world. We cannot compare 
theories with anything that is not a product of another theory. So any talk about the ‘the 
world’ is relative to the alternative theories available.”
92
 Merchant’s project was precisely 
to understand how ideas of nature are produced and transformed within the historical 
tensions and dynamics of socio-ecological reproduction—in this, it demands repetition—
however, her “true” nature was emerging alongside the image of the new economy. 
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Rather than posing a new, seemingly trans-contextual, aesthetic norm of nature (or 
vocabulary) that artists, critics, and activists are supposed to mimic, one would instead 
immanently contextualize ideas of nature, regarding them as ways of imagining and 
producing the environment through literary and cultural narratives. It would require us to 
examine ideas of nature “in the making” as constitutive of post-Fordist and neoliberal 
societies, and constitutive of what might supersede them. Ideas of nature cannot be 
thought of as being in simple structural opposition to the society they critique, nor are 
they completely determined by them as in a Foucaultian “discursive regime;” rather, 
these ideas of nature are articulated in specific material contexts and circulate within the 
world they claim to represent. They are, like Beethoven’s pastoral, images of historical 
interpretations of the world.  
 
Methodology: A Cultural Studies Approach to Environmental Humanities 
 
In his 1998 introduction to Writing the Environment, Richard Kerridge describes 
the “new environmentalist cultural criticism” as a move beyond science and geography 
into the humanities. “The ecocritic,” Kerridge writes, “wants to track environmental ideas 
and representations wherever they appear, to see more clearly a debate which seems to be 
taking place, often part-concealed, in a great many cultural spaces.” “Ecocriticism,” he 
continues, “seeks to evaluate texts and ideas in terms of their coherence and usefulness as 
responses to environmental crisis.”
93
 Kerridge’s description locates the ecocritic in the 
middle of things. Ecocriticism does not provide the critic a methodology by which she 
might stand outside society and be in touch with the ultimate nature of reality (or ultimate 
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reality of nature); neither can ecocriticism fully endorse grand theories which seek to 
displace humans as the producers of their own discourses in the name of anti-
anthropocentrism. The critic remembers Edward Said’s notion of “traveling theory;” 
interpretations of particular works and situations are divorced from their original context 
to become “theory,” and then become institutionalized, shape practices, and for various 
reasons are later rejected or given up, often in the name of the very concepts and 
practices they made possible in the first place. The first task of the critic, it would seem, 
is to recognize that at any historical moment, what appears as the dominant and emergent 
ideas have developed in relation to one another; each represent human efforts to 
understand and change a particular context. Some, like residual ideas, persist even after, 
or perhaps on account of, their failure. In this section, I describe the cultural studies 
concepts of articulation and conjuncture that I take up and which shape my ecocritical 
approach to the project. 
Articulation is a theory of linking relations across contexts that allows one to both 
“track environmental ideas and representations,” and to “evaluate texts and ideas in terms 
of their coherence and usefulness as responses to environmental crisis.” A text is coherent 
only in relation to something else (usually another text), and one can only speak of 
usefulness in relation to a context or situation. In other words, how a particular dimension 
or context of the environmental crisis is understood will determine whether or not a text 
is coherent or useful as a response. This means that the “work” a novel does—whether 
aesthetic, ideological, entertaining, informing, or serving as the basis for non-literary 
activity—may differ from context to context, from one decade (or period) to the next. 
“Articulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to 
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that reality, this experience to those politics,” writes Lawrence Grossberg. “And these 
links,” he continues, “are themselves articulated into larger structures.”
94
 Jennifer Daryl 
Slack considers articulation to be “one of the most generative concepts” of cultural 
studies, in that it breaks with the various structuralist determinisms without rejecting a 
consciousness of historical constraints in which people make history.
95
 As a way of 
relating culture to politics that understands both as mutually determined, articulation is 
the process of recognizing the unevenness of this determination and the specificity of the 
connections. As such, it is “the production of identity on top of difference, of unities out 
of fragments, of structures across practices;”
96
 even “links between concepts”
97
 can take 
historical significance.  
For examples of articulation at work in this dissertation, we can turn to chapters 
three and four. In “Life Finds a Way,” I take up the political and environmental uses of 
complexity and chaos theory to compare how a similar idea of nature can be articulated 
to very different politics in an era of deregulation. In the case of Michael Crichton, chaos 
and vitalism serve to substantiate arguments against public regulation and control of 
industry; for Octavia Butler, her affirmation of life in the face of chaos is a pragmatic 
response to a condition of economic precarity and racism in a not too distant future. In 
chapter two, my reading of John Updike’s Rabbit is Rich details the subtle shift in the 
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discourse of the novel toward a speculative relation to the future. It is a subjective shift, 
generated by small-scale economic transactions and discussions of the energy crisis, 
which will become an objective component of the emergent neoliberal economy under 
Reagan and the rampant speculation that led to the financial crisis of 2008. Thinking 
these developments through the concept of articulation allows one to see, as Stuart Hall 
puts it, “how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together 
within a discourse and… how they do or do not become articulated, at specific 
conjunctures, to certain political subjects.”
98
 As my account of environmental culture and 
Fordism in this introduction illustrates, these articulations are neither random nor wholly 
determined.  
Stuart Hall adapted the concept of the conjuncture from Antonio Gramsci and 
turned it into a practice that informed work at the Center for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (or “Birmingham School”). For Gramsci, the conjuncture refers to the political 
complex of forces, institutions, and imaginaries (education), which make up the national-
popular at a given historical moment. For Hall, conjuncture contains all of Gramsci’s 
definition, but is slightly abstracted so as to become a broader practice of humanistic and 
social scientific inquiry: conjuncture is how various contexts (and contextualizations) are 
related and is also the act of relating.  As Grossberg explains, there are various ways that 
humanities and social science researchers approach the study of contexts: there is Marxist 
historicism, Foucaultian “discursive apparatuses,” and the “situated knowledges” of 
pragmatism and feminism, to name the most influential. While each of these efforts to 
frame and explain contexts is useful, none can provide a full or total account on their 
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own. One needs a way of accounting for why particular contextual inquiries are taken up 
at different times by different people or groups, and their effects; in other words, the 
conjuncture is an account of how the context shapes the inquiry (and how the inquiry is 
itself articulated politically). Hall’s conjuncture describes “the complex historically 
specific terrain of a crisis which affects—but in uneven ways—a specific national-social 
formation as a whole.”
99
 
A recent example of this is Zamora and Behrent’s, Foucault and Neoliberalism, a 
collection which argues that Foucault’s selective reference of neoliberal philosophers, his 
amorphous concept of power, and more importantly, his own turn toward the self as a 
project, has provided a left-wing supplement to neoliberalism in the Anglo-American 
academy and in the radical portions of the left which have effectively given up on making 
claims on the state.
100
 The Birmingham School’s inquiries into subcultures, for instance, 
were never simply celebrations of “resistance,” they were always concerned with how 
unequal economic relations might be reproduced through what we might now call 
“Foucaultian” practices of symbolic (or “cultural”) contestation, even by the working 
poor.
101
 In a similar way, ecocritics might wish to interrogate how culture- and class-
specific ways of “being ecological” reproduce inequality and evade questions of national 
or state politics by shifting the focus to the cultivation of one’s being rather than towards 
the economic conditions and concentrations of private power that constrain technological 
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development and environmental policy.
102
 “Cultural studies,” Grossberg writes, “starts by 
recognizing that the context is always already structured, not only by relations of force 
and power, but also by voices of political anger, despair, and hope.”
103
 These voices are 
what lend social reality its active and open quality, and cultural studies can be understood 
as a form of desiring-production which intervenes in the ongoing construction of that 
reality. For Hall and the Birmingham School, their conjuncture was (and arguably still is) 
the neoliberal modernization of Margaret Thatcher, in which organized industrial labor 
was broken up, state institutions privatized, and “society” replaced by “individuals.” 
For examples of conjunctural reading in this dissertation, we can turn to chapters 
two and five. Chapter one argues that Mary McCarthy’s Birds of America addresses the 
impasses of left-cultural criticism at the limits of Fordist organization of nature and 
culture. The distinctions and consumer practices of mass and high-culture are modeled on 
“wilderness reserve” pattern of scarcity and private experience. McCarthy’s declaration 
of the death of Nature, for instance, at the moment when the US environmental 
movement achieved national visibility was, for her, not only the death of a certain 
conception and historical experience of the natural world, but also of a certain conception 
and historical experience of culture, which was being called into question by the Paris 
events of 1968. Chapter five argues that William T. Vollmann’s re-writing of North 
American history in The Ice-Shirt (part one of the Seven Dreams series) and Imperial, are 
a response to the economic consolidation of the continent under NAFTA. Vollmann links 
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contemporary financial and state practices (e.g. racialization, militarization, and 
rationalized precarity of agricultural labor) as the present configuration of a much longer 
history of conflict over land, resources, and bodies, by empires whose aspirations were 
written in the desires of charismatic and unknown individuals alike. Vollmann’s 
metafictional historiography foregrounds the act of narrative and memory-making, 
which, I claim, contributes to Nancy Fraser’s three-fold conception of justice in the new 
era of transnational capitalism. 
 My conjuncture is the United States since 1971, and the way that writers have 
taken up images of nature and the environment to naturalize, challenge, defamiliarize, or 
affirm, capitalist modernization during a period when the disastrous environmental 
effects of this development have become a permanent feature on the horizon of 
modernity. Each chapter addresses an environmental discourse that is potentially a site 
(or vector) of recuperation—the death of nature, energy crisis, chaos/deregulation, and 
geography as destiny—and corresponds to a particular decade. My choice of texts are 
driven by the need to “meet people where they are,” and they are lots of places. 
McCarthy’s late fiction spoke to both national audiences and literary-political circles; 
Updike’s depiction of energy anxieties captured a sense of national feeling and received 
the National Book Award; Crichton’s Jurassic Park has become one of the most iconic 
science-fiction film franchises, while Butler’s Parable novels assert the stakes of 
African-American imaginaries in the present and future; finally, Vollmann’s status as 
high-literature is complemented by his field-work and journalistic efforts to chronicle 
inequality (economic, gender, sexual, racial, and national) around the world. His 
embedded practices—which I neither have room to list nor explicate—attempt to 
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incorporate ethico-political practices of lived engagement into the literary form of some 
of his most dense “complicated” works, modeling, in effect, what it means to construct 
“knowable worlds.” Literature, and novels in particular, construct worlds in which we 
simultaneously recognize and are distanced from our own. By linking images of society 
and nonhuman nature through the consciousnesses of individuals, novels allow us to 
decide which conventions should be changed and which are worth preserving. 
Chapter two, “The Common World and the Shadow of Nature: Mary McCarthy’s 
Birds of America,” discusses McCarthy’s self-described “perverse” environmental 
politics in the context of her opposition to the war in Vietnam and her experience in the 
1968 Paris uprisings. Through this bildungsroman and novel of ideas, McCarthy explores 
the limits of the wilderness ethos, and the end of a metaphysical politics for which nature 
functions as a universally recognizable domain in which the good, the true, and the 
beautiful are reconciled. Similarly, the novel explores the limits and uses of culture 
through a critique of the public museum. Central to my argument is Hannah Arendt’s 
concept of a common world, which I draw from a careful reading of her recently 
published letters with McCarthy. What the main character experiences as a 
disenchantment of both nature and culture is the recognition that the Fordist model of 
mass consumption is exhausted and that the Arendtian common world has yet to be built. 
As a member of the New York Intellectuals, a group of influential critics who are not 
known for having an interest in environments outside the urban experience of Jewish 
immigrants, McCarthy’s late fiction dramatically reframes the relevance of their 
arguments for contemporary readers. 
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Chapter three, “Energy Futures: John Updike’s Financial Petrofiction,” discusses 
Updike’s award-winning portrayal of the 1979 energy crisis in Rabbit is Rich (1981). 
Updike’s iconic character, Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom, rides out and tenuously benefits 
from the crisis as the recent inheritor of a Toyota dealership. Experiencing the oil crisis, 
along with President Carter, as a crisis of national futurity, the aging Rabbit turns to 
speculation in currency and in the housing market. This turn towards speculation, I argue, 
anticipates the rise of Reagan-era neoliberalism and the emergence of set of arrangements 
that culminated in the financial meltdown and subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. 
Through a close reading of the characters’ sales (and interpersonal) strategies, I examine 
how the dialogue creates what economist Christian Marazzi calls “structural information 
deficits” which produce a speculative relation to the future for the subject, a relation that 
is mobilized through institutional insecurity. Updike’s realism depicts a set of emotional 
responses generated by the energy crisis, which become normalized under neoliberalism, 
and work to prevent the imagination of long-term solutions to the energy and 
environmental problems of petromodernity. 
Chapter four, “Life Finds a Way: Science Fiction’s Deregulatory Fantasies,” takes 
up Michael Crichton’s Jurassic Park and Octavia Butler’s Parable novels to examine 
how the environment imagined as cosmos works to naturalize theories about society. This 
chapter explores the ambivalence of the discourses of chaos and complexity. For Jurassic 
Park, chaos and complexity serve Crichton’s “double narrative.” The novel’s external 
narrative depicts the catastrophe as the consequence of a lack of public regulation and the 
evasion of international law by corporations; simultaneously, the narrative within the 
park celebrates chaos as it explodes the limits of “control” and regulation. In Butler’s 
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world, the social provisions of the U.S. government are all but non-existent, and the 
young narrator composes a new spirituality based on universal instability as she travels 
and rebuilds community life in a privatized, near-apocalyptic society. For the 
marginalized and “disposable” populations of the novel, the affirmation of precarity is a 
pragmatic means for transforming social conditions. This chapter illustrates the way that 
similar ideas of nature can be articulated to a different set of uses and political 
commitments.  
Chapter five, “Reterritorializing North America: William T. Vollmann’s 
Environmental Memory,” turns to historiographic metafiction to argue that contemporary 
environmental writers are pushing the genre past its postmodern “origins.” Through 
Vollmann’s novels The Ice-Shirt (1992) and Imperial (2009), I argue that his writing 
reconstructs what ecocritic Lawrence Buell calls “environmental memory” for North 
America during a new age of transnational capital. I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the territory and the work of political philosopher, Nancy Fraser, to examine 
how Vollmann’s metafiction exposes the “frames of justice” underlying transnational 
disputes over recognition and redistribution. By foregrounding memory as an act of 
production, this chapter argues for the importance of literature and culture to 
contemporary struggles for environmental justice at the national and international scale.  
 
Fordism, Nature, and its Discontents 
Terry Eagleton argues that even when literature deals with the most minute and 
empirical-particular details of life, it nevertheless addresses itself to the universal. He 
writes that for Marx, “universals are actually part of the furniture of the world, not simply 
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convenient ways of viewing it.”
104
 Without a universal abstraction like “labor,” for 
instance, capitalism would not be able to function. Similarly, humans are individuals “by 
virtue of their participation in ‘species-being,’” Eagleton writes, “the process of 
individuation is itself a power or capacity of this common nature.” Even when the novel 
engages in “ideological” depictions of the world, through its form it can still enable 
readers to unpack and call into question the relation between individual experience and 
the universal categories that make up social life. To paraphrase Rorty, it exposes us to 
different experiences and ways of being human, which is all we have. Paul Goodman 
argues that “Man [sic] is the animal [sic?] who makes himself and one who is made by 
his culture.” This making is the object of the humanities: “Literature repeats the meaning 
and revives the spirit of past makings,” Goodman writes, “by using them again in a 
making that is occurring now.”
105
 It is not just particular content that matters—what 
image of Nature, the Human, and Society is being offered—but the form, which links it 
to historical organizations of production and enables a range of possible interpretations. 
The circulation (e.g. production, consumption, distribution, and exchange) of novels 
takes place alongside other forms of social production which simultaneously produce 
ideas of Nature as part of the furniture of our world. This is why, I argue, one cannot 
study changing concepts and narrative figurations of the environment without relating it 
to production (in general), hence the title Nature Industries. 
In the opening pages of the Grundrisse, Marx criticizes cultural narratives that 
situate (or begin with) an individual in nature without historical reference to socially-
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mediated production. He compares them to Daniel Defoe’s fictional Robinson Crusoe, 
calling them “eighteenth-century Robinsonades.”
106
 One of the troubles with Defoe’s 
narrative is that it offers a fantasy of man in nature that relies on ahistorical abstractions 
of both categories. The culturally-specific knowledge and attitudes that Crusoe carries 
with him, the conditions that brought him to the island, and the colonial relations with 
Friday, are all bracketed to become a “just so” story of the origins and development of 
production as entrepreneurial individualism. The naturalism of the scene—an island 
wilderness—serves to naturalize the actions, events, and the main character. Defoe’s 
“naturally independent, autonomous subjects” formed the later basis of Rousseau’s 
concept of the social contract, and subsequent economic theories of Smith and Ricardo.  
Against this view of production in the “absence” of society, Marx argues that 
production is written into our bodies: “no production [is] possible without an instrument 
of production, even if this instrument is only the hand.” The hand of an eighteenth-
century sea merchant is different from the hand of a hunter-gatherer, an assembly-line 
worker, or a post-industrial organic gardener in the rust-belt; they each produce their food 
in historically-specific ways that entail a different relation to the self and the body. 
“Hunger is hunger,” Marx writes, engaging the fantasies of natural man; “but the hunger 
gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which 
bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. Production thus produces not 
only the object but also the manner of consumption.”
107
 Marx illustrates production 
through acts of consumption and, more importantly, foregrounds the historical subject 
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that is produced between these two moments. Without situating the historical subject 
within a historical arrangement of material production, one will endlessly re-enact the 
“Robinsonade” confrontation of nature and culture (e.g. natureculture), reinforcing the 
originary abstractions of Defoe and naturalizing the historical subject which relates the 
two (equally historical) categories. Marx’s criticism of Defoe illustrates not only that 
literature reflects the ideas of the times, but actively produces the universalities which 
become the furniture of our existence. Literary narratives are capable of becoming the 
basis for other forms of non-literary discourse as they mobilize social imaginaries of 
nature and the environment within the activity of production.  
Antonio Gramsci was interested precisely in what kinds of subjects are produced 
within the modern regimes of production. In his writings on “Fordism and Americanism,” 
he described the alienated relation to experience in the modern factory. For Gramsci, this 
involved the industrial repression of “animality” and, indeed, the inspiration for Ford’s 
assembly lines came from the disassembled animal bodies in the Chicago stock yards.
108
 
To separate the abstract labor from the particular laborer, the Taylorist assembly line 
disarticulated the movements of body parts from their bodies and mental life from action. 
“Industrial factories used the body, forcing it to leave the soul outside of the assembly 
line, so that the worker looked like a soulless body,” writes Franco Berardi. “The 
immaterial factory [of post-Fordism] asks instead to place our very souls at its disposal: 
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intelligence, sensibility, creativity, and language.”
109
 For both manual and mental 
laborers to reproduce themselves, we require not just space and time for leisure 
consumption, but engagements with alterity that allow for a reterritorialization of our 
senses, our bodies, and our desires. This has sometimes generated classed conflicts 
between “active” and “contemplative” uses of the environment in national parks. Nature, 
as a non-privatized environment without permanent human industry, serves as a means 
and space for the reproduction of workers.
110
 It is thus a site of struggle both as an 
environmental commons (species/speciation) and a material opportunity for worker 
autonomy and creation beyond the logics of both production and consumption.   
In Peter Drucker’s account, Fordism was “the organization of men, machines, and 
materials into one productive whole.”
111
 More than simply the idea of mass production, it 
was a wholistic and often nostalgic vision. Henry Ford sought to close the loop between 
production and consumption, raising wages in 1914 to a “utopian” five dollars per hour 
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so that his workers could become consumers of the objects they produced. As Drucker 
observes, Ford invented no product, but rather a form of organization, along with a social 
imaginary. Predicated on the nostalgic image of the American town, Ford’s effort to 
stand athwart modernity ironically became the template of American (and global) 
modernization. This is the era of Heidegger’s Gestell, or the environment gathered 
together into a “standing reserve,” by modern technics. He and his fellow Weimar 
conservatives critiqued Fordist mass production and the promise of mass consumption. 
Heidegger’s philosophy lent itself to the “reactionary modernist” project of National 
Socialism.
112
 For Walter Benjamin, whose early politics fused both left and right-wing 
critiques of modernity, mass production is simultaneously the production of masses; it is 
a temporal cycle which can only be broken by a messianic or apocalyptic eruption of 
reconciled eternity—as a moment of redemption and rest—into history.
113
 Displaced to 
the United States, Horkheimer and Adorno understood cultural production as a space of 
relative autonomy that had followed nature in being subsumed by cycles of accumulation. 
In their critique of Fordist “total administration,” a once emancipatory Enlightenment 
reason reduces the natural world to a mathematical image ready-made for domination by 
the sciences and rendered “universally fungible” by the logic of exchange. Here, Nature 
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enters the entertainment complex; the only authenticity to be found is in high modernist 
gestures that acknowledge this loss as a material negativity which cannot be fully 
reconciled with its concept.
114
 The social order of “men, machines, and materials,” would 
remain internally antagonistic so long as it is organized as domination, predicated on the 
renunciation of the self against a falsely objective world, and demanding sacrifice in 
exchange for survival. 
Nature was indeed becoming organized along the logics of modern management, 
which Hardt and Negri describe as “a synthesis of Taylorism in the organization of labor, 
Fordism in the wage relation, and Keynesianism in the macroeconomic regulation of 
society.”
115
 Under the Fordist-Keynesian regulation model of environmentalism, parks 
and spaces of public nature served, in theory, to conserve large-scale tracts of wilderness, 
and to offer a promise of human individuation. This public nature institutionalizes the 
synthesis of the environment as both resource and metaphysical inspiration. They are 
populist repositories of solitude and leisure where a person can reintegrate their senses 
after having been fragmented by the division of labor in the factory. This was the dream 
of Robert Marshall, scientist and head of the U.S. Forest Service under FDR. As a 
member of the socialist League for Industrial Democracy, Marshall advocated for The 
People’s Forest against capitalist exploitation of the environment, first as a commons and 
second as the public’s right to “pure aesthetic rapture.”
116
 His aesthetic defense of 
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wilderness offered a progressive, as opposed to a reactionary, version of modernism that 
sought to reconcile “a twentieth-century and a primitive world.”
117
  
Nature, in the modernism of the first half of the 20
th
 century, stood in relation to 
industrial society as negativity—as the un-assimilated. It was the location of the 
primitive, the instinctual, of madness: a place of negative freedom capable of re-
energizing modern subjects. As the transcendent Nature of the nineteenth century was 
replaced by the spatial regulations of the twentieth century, organicist conceptions of 
society and nature began to unravel and stand in opposition to one another. The 
reconciliation (or recombination) of society and nature was mobilized by writers across 
the political spectrum. Joshua Schuster argues that avant-garde poets responded to 
conditions of increased urbanization by affirming “regeneration through pollution.”
118
 
For others, nature was not just plants and animals but a mythical space and force capable 
of personal rejuvenation—e.g. Babbitt’s Thoreauvian excursion from his desk job—
equally capable, as the Frankfurt sociologists understood all too well, of inspiring hyper-
modern barbarism. Norman Podhoretz, for instance, attacked the beats as “Know-
Nothing Bohemians” who “worship primitivism, instinct, energy, and ‘blood.’”
119
 It was 
an early critique of New Left irrationalism he would later share with other New York 
Intellectuals. If these artists were challenging the distinctions between nature and culture 
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in order to produce new hybrids, they were also attempting to link up social aspirations 
with (or against) the developments of modernization. 
For Anglo-Americans like the beats, Nature was also figured as colonized and 
racialized others. People who were believed to be closer to Nature by virtue of their 
poverty or outsider status were either treated as romantic figures to be emulated or unruly 
objects to be disciplined. The “Savage Reservation” in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World, for instance, stands in stark contrast to the novel’s biopolitically regulated, hyper-
Fordist, World State, and yet it is impossible to imagine one without the other.
120
 Henry 
Ford has replaced Christ as the epochal division of calendar time. Indeed, the idea of 
nature under Fordism is haunted as much by the industrial alienation of man from Nature 
as by the perverse and monstrous hybrids of man and Nature under the various large-
scale social projects to organize “men, machines, and materials into one productive 
whole” (e.g. Fascism, Communism, and the “totally administered” Liberalism of the 
culture industry). It was the contradictory desire for techno-social integration and 
simultaneously the fear of total rationalization. These hybrids became figures that 
enabled criticism—both left and right—of the societies that produced them. The 
progressive programs of the New Deal, for instance, were haunted by specters of rural 
degeneracy, in which the animality that industrialism (and mass education) had abolished 
threatened to return. They were sites of normative contestation in which failed promises 
were exposed and where protest against indignity met affective appeals to pity. For the 
writers and filmmakers of the New Deal, Nature was the location where religious 
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narratives played themselves out on Earth: mythical droughts, floods, pastoral harmonies, 
and apocalyptic dust bowls.
121
  
Prior to the environmental dislocations and reconstructive projects of the New 
Deal, the Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927 was a pivotal event with both 
environmental and cultural significance. The flooding of the Mississippi led to the 
modernization of federal government agencies; it also transformed property relations of 
sharecroppers and small farmers along the river, economically stripping many of what 
little livelihood they had. Its shock was even felt in Europe, where Walter Benjamin’s 
radio addresses give some insight into its magnitude. Benjamin contrasts the river with 
modern modes of transportation as “a line on which you might think you could rely, just 
as you would on a boulevard, or a railroad line.” However, this “continuously flowing” 
line expands, contracts, and wanders according to its “annual mood changes.” The 
uneven movement of water deposits its traces in a sedimented history of “countless lakes, 
lagoons, swamps, and ditches.”
122
 At the heart of its industrial might flowed an 
unpredictable force of Nature, known only to those (perhaps) most familiar with its 
temperament. In order to save New Orleans, farmers upriver would be forced to destroy 
the levees and sacrifice their land. Half a million people were made homeless as over 
100,000 square miles were flooded.  Benjamin highlights the tragic story of one 
particular family, but is equally impressed by the industrial response to the crisis. Over 
50,000 ships—even luxury boats—joined aircraft squadrons in a kind of total 
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mobilization that would prefigure the Second World War. Yet this effort is unable to hold 
back the “raging elements of human cruelty and violence,” he writes. “The dams that the 
law has built to contain [the Ku Klux Klan] have held up no better than the actual ones 
made from earth and stone.”
123
 
Benjamin’s “The Mississippi Flood of 1927” describes an unpredictable Nature. 
The line of the river’s flow serves as both a metaphor of the unevenness of history and as 
a material agent in that same history. One might read it as a figure of “divine violence” in 
Benjamin’s political metaphysics. The flood stands alongside his radio addresses on the 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and the destruction of Pompeii (which opens by discussing 
the monstrous hybrid, the Minotaur).  Just as the Lisbon earthquake gave rise to the 
Enlightenment’s own critiques of optimism and mastery—Voltaire’s Candide, for 
example—the 1927 flood thematically, formally, and geographically expanded the Blues 
as a critique of North Atlantic modernity. As Cornel West argues, the Blues is an 
expression of the tragic-pragmatic consciousness developed in the economic and racial 
injustices of modern American life. The “tragic-comic” mode does not promise the kind 
of triumph and mastery like the techno-scientific enlightenment that emerged alongside 
global imperialist powers, but rather “Blues is about resistance” and “persisting” in the 
face of hardship.
124
 As displaced African Americans spread the Blues from its geographic 
origins in the Mississippi delta to northern industrial cities like Chicago, artists who had 
written of labor in the delta carried that environmental memory to poorly electrified 
urban tenements. The memory of environmental hardships became allegories through 
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which writers like Richard Wright and William Attaway contributed to the struggles for 
communism and racial equality in the industrial north.
125
 In the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, clichéd images of broken levees and “flowin’” people came back to life with a 
new urgency, flashing up from the past in a moment of crisis as a material-poetic 
reminder that events, as Benjamin argues, do not occur in a linear progression through 
empty time, but rather in a “time of the now” through which historical injuries might be 
recognized and redeemed.
126
   
The environmentalism of the twentieth century emerged as a modernization 
project seeking to institutionalize and reconcile the individualist environmental 
imaginaries of the nineteenth century with progressive responses to regional hardships in 
Depression-era United States. The Civilian Conservation Corps, as Neil Maher 
convincingly argues in Nature’s New Deal, bridged “Progressive and postwar politics by 
helping Franklin Roosevelt to forge his liberal New Deal coalition…[and] by raising 
support for the welfare state in every region of the country.” “The Corps and its work 
projects,” Maher writes, “appealed to foresters in the West, to farmers in the Dust Bowl 
and in the soil-eroded South, and to easterners who could now recreate in hundreds of 
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new state and national parks in their cities’ backyards.”
127
 The range of environmental 
appeals, though geographically inflected, articulated diverse environmental needs and 
desires with the interests of the modern welfare state. In this context, the 
institutionalization of wilderness, in the form of federally protected national parks and as 
a legal concept, was an effort to reconcile the instrumental and the metaphysical “uses” 
of nature. Aldo Leopold’s later account of the CCC restoration of marshlands, for 
instance, resembles arguments for abstract expressionism as a defense of freedom and a 
critique of instrumental, market utility.
128
 “Thus always does history,” Leopold writes, 
“whether of marsh or market place, end in paradox. The ultimate value in these marshes 
is wildness, and the crane is wildness incarnate.”
129
 The market appeal—or utility—of 
wild marshes, like art, becomes its uselessness, with the crane standing in for the artist as 
the embodied expression of freedom. Leopold’s disavowal of the economic resembles the 
tendency that Pierre Bourdieu recognized in the art world, namely that the refusal of 
commercial interests becomes the selling point: wild marshes accrue cultural capital.
130
   
Mid-century environmental writers like Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson were 
scientific and public professionals who, for the sake of their audience, appealed to the 
folk environmentalism of their day. Leopold did this through the genre of field notes and 
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personal journals while Carson became famous for deploying the pastoral and 
apocalyptic genre in her warning against the use of chemical pesticides. In a way, each 
disavowed their professional ethos in order to make their appeal, but only Carson was 
punished for it. Not only was she a woman, but her work directly challenged the chemical 
companies whose products were the material embodiment of progress. However, no one 
heightened and played with these contradictions more than Edward Abbey. His 1968 
Desert Solitaire combines the outrage of a federal employee on behalf of the public good 
with the private, “romantic” project of self-creation.
131
 Abbey turns the language of 
disability on its head to challenge the petro-normative, high-speed automobility of 
spectator-tourists, whose infrastructure was destroying not just the parks themselves, as 
places and habitats, but was laying the groundwork for intensified mining—often on 
indigenous lands—required by “democratic” mass consumption. A red-diaper baby, 
Abbey’s anarchism came out of his experience as a soldier in World War II as much as it 
did from his assembly-line work at a television factory. His critique of Fordism from the 
location of the national parks articulates the contradictions that were there from the 
beginning—the bureaucratic rationalization of wilderness spaces and free individuals—to 
a radical politics that challenges mass consumerism and the war in Vietnam. My chapter 
on Mary McCarthy’s Birds of America begins in this moment.  
After hoisting a red handkerchief to meet the “crimson sunrise” on the morning of 
May Day, Abbey remarks that “the extreme clarity of the desert light is equaled by the 
extreme individuation of desert life-forms. Love flowers best in openness and 
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 His concern with individuation—rather than individualism—is shared by 
thinkers like Gilbert Simondon, whose “machinic” vision of individuation became central 
to ’68-ers like Deleuze and Guattari, and later, Bernard Stiegler.
133
 Individuation implies 
a becoming in relation to a context in which distinctions and variations enable further 
individuation. Where the soixante-huitards demanded forms of individuation apart from 
(which is to say in and through) the desiring machines of pan-semiotizing capital, Abbey 
explores individuation on naturalistic grounds in and through a critique of image-based 
ecotourism and state-powered oil industries. The anarchic revolution of desire “did not 
take place;” rather, it was recuperated by the same market forces it was meant to 
explode.
134
 Nancy Fraser argues that a similar reversal happened with second-wave 
feminism. “In a fine instance of the cunning of history,” she writes, “utopian desires [of 
1968] found a second life as feeling currents that legitimated the transition to a new form 
of capitalism: post-Fordist, transnational, neoliberal.”
135
 American environments have 
often served as the location to narratively produce and naturalize certain modern 
conceptions of the individual, sovereign subject. As in the work of Thoreau, however, 
they have just as often served to challenge that independence—Abbey’s red handkerchief 
is a small sign of solidarity with those struggling distantly, in their own contexts, for their 
own forms of collective individuation. “Romanticism,” he asks in his journal, “the search 
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for the intimate in the remote?”
136
 The postwar US environmental imagination is a 
liberatory one of “openness and freedom;” at the same time this seemingly instinctual 
hostility toward “control” has left it open to becoming articulated with a deregulatory and 
individualist consumerism that is existentially poised against (or has given up on) the 
very kinds of large-scale state intervention needed to maintain those environments. 
Jonathan Franzen’s 2010 novel, Freedom, offers a realist depiction of this tension 
at work. Circumventing the parental authority of the state, the aging baby-boomer 
protagonist establishes—with the help of a billionaire and coal companies—a series of 
fragmented reserves for endangered bird habitat. The birds require a non-fragmented and 
non-arbitrarily cobbled-together habitat. Cumulatively, the individual plots add up to a lot 
of land. However, the lack of contiguous habitat dooms the birds and the project. In the 
pages of Dissent, Jeff Williams labels Freedom a “neoliberal novel” in that it embodies 
the capitulation to the “plutocratic imagination” in American politics, one that sees a 
Faustian bargain with monied interests as preferable to (and more “realistic” than) social 
democratic politics.
137
 “Although Walter appears to be progressive,” Williams writes, 
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“his reasoning follows much of the neoliberal creed: government is cumbersome and 
inefficient, social problems can be more effectively handled through private means than 
public ones.” It is an illustrative example of Fraser’s argument that an ostensibly radical 
focus on individual agency in one moment can become imbricated with the governing 
logics of the next. For Williams, Franzen’s novel “renders liberal procedural solutions—
solutions that were articles of faith during the heyday of the American welfare state—
impracticable; we can only successfully solve problems through private means and 
individual action.” 
As Franzen’s representative of late baby boomers, Walter Berglund embodies the 
tension between a “deregulatory” cultural freedom and the need to democratically 
regulate social-economic relations with a nature that can no longer be thought of as either 
subject to industrial management, nor as the free-wheeling and infinitely adaptive “other” 
of a repressive culture. The novel ends with Walter living alone, having taken up a 
crusade against domesticated cats who are responsible for the killing an estimated one to 
four billion birds per year. Cats are a homonym of Katz, as in Richard Katz, Walter’s 
rock-star friend who slept with his wife, Patty, and contributed to their divorce. Readers 
are left questioning whether or not Walter has secretly killed his neighbor’s cat and left 
questioning the psychological motivations of his past environmentalism. Rather than 
suggesting there can be a purely-motivated environmentalism, Franzen illustrates—to the 
dislike of many readers—that our involvements in the world cannot but be entangled. As 
Judith Butler argues, “no subject emerges without a ‘passionate attachment’ to those on 





 If, in his effort to illustrate this entanglement, Franzen reduces 
what could be a sociological criticism to a psychological profile, he will have 
accomplished the conservative move of treating structural problems as an issue of 
cultivating the proper attitude; however, his work on Karl Kraus suggests a more 
dialectical reading.
139
 Neoliberal privatization expresses itself in a kind of cynical 
knowingness that accompanies a sad, and often defensive, opportunism, what Foucault 
called the entrepreneurial subject. On the left, this often takes the form of “a certain 
romantic attachment to the politics of failure [and] to the comfortable position of a 
defeated marginality.”
140
 The diminished sense of historical agency under “capitalist 
realism” follows from the atomization of the workplace and public sphere. 
Lest we look with rose-tinted glasses at the Fordist-Keynesian “compact,” C.L.R. 
James’ 1950 outline of the diminished sense of freedom within that arrangement is 
instructive. “Under pressure of the labor organizations, the state actually proposes now no 
longer freedom but security,” he writes. “Security for children; against sickness; better 
housing; for rural areas technical education and fixed prices; for full employment; for 
vacations and pensions… There can be no more striking contrast to the heroic 
frontiersman, trader, sailor and artisan striving to be a capitalist of the early days.”
141
 For 
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James, “individual freedom and freedom of association” had been displaced by a 
bureaucratic securitization in the interests of industry and the state. Whereas Europe 
accomplishes these aims through the “nationalization of industry,” he suggests, America 
was doing so through “free enterprise.” This American mixture of free market pathways 
to securitization prefigures Foucault’s later critique of the emerging “biopolitical 
governmentality” in European and American thought.
142
 However, James’ Marxist 
humanism is better able to account for the refusal of individuals and groups to comport 
themselves as proper subjects, and is dialectical enough to recognize how the unfinished 
tasks of one generation can become the constraints of the next.  
The waning of organized labor as a significant force between capital and the state 
was accompanied by the shift toward “cultural” politics and the micropolitics of 
distributed agency. In his defining work on twentieth century American political 
economy, Labor and Monopoly Capital, Harry Braverman argues that the displacement 
of the category of human labor power by nonhuman agency is a particularly classed 
consciousness. 
The human capacity to perform work, which Marx called “labor power,” must not 
be confused with the power of any nonhuman agency, whether natural or man 
made… Only one who is the master of the labor of others will confuse labor 
power with any other agency for performing a task because to him, steam, horse, 





In 1974, Braverman anticipates the philosophies which will be developed 
alongside the emergent transformations of production. These philosophies lend 
                                                          
142
 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-9, 
Trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2008). 
143
 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century, 25
th
 anniversary edition (New York: MR Press, 1998), 35. 
65 
 
themselves to members of the professional-managerial class whose education, training, 
and labor often involves the management and logistics of human resources, supply 
chains, and communication networks. The elision of class antagonism from this 
arrangement erases the struggle through which these networks are maintained. As 
Boltanski and Chiapello observe, the language of exploitation is jettisoned in favor of the 
language of inclusion and exclusion. None are excluded so that all may be exploited 
through their inclusion. If there is an environmentalism of the poor, there is surely an 
environmentalism of the professional-managerial class. It is the philosophy of a 
coordinator class, lending itself to interdisciplinary programs at universities which 
produce the next generation of those who will manage the labor of others, manage 
ecosystems, and learn to translate conflicts over power into technological problems to be 
solved by contingent policy arrangements and momentary financial interests. “The 
chronic instability caused by unexpected developments, permanent innovation, ever-
changing possibilities and opportunities in the contemporary workplace, as well as in the 
wider environment, demands a specific skill of post-Fordian workers,” writes Pascal 
Gielen. “They must continuously take advantage of changing opportunities and a 
kaleidoscope of options;” they are “mentally flexible,” and “open to new circumstances 
and new ideas, in order to put them to work for the immaterial production process.”
144
 
Massimo de Carolis develops a phenomenology of this opportunism: 
One of the most incisive effects of recent technological development has been to 
subvert this distinction between community and environment—first by rendering 
ever weaker the ties of the community, then by colonizing the environment in an 
ever more massive way, and finally by generating theoretical and practical 
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paradigms capable of being applied indiscriminately to social reality no less than 




No field has both generated and interrogated more paradigms applying to both the 
social and the natural (and generated more controversy) than science studies.
146
 Donna 
Haraway, for instance, writes that “if technoscience by our moment in history is ‘nature’ 
for us—and not just nature but nature-culture—then understanding technoscience is a 
way of understanding how natures and cultures have become one word.”
147
 While the 
field sometimes collapses the descriptive, the ontological, and the normative, in ways that 
may appear sloppy—or would appear to produce the very effect that Carolis describes—
the purpose is to challenge the convention of classifying one set of conventional 
descriptions as natural and another set of conventional descriptions as cultural (or 
constructed). It is concerned with the “vast disparities of wealth, power, agency, 
sovereignty, chances of life and death” at stake in the sciences. Rather than demonizing 
technoscience, Haraway argues that her feminist approach affirms “technoscientific 
liberty, technoscientific democracy, [and] understanding that democracy is about the 
empowering of people who are involved in putting worlds together and taking them 
apart.” In the era of climate change, and the search for new metanarratives that might 
enable large-scale social response, the role played by the sciences (for good or ill) in 
shaping narratives and social imaginaries deserves scrutiny. “Understanding the world is 
                                                          
145
 Massimo De Carolis, “Toward a Phenomenology of Opportunism,” Radical Thought 
in Italy: A Potential Politics, Eds. Hardt and Virno (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1996), 37-52, 46. 
146
 Andrew Ross (ed.) Science Wars (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).  
147
 Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf (New York: Routledge, 2000), 157. 
67 
 




The generalized opportunism Carolis describes is both a social experience and an 
institutional practice. C. Wright Mills claimed that “in every intellectual age, some one 
field of study tends to become a sort of common denominator of many other fields.”
149
 
Whereas sociology became the default discourse of postwar liberalism, economists and 
social scientists increasingly turn to the natural sciences for descriptive and normative 
models. While this is not all bad, it can be understood as a turn which seeks to frame 
social and market relations as transparent reflections of natural needs. The neoliberal 
philosopher, Friedrich Hayek, does just this. In his collected lectures in The Fatal 
Conceit, Hayek asserts that natural “complexity” poses a fundamental limit to knowledge 
and argues against government regulation, public investment, or other forms of social 
intervention into markets.
150
 By naturalizing the market, and thus the economics which 
speaks in its name, Hayek aims to render the concept of “social justice” quite literally 
contrary to nature. The commonly held belief that we should not “interfere” with nature 
easily translates to “we should not ‘interfere’ with the market.” This naturalizing 
development is eloquently captured by Italian philosopher Paolo Virno, who offers a 
Latourian litany avant la lettre of the Italian “counter-revolution.” 
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How does the Italian culture of the 1980s resemble a manger scene, complete with 
donkeys, Magi, shepherds, holy family, and so forth—various masks for one 
single spectacle? One aspect is the widespread tendency to naturalize the various 
social dynamics. Once again society has been refigured as a “second nature” 
endowed with unnamable objective laws. What is different, and this is the really 
remarkable point, is that to everyday social relations are applied the models, 
categories, and metaphors of postclassical science: Prigogine’s thermodynamics 
instead of Newtonian linear causality, quantum physics in the place of universal 
gravitation, and the sophistic biologism of Luhmann’s systems theory instead of 
Mandeville’s “fable of the bees.” Historical social phenomena are interpreted on 




Under the auspices of “de-centering the human,” the scholarly turn toward 
methodological “grand theory” erases the struggles over the sites and interpretations of 
the environment and culture. By displacing “the human” the critic hides their own hand. 
Critics take up scientific models to study society and nature only to naturalize the social 
arrangements which produced those models (and metaphors). Timothy Brennan 
associates these styles of posthumanism with a new imperialism, in which the offspring 
(and exports) of US Cold War sciences displace the humanist imperatives of “the 
anticolonial century.” “It maneuvers in a business climate and a media culture that 
assumes the supremacy of the natural sciences,” he writes, “above all the managerial 
wing of the applied sciences.”
152
 Brennan describes these tendencies, which are familiar 
to the environmental humanities: (1) “[T]he tendency to posit randomness or irresolvable 
uncertainty when analyzing any nonlinear or complex system;” (2) “the tendency to posit 
autopoiesis in human and natural systems… that [organisms] respond to their 
environment in ways determined by their internal self-organization and are therefore 
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powerless to recognize anything outside their internal points of reference;” (3) “the 
redefinition of ‘communication’ so that it no longer means the intentional exchange of 
information but rather the biomechanical exchange of chemical or electronic signals;” (4) 
“the proposal that when human systems become so large that they cannot be controlled 
by planning;” (5) “the redefinition of the term ‘environment’ to mean a hybrid of the 
natural and human worlds, not only without priority but without distinction;” and finally, 
(6) “the postulate that ‘life’ may be defined as ‘information.’”
153
 Each of these tendencies 
corresponds to Braverman’s account of the way human labor is decentered and reduced 
to another “factor of production,” in a process seemingly without subjects (but certainly 
with winners and losers). Each corresponds to developments in post-Fordist technology 
and to redescriptions which naturalize the social relations inscribed in (and reproduced 
through) those technologies. Each of them implicates contemporary practices in the 
environmental humanities in their reproduction of classed outlooks on the production of 
the world. 
By operating on the assumption that societies have “objective laws” that can be 
discovered the way we discover photosynthesis or the evolution of an eyeball, they 
quietly erase the sheer agonistic effort—what Rob Nixon calls the slow violence or, 
against this, one might pose the long care—that it takes for social arrangements to persist 
over long periods of time. Historical materialism, while arguing that class struggle 
constitutes an objective dynamic in the social order, acknowledges that things can be 
otherwise. Virno observes that, “in Germany and elsewhere ecologism inherited themes 
and issues from 1968, in Italy instead ecologism was born against the class struggles of 
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 For Brennan, this posthumanism unfortunately follows postmodernism as 
“an effort to salvage something liberating from an abject defeat.” In the way that 
postmodernism “embrace[s] commodification as a form of transgression,” and cedes the 
formation of subjects to a corporatized mass culture, posthumanism legitimizes 
alienation. “To disembody human skill and intelligence, to de-realize human will and 
effort, to unthink the human,” he writes, “is the form of its sublime.” It amounts to “a 
massively willed and historically determined effort to be done with will and history as 
human making.”
155
 While this sublime may be at home with deep ecology—whose 
critique is often so “deep” as to be practically useless—and may find a place in the 
managerial-entrepreneurial fetishization of market complexity and digital transcendence, 
nothing, it would seem, could be further from the project of cultural studies or from an 
environmental humanities concerned with making a different world in the context of 
neoliberalism and the Anthropocene. By building conjunctures, we can better understand 
how the uses of culture and the natural sciences construct environmental imaginaries, and 
better understand how those imaginaries are politically articulated.
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THE COMMON WORLD AND THE SHADOW OF NATURE: MARY 
MCCARTHY’S BIRDS OF AMERICA 
Nature is no longer the human home.  
Mary McCarthy, The New Yorker, 1969 
 
I’m not for throwing out nature. Somebody is throwing it out, not me. I’m 
against those people who are throwing it out—not out of the novel but out 
of life. 
Mary McCarthy, The Listener, 1970  
 
In Mary McCarthy’s novel, Birds of America (1971), the young American 
protagonist, Peter Levi, writes to his mother, Rosamund, and recounts the difficulty of 
living out his Kantian ethics as a student in a Parisian hostel. The year is 1964, and the 
categorical imperative has compelled him to spend his days painstakingly cleaning the 
fast-accumulating and foul-smelling waste in the communal toilet, even though the hostel 
employs a small cleaning staff. Peter is appalled at his “fellow residents” whose fecal 
traces are left everywhere: 
So far as I could tell from the evidence, the majority either didn’t mind leaving 
traces of themselves or else didn’t notice. They just went in, did their business, 
and exited, pulling the chain, without waiting to see whether the water flushed. 
But how was it possible not to notice the traces of the guy before you and, 
noticing, not to react? Could humanity be divided into people who noticed and 




 The recognition that there is no longer any transparent experience which might be 
called a common world is one of many instances in this bildungsroman where the main 
character loses his youthful idealism. From there, the reader follows Peter Levi’s 
realization that Nature can no longer serve as the common, unquestioned ground for 
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shared values, aesthetics, and knowledge.
2
 As such, he’s lost the comfort of a 
transcendent order capable of providing a set of norms that might stand as a critique of 
our fallen social existence. This is devastating for Peter, who is a young, white, middle-
class, civil rights radical and nature enthusiast, and whose arguments against industrial 
modernization rest on romantic assertions of culture as a refuge against philistine mass 
consumerism. When Peter lies in his hospital bed, half-comatose from an infected swan 
bite, the specter of Immanuel Kant appears in his room to inform him, with all the finality 
of the last words in the novel that, “Nature is dead, mein kind.”
3
 This death of Nature, 
while a private revelation in Peter’s life, corresponds to the historical events that 
occupied his every waking thought: the destruction of individual experience in both 
nature and art by consumerism (simulation) and the impending US war in Vietnam 
(annihilation). Nature was being killed both by its rationalized conservation and by its 
irrational destruction. The utopian promise of Nature as a ground for ethics hangs over 
the protagonist’s efforts to articulate a cultural politics of the environment as they do for 
McCarthy herself. 
I argue that the narrative loss of Nature as a common world is simultaneously a 
progressive recognition that a common world has yet to be constructed in the conditions 
of late Fordism. To support this interpretation, I read Birds of America alongside 
McCarthy’s 1969 New Yorker essay, “One Touch of Nature,” as well as the 
correspondence with her lifelong friend and interlocutor, Hannah Arendt, whose concept 
                                                          
2
 In this chapter, as throughout the dissertation, Nature is capitalized when I want to 
stress the metaphysical entity in question. The lower case is used to refer to lay nature, in 
the colloquial sense of the non-human environment or a quality of something. This is 
standard practice in the field of ecocriticism.  
3
 McCarthy (1971), 344. 
73 
 
of the common world deeply informed McCarthy’s own critique of mass consumer 
society.
4
 In the imaginary of many left critics of the period, both culture and nature stood 
for negations of industrial capitalism. Birds of America puts these claims of autonomy to 
the test, and finishes by negating Nature itself. The final moment is catastrophically open. 
This final disenchantment becomes a moment of enlightenment as the hallucinated Kant 
delivers the protagonist from his immaturity. However, the communicative exchanges 
throughout the novel also prefigure the world it wants to create. The common world is 
not something that will emerge once everything else is cleared away or is laid to rest; 
rather, it is what will need to be produced through communicative, artistic, and political 
exchange in concert with others. 
As a self-described “novel of ideas,” Birds of America challenges the romantic 
anti-capitalism of many in the student left and emerging environmental countercultures of 
the 1960s who opposed the consumerism of postwar Fordism and the bureaucratic 
liberalism that managed it. By troubling the young protagonist’s ideas about nature, 
McCarthy also challenges the ideas about culture championed by her milieu of New York 
Intellectuals. Throughout much of the 20
th
 century, this famously influential group of 
leftwing anti-Stalinists, associated with journals like Partisan Review, Dissent, and 
Commentary, held what scholars have called an “Eliotic” or “Arnoldian” leftism, 
maintaining that high culture (whether classical or avant-garde) and democratic socialism 
are not mutually exclusive. In Birds of America, McCarthy subjects these ideals to 
“reality tests” and conversations that explore the range of an idea’s claim on the actual. 
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The chosen epigraph for the novel is a Kant quote she received from Arendt which reads: 
“to attempt to embody the Idea in an example, as one might embody the wise man in a 
novel, is unseemly…for our natural limitations, which persistently interfere with the 
perfection of the idea, forbid all illusion about such an attempt.” McCarthy’s project is to 
perversely prove Kant right on this score. In this “unseemly” novel, ideas face 
interference from limitations ranging from the natural to social to the psychological. 
“Birds of America is not a realistic novel,” she writes, “It lies in a strange territory 
somewhere between a philosophic tale and a gruesome slapstick horror story even though 
at times it seems to have a common border with straight satire of contemporary life.”
5
 It 
has been described by McCarthy and her numerous critics as her Candide. McCarthy’s 
weird genre reappropriates the eighteenth century novel of ideas to interrogate 
mainstream and radical forms of middle class idealism at the end of the 1960s.  
According to Richard Ohmann, the US canon between 1960 and 1975 was 
defined by the personal and apocalyptic anxieties of the professional-managerial class. 
He places McCarthy alongside Joan Didion, Marge Piercy, Phillip Roth, John Updike, 
E.L. Doctorow, James Baldwin, Thomas Pynchon, and William Gaddis, as a writer who 
shares the PMC premise that “individual consciousness, not the social or historical field, 
is the locus of significant happening.”
6
 McCarthy stages a confrontation with the 
historical field through the transformation of an individual consciousness. Melvin 
                                                          
5
 Sabrina Fuchs Abrams, Mary McCarthy: Gender, Politics, and the Postwar Intellectual 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 99. 
6
 Richard Ohmann, “The Shaping of A Canon: U.S. Fiction, 1960-1975,” The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, Eds. Vincent Leitch, et al. (New York: Norton, 




Maddocks calls the novel an “Obit to Nature” in TIME magazine. He writes that 
McCarthy “has taken America’s Nature man—Deerslayer / Ishmael / Thoreau—and 
plunked him down in the plastic 1960’s: an anachronism who proves not only Nature is 
dead but also the original America that was a part of it.”
7
 McCarthy’s hybrid genre seems 
appropriate for our current decade, which includes regular announcements of “the end of 
Nature,” or at least certain ideas of it, along with the death of the environmentalism 
claiming to speak on its behalf.
8
 
Then, as now, a heightened sense of urgency necessitated pulling the rug out from 
under the traditional sources of consensus. Terms like “Nature” suddenly have too many 
meanings, too many referents which proliferate beyond the confines of any one 
discursive or political effort to contain them. During such a crisis of legitimacy, artists, 
writers, and critics, work to “preserve, modify, or supersede” the descriptive terms which 
seem to no longer adequately hook into the world the way they once did.
9
 This is often 
experienced as a disintegration, or disenchantment. What is often lost too is the 
reconstructive effort, that is, efforts to construct alternative narratives within the present. 
As the Anthropocene puts an end to the thirty-year window of life without 
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metanarratives, it looms as either a symbol of apocalyptic failure or an opportunity to 
confront what cultural anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli calls a “monstrous truth,” one 
that demands normative commitments which can no longer be justified on transcendental 
grounds.
10
 These narrative (and normative) challenges have in recent years been 
advanced by movements like Occupy, Idle No More, and Our Children’s [Climate] Trust, 
who have worked to create new environmental narratives. Even the renewed interest in 
democratic socialism suggests a desire for new practices of producing and relating the 
individual to “the common.” They announce an effort to critically reconstruct publics and 
agendas on the basis of solidarities in the making—not on the belief in a shared essence 
that emerges once all of our differences are cleared away. To this end, I reconsider 
McCarthy’s “death of Nature” novel in light of her primary interlocutor, Hannah Arendt, 
whose concept of a common world stands as the most salient image of how publics might 
compose themselves. 
The correspondence between McCarthy and Arendt contains numerous exchanges 
on Birds of America and the ideas of nature that circulate in the novel. In their letters, 
they express repeated concern over the “fraying technological fabric” of postwar liberal 
democracies. While critical of the New Left’s authoritarian tendencies, which they see as 
symptoms of the crisis, they are nonetheless sympathetic towards its sense of urgency and 
idealism. During the events of 1968 in Paris, McCarthy took heart in the anarchists at the 
Odéon Theater who created a popular and accessible communicative political space in 
which people “of all walks of life” came to discuss the issues; this, she contrasted with 
the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists of the Sorbonne and the Maoist posturing of the Tel 
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 McCarthy was drawn to the Odéon group who announced in their 
communiqué that their occupation intends to make the theater “open to all… in order to 
undertake a labor of reflection concerning our refusal of the distribution of entertainment-
as-merchandise and… for the development of an art of combat” against “bourgeois 
culture” and “capitalist society.” Refusing the Fordist model of culture as spectacular 
consumption, they wanted critical space to restore creative action to public life. Despite 
the insurgent rhetoric, they imposed no ideological line and explicitly invited 
“entertainment professionals, in collaboration with workers and students, [to] take similar 
initiatives at their own workplaces.”
12
 Written during this period, Birds of America 
refuses to reduce these concerns to generational anxieties. The contradictory demands of 
its young protagonist express a need to build a common world against what he sees as a 
technocratic war against people and nature driven by mass consumption. In The Human 
Condition (1958), Arendt develops her concept of the common world against mass 
society as a sphere that is actively produced through human labor and communication.
13
 
In this regard, what J.M. Bernstein describes as Arendt’s “political modernism” is 
formulated against the dissolving horizon of life on earth.
14
 The launch of the Russian 
satellite in 1957 unmoored human activity from gravitational bounds, the exploding of 
the atomic bomb destabilized matter at the smallest level, and in the workplace, 
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automation and the communicative labor were arriving to disrupt the differences between 
work, labor, and action. The image of Nature as harmonious background too often 
implies a world without effort, without change, and without the struggle to understand, 
narrate, and organize that change; however, the narrative of loss and recovery—the 
recovery of meaning within a new context, or the creation of a shared recognition of a 
common thing—describes a continual process of historical becoming. Bernstein can just 
as easily be describing the experience of McCarthy’s young protagonist when he 
characterizes Arendt’s modernism as: 
The disenchantment of nature, secularization, the collapse of traditional authority, 
and release from the authority of dead gods and dead ancestors, but [it] equally 
involves the uprising of the new… what is without foundation, what is 
groundless, what affirms human particularity against the universal, what thus 
proceeds from human doing rather than unchanging reason, what belongs to 
history and its development, what bears within itself the emancipation of the 




Arendt develops her concept of the common world against mass society as a 
sphere that is actively produced through human labor and communication. For Arendt, 
the common is not to be confused with something that pre-exists society or the 
differentiation between public and private. It is “not identical with the earth or with 
nature,” as in many environmentalist arguments for the commons. Rather, the common 
world is a collective construction, or constituting collectivity, organized around a shared 
and recognizable thing. “To live together in the world means essentially that a world of 
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who 
sit around it,” she writes; “the world like every in-between, relates and separates men at 
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 Here, the massified experience of atomized subjects “resembles a 
spiritualistic séance where a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly, 
through some magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons 
sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated 
to each other by anything tangible.”
17
 The “weirdness” of mass society is thus only the 
illusion of disenchantment, an illusion which a proper politics of the common would 
exorcize. A politics of the common would re-materialize the table (or toilet, or 
environment) that mass society has erased, in that the practical thing would be restored to 
its constitutive role in public life. In this context, Peter Levi’s “bathroom ethics” can be 
understood as a failed response to the massified division of labor in the hostel which 
divests individual responsibility for collective waste.  
Peter Levi lives out this demythologizing movement of modernization. He 
recapitulates the production of nature in the American imaginary from the hunter-
agrarian economy the New England “primeval” forests to its post-industrial simulation in 
wildlife reserves and eco-tourism. In Moishe Postone’s account of late capitalism, the 
natural world undergoes “an accelerating transformation of qualitatively particular raw 
materials into ‘matter,’ [and then] into qualitatively homogenous bearers of objectified 
time.”
18
 McCarthy echoes this late modernist transformation of nature into time that we 
find famously enunciated by Hamm in Samuel Beckett’s Endgame. “Nature has forgotten 
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us,” Hamm says. “There is no more nature,” replies Clov. “No more nature! You 
exaggerate,” Hamm responds: “But we breathe, we change! We lose our hair, our teeth! 
Our bloom! Our ideals!”
19
 Beckett’s exchange registers the increasing abstractness of 
nature as time, bodily duration, and the aging process, which perhaps makes a coming of 
age novel an ideal genre for locating “our ideals” within the planet’s forgotten memory 
banks. However, as the bombs are dropping on Vietnam and Peter awakens from his 
swan-induced coma, the anxiously open ending induces this feeling of historical 
contingency. He must struggle to affirm “what is without foundation, what is 
groundless,” and his own “particularity against the universal.”
20
 Here, “emancipation of 
the human from myth and nature” does not entail an escape from the material world, but 
rather from the social norms that justify inequality and violence by appeals to Nature, 
whose shadow looms over mass society like that of the disappearing table. 
In a 1972 Newsweek article titled, “Imagination, Anyone?,” McCarthy addresses 
environmental stumbling blocks context of the McGovern campaign. She considers the 
environment a “pseudo-issue” on which campaigns avoid offering anything of substance. 
Environmental issues are overdetermined by class and economics; in a sense, they are 
polluted by the idea of Nature as an object of elite consumption and leisure. 
In principle everybody is for the environment. In practice almost nobody is, 
chiefly because of general unwillingness to make the smallest immediate sacrifice 
in terms of comfort, speed, or profit, but also because to be “for the environment” 
has been construed to mean that you put clean air or water ahead of social justice 
for the poor. To propose that environmental measures be enacted into law is to 
identify yourself as a rich man’s candidate, while the real rich man’s candidate, 
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since nobody challenges him to impose antipollution controls on industry… 




Environmentalism has long faced a political dilemma; it agitates for public and 
scientific—secular—intervention yet relies on an inflated spiritual rhetoric inherited from 
Romanticism and the leisure economy it inspired. What chance does the metaphysical 
grandeur of Nature have, no matter how brimming with meaning, when its survival 
depends on the contingencies of election cycles and business interests, and especially 
when those interests are embedded in what McCarthy and Arendt in their letters call the 
“technological fabric” of society? One response is utopianism, attempting to preserve an 
ideal by dropping out and getting “back to the wrong nature” as William Cronon puts it.
22
 
While there are oppositional versions of this move, it is precisely this vision of Nature as 
a refuge from modernity that is associated with the leisured middle-class (and middle-
class radicalism) of the postwar period. In the seventies and eighties, the marginalization 
of environmental concerns led to the rise of deep ecological thinking that, in Peter C. van 
Wyck’s estimation, “lifts and relocates a contested and confused modern subject from its 
structured relations to ideology, politics, the unconscious, and so on, to a smooth, 
noncontradictory ecological space.”
23
 To the extent that ecology, as a movement, 
promises a grand reconciliation of conflicting vocabularies, experiences, and interests, it 
provides an imaginary that mystifies actually-existing social relationships and 
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institutional arrangements. McCarthy encourages readers to see through this “inert and 
soggy climate” and remember that “practical imagination once played a role in politics.” 
She shares this practical imagination with “social ecologist” New York Intellectuals like 
Murray Bookchin and Paul Goodman. Just how is this practical imagination to be 
sustained when metaphysical Nature is deflated to material-discursive nature? Michael 
Bess captures the irony: “it was the advent of environmentalism,” he argues, “the widely 
popular idea of saving nature—that helped explode the old conception of nature itself.”
24
 
McCarthy wrestles with this dilemma and ends by defending the role that aesthetics can 
play in recomposing a common world.  
In her 1969 New Yorker essay, “One Touch of Nature,” McCarthy laments the 
progressive abolition of the natural world from modern literature, but in turn criticizes the 
contemporary environmental movement for seeking to conserve “scenery” amidst the 
mauling advance of industrial capitalism. Technology, she argues, has become our new 
Nature. This anti-romantic approach to ecology contains a perverse affirmation that 
anticipates later expressions of cyborg and socialist feminist irony. Birds of America 
bears this out, affirming the death of the universal concept of Nature. Culture follows 
closely behind, as Fordist subsumption eliminates the promise it held as a separate 
sphere. For the Arnoldian leftists, culture served as a replacement for religion in that it 
was believed to enjoy a degree of relative autonomy from the philistine world, and could 
thus become, if not a source of avant-garde politics, then a “total qualitative assessment” 
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of society, to use Raymond Williams’ memorable description.
25
 Peter Levi’s political 
investment in the ideal of culture, as a transcendent source that can stand in for the “lost” 
common world, takes its refuge in high art against mass culture. Like culture, his 
imagination of nature as a refuge of autonomy becomes impossible to maintain without 
public regulation and state intervention.  
“One Touch of Nature” is concerned with the increasing absence of natural 
environments in modern literature, but ends by affirming that “Nature is no longer the 
human home.”
26
 First, McCarthy argues that the loss of Nature as an extra-textual 
reference threatens to divorce literature from its moral capacity to speak to matters of 
shared social significance by weakening its claim to represent. With neither a concept nor 
recognition of “the natural” one cannot distinguish between free and coerced action, or 
between persuasion and violence.
27
 In other words, Nature does not provide so much a 
norm that tells us how to live, but serves as a common point of reference through which 
we recognize ourselves in a world that we share with others. This shared recognition is 
necessary for articulating our desires alongside others. For McCarthy, the loss of external 
reference in increasingly self-referential forms of literature reflects a historical moment 
of modernization and signals a failure of literature to respond to the social needs of its 
audience.  
In this account, the beautiful is a reminder of complicity and thus a possibility for 
ethics. On request, Arendt sent McCarthy a postcard in 1970 quoting Kant, with a rough 
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translation: “The beautiful things in the world (meaning natural things) indicate that man 
is made for and fits into the world and that his perception of things agrees with the laws 
of his perception.”
28
 In a 1971 interview about the novel with Jean-Francois Revel, 
McCarthy admits to agreeing with Kant’s notion that beauty in nature is proof “that man 
fits into the world;” natural beauty, in other words, is evidence against a universal 
condition of alienation. When the beautiful things of the world are threatened with 
destruction (e.g. “the outdoors, plants, farms, forests”), our ability to recognize ourselves 
and our ideals by way of beautiful things is also threatened, leaving “no ground for 
ethics” wherein “there’s no longer a point of reference or court of appeals.”
29
 This is 
similar to Adorno’s dialectical defense of natural beauty, in that even if it is “at its core, 
historical,” natural beauty nevertheless holds out a promise of earthly harmony crucial to 
any project of emancipation.
30
 “The feeling of natural beauty [is] intensified,” he argues, 
“with the suffering of the subject thrown back on himself in a mangled and administered 
world.”
31
 In the moment when they are most needed, the beautiful things of Nature are 
becoming most threatened, along with, as Harvey Teres observes, any discussion of 
beauty as such. Teres cites McCarthy’s 1974 lecture, “Living with Beautiful Things,” as 
“one of the last serious discussions of beauty before that subject all but disappeared as a 
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legitimate subject among American intellectuals.”
32
 Her lecture traces the pedagogical 
function of beauty as it shifted from art and architecture in classical cities to the natural 
world outside of mass industrial towns. Modern subjects are left with a concept of nature 
that does not include them, and with ideals of authenticity pre-packaged with a 
transcendent ethics, uncontaminated with human particularity.  
In The New Yorker, McCarthy traces the effects and exhaustion of this 
arrangement, identifying affinities between back-to-the-land hippies and the John Birch 
Society. “A return to Nature implies not merely a rejection of the mechanics of modern 
life but an actual conviction of being poisoned by their effluvia,” she writes, “whether 
identified as smog or the mass media or doctored [fluoridated] H2O from a state 
reservoir.” “A desire to burrow in the ground,” she continues, “below the contamination 
level, is seen in the vocabulary of radical youth, with their so-called underground press, 
and in the stockpiled shelters of the Minute Men.”
33
 A distrust of surfaces thus 
reanimates old metaphysical distinctions between reality and appearance. The 
metaphysical obsession with the singular reality beneath the multiple appearances, and 
preference for authenticity over kitschy knock-offs, is generated by media representation 
and commodified experience. For the left, authenticity meant expanded self-individuation 
in the face of a market-society that was all-too-eager to simulate the experience of 
individuality; on the right, it took on the “paranoid style” of big government conspiracies 
and libertarian desire for a stable referent mediating liberal exchange (gold). McCarthy 
argues that this elective affinity between the far left and far right comes from a loss of 
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solitude. The retreat to Nature contains a desire to test the reality of one’s subjectivity in 
an encounter with the absolute, to produce a singularity that cannot be rendered fungible 
by the market. Alain Badiou affirms this “passion for the Real” as the impulse at the heart 
of aesthetic modernism.
34
 McCarthy would argue that these people desire a Nature that 
can serve as “a final court of appeals:” an aesthetic replacement for a dead god that might 
save us from the trouble of engaging the practical imagination in politics.
35
  
This reaction is symptomatic across the political spectrum and suggests that 
modernization is in question rather than any one political modernism attempting to shape 
it. Fredric Jameson too, ponders the effects of a “completely humanized environment” on 
the capacity for people to find meaning in technological modernity; that is, without a 
constitutive exteriority, or what Cary Wolfe calls a “pragmatics of the outside,” we lose 
the “one touch of Nature” that can serve as a common reference point that is necessary 
for discerning the boundaries and effects of a political community.
36
 Jameson writes: 
We must ponder the anomaly that it is only in the most completely humanized 
environment, the one most fully and obviously the end product of human labor, 
production, and transformation, that life becomes meaningless, and that existential 
despair first appears as such in direct proportion to the elimination of nature, the 
non- or antihuman, to the increasing rollback of everything that threatens human 




Left critics of total administration have always been better at imagining this 
“well-nigh limitless control over the external universe” than capitalists have been at 
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accomplishing it. Climate change and the myriad other environmental crises illustrate 
how just how limited that control ever was. This high note of pessimism masks a hubris 
which frames humans as the only active force in the world. Or perhaps, the only force 
capable of deliberating on how it is to be a force. We are, as new materialists argue, co-
producers with the various agencies of the nonhuman world, and yet, even as these 
agencies comprise our own ecological conditions of possibility, the means to annihilate 
these conditions are determined by capitalist social formations. Jameson argues that 
rather than clinging to “some ultimate reality, some ultimate bedrock of existence, artists 
and thinkers of such a period,” should instead, “cling to the experience of 
meaninglessness itself.”
38
 McCarthy reminds us of Dostoevsky’s illustration that 
“clinging to the experience of meaninglessness” can also lead to terrorism.
39
 These two 
options may be useful for dramatizing the disorienting experience of global 
modernization, but they offer little by way of guidance on such profane matters as water 
conservation and energy policy, public health, or wildlife management. The experience of 
meaninglessness goes hand in hand with a certain “left melancholy,” typified by Peter 
Levi’s loss of transcendental justifications for his utopian critique.
40
 If there is a perverse 
benefit to the destruction of the natural world, it is that it relieves us of the illusion that 
our social justifications lie outside our historical ideals, social formations, and collective 
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tastes. McCarthy links the genuine desire to save beautiful natural places with the 
“reactionary” belief that Nature “is itself a value,” lying outside an industrial capitalism 
which produces “scenery” as its exteriority:  
Well-meaning efforts to save the scenery from real-estate developers and oil 
refineries, to create wild-life preserves and national park areas (strictly regulated 
and policed by rangers) do not and cannot re-establish nature in her natural place. 
Modern moves to conserve a patrimony of mountains, gorges, rocky 
promontories, unspoiled beaches, are like moves to save stage scenery—prop 
trees and painted flats. […] To the extent that Nature has to be defended from 
man (with the inevitable recourse to police power), instead of being intrinsic to 
his species-existence, it is simply a backdrop, a photogenic setting, and has 
nothing to say, one way or another, in determining values or revealing truth. 
Indeed, the notion, still harbored by every reactionary heart, including my own, 





McCarthy recognizes that we can save beautiful places and natural environments, 
but there is no saving Nature. It is precisely this transformation of the environment into a 
“matter of taste” (backed by police power) that concerns her main character, and re-
installs the importance of art and its critical relation to democratic politics. McCarthy 
admits her nostalgia, yet she knows, against her own “reactionary heart,” that the status 
of Nature as a source of value has been called into doubt by the very forces capable of 
saving it. This questioning of her desire for uncorrupted nature finds an appropriate 
metaphor. She argues that Romantic Nature as an “utterance of the Universal Soul” is 
“the product of a rather widespread sub-species of humanity that secreted within itself a 
gland like that in the spider functionally adapted to the spinning of webs.”
42
 Thus, the 
concept of Nature we have inherited is the result of efforts by particular artists and 
thinkers to tell stories about society, stories which ensnare us in their figuration. In a 
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brilliant recursive move that illustrates her argument, McCarthy uses spider physiology 
and labor as “one touch of Nature” to argue for the necessity of nonhuman reference (or 
agency) in human self-understanding and narrative formation. It serves too as a reminder 
that the natural world includes cunning. 
Birds of America opens with the death of “the Great Horned Owl” at the local 
Wild Life Sanctuary. It is not just any Great Horned Owl, but one who stands, in Peter’s 
imagination, as a metonymy of timeless Nature. That this figure “could have ‘passed 
away’ like any senior citizen” shocks Peter into recognizing the historicity of the natural 
world, and the sanctuary itself as a kind of quarantine against the passing of time.
43
 Peter 
is described as being “attached to history, provided it stayed still,” and “opposed to 
progress in any direction” “except in the field of civil rights.”
44
 His relation to nature is 
mediated by what Heidegger would call a “standing reserve” of species and is more like a 
standing reserve against history. Cormorants, for instance, fascinate him in their “stillness 
and fixity,” and seem “horribly ancient… as though they preceded time.”
45
 These 
individual creatures may die but they are taken as signs of an unchanging order beyond 
themselves. Insofar as this particular wild life reserve stands in for Nature as a whole, it 
appears to Peter that Nature is under historical threat from both industrial society and 
from conservation efforts to “organize and manage” it. For Peter, the sanctuary is not an 
effort at preserving ecosystems and species habitat from material degradation; it is, 
rather, a preservation of experience beyond the social. 
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He refuses to join the local Nature Study group hosted by the sanctuary because 
“he did not want his relationship with Nature organized and managed for him.”
46
 Like 
Emerson, Peter follows in the American tradition of wanting an original relation to the 
universe. The continuous reference to the sanctuary as “his sanctuary” marks a claim of 
ownership over the refuge as a private space.
47
 It serves as a private retreat and a realm of 
autonomy from the organized and managed world of postwar consumer society. The 
experience would be ruined if he actually owned it and had to manage it himself. The fact 
that it lies in a public trust and managed by government intervention relieves Peter of 
responsibility and provides him the freedom to live as if he were “exploring a wilderness 
unknown to the aborigines.”
48
 This is pure fantasy, as historians have illustrated the 
astonishing degree of environmental management that pre-Columbian North American 
societies performed not only for subsistence but also to maintain vast continent-wide 
trading networks.
49
 By carrying the American mythology of wilderness into the space of 
the wildlife sanctuary, Peter’s celebrated original relation to Nature contains quite a bit of 
disavowed history, organization, and management. 
At the time, this wilderness myth had its New Left boosters and critics. The 
liberatory ethos of Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization (1955/1966) for instance, 
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appealed to professional middle class students in that it translated Freud’s critique of 
“civilization” into the bureaucratic era of Fordism. However, the primitivism underlying 
its argument, the belief that “man’s happiness and well-being decreased in direct 
proportion to his degree of civilization,” has a much longer history in post-Romantic 
American ideas about nature.
50
 Irving Howe, McCarthy’s fellow New York Intellectual, 
observed that much of the American literary imagination (exemplified by Faulkner) 
assumed a “radical disjunction between social man and the natural world,” in which 
social man was seen as a degraded version of the ideal of natural man. This has led to a 
confusion between apolitical cultural or religious postures—e.g. “Edenic and apocalyptic 
moods”—and political movements that work toward achievable ends.
51
 “The wilderness 
is primal, source and scene of mobility, freedom, innocence,” Howe writes. “Once 
society appears, it starts to hollow out these values. And not one or the other form of 
society, not a better or worse society, but the very idea of society itself comes to be 
regarded with skepticism and distaste.”
52
 
This antagonistic relationship to society takes an eco-oedipal turn, as Peter “liked 
to fancy that he and his mother were pioneers.” We are told that “his love for his mother 
coincided with his love of Nature and of the austere New England landscape,” an 
“Earthly Paradise” defined by “the absence of others.”
53
 He defies his mother’s 
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boyfriend, babbo, the anarchish-intellectual, who exclaims that “Nature is an 
anachronism!”
54
 After the Wilderness Act of 1964, the fantasy of Nature as a radical 
exterior to the technocratic totality becomes hard to maintain; equally hard to maintain is 
the radical separation between “social man and natural world” that Howe observed. 
Proving babbo’s theory correct, the narration informs us that “Peter did not have the 
makings of a real naturalist—he only liked Nature, which is not the same thing.”
55
 But 
not all Nature is equal. “He was convinced,” for instance, “that [the desert] was the 
product of some nuclear catastrophe that had befallen an earlier race of scientists. He 
declined to consider Death Valley a part of Nature. Peter was strongly in favor of Nature, 
and he was against modern physics for interfering with Her.”
56
 Environments that do not 
fit his ideal are written off as anthropogenic aberrations, even if these aberrations pre-date 
humanity. In his shock at the historicity of the Wild Life Sanctuary, Peter wrestles with 
this responsibility, asking if—and how—he would be responsible for the “sequel” to the 
Great Horned Owl: 
What if the owl, weakened by captivity, was unequal to liberation? It might 
starve, left on its own in the woods. Alternatively, the predatory killer, freed, 
might make a holocaust in the wild-life refuge. Peter thought with anguish of the 
pine grosbeaks he and his mother had seen, almost tame, in a wild apple tree on 
Columbus Day; he imagined their rosy bodies all red with gore. A sanctuary was 
meant to be safe. He recognized with a sad Hello the classic conservative 
arguments as they passed through his head—arguments for not meddling with the 
status quo. […] Now that the notion of change had glided into his mind, he could 
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This passage marks a secularization of Nature in Peter’s imagination as it shifts 
from myth to a historical problem of managing ecosystems and species reproduction. 
Absent the environmental sciences, the question of what (and where) counts as natural 
becomes an aesthetic question, in which animals and landscapes become representations 
of environmental values—in McCarthy’s words, “a matter of taste.” The obverse side of 
this is that naturalized landscapes can no longer serve as ahistorical models for ethics. 
The political beliefs at the heart of modern conservation are exposed. Libertarianism in 
the space of the sanctuary could just as easily lead to a “Columbus-like” bloodshed with 
catastrophic results, while a totally planned ecology, with the belief that groups of species 
will act in accordance with our designs, might turn the sanctuary into a gulag. With the 
Vietnam War looming in the background, Peter’s question of whether the owl would be 
“unequal to liberation” sounds like the arguments of those hostile to national liberation 
movements, thus linking environmental management, metaphorically if not directly, to 
colonial rule. McCarthy foregrounds this ambivalent set of problems—aesthetic, 
scientific, and social—that would later fall under the category of biopolitics. Sustainable 
ecologies could very well be “ugly,” parasitic, or teeming with relations that bear no 
correspondence to human recognition of symmetry, ideals of justice, or pleasure.  
In the “epistle” chapter, Peter considers the broader implications of his ethico-
aesthetic revelation. “When Kant asks what the world would be like if everyone stole, 
that may be at bottom an aesthetic question,” he writes to his mother. “What would the 
world look like?”
58
 Precisely in striving to remove taste from ethics, Kant universalizes 
agreement on what is beautiful. Peter’s belief that a proper cultural education—i.e. what 
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people find beautiful and therefore good—can be the source of the common world 
missing from mass society, comes into conflict with the consequences of mass access to 
art. Peter quickly turns on his mother and accuses her of being a snob who puts aesthetics 
before democracy. An accomplished musician, Italian émigré, and anti-capitalist 
intellectual, Rosamund Levi resembles today’s slow food enthusiasts; as she scours the 
antique stores of Rocky Port looking for older, labor intensive devices, she evokes 
quizzical looks from store owners and homemakers. She wishes that she could go on 
voting for Norman Thomas forever, and pines for the days of the war, when puritan 
economizing and morality were linked in a pastoral vision of socialism, before it was 
inevitably “doomed” to dissolution by postwar abundance.  
Peter accuses her anti-consumerism of being a veiled elitism. He says her 
“greatest weakness” is that she “can’t legislate” and is resentful because of it. “You want 
your whim or prejudice to be a universal law,” he writes. “Maybe all artists are like that; 
they feel they are at the end of some teleological chain. I’m coming to the conclusion that 
art is incompatible with democracy. If I want to be a democrat, it’s an awful handicap to 
be the son of an artist. I will have to reject you, if I can.” “Because,” he finishes his 
thought, “you are a snob. Without wanting to be one. You can’t help it.”
59
 Peter mounts a 
critique of art in the name of democracy before later reversing this position and 
embracing his snobbery in his Sistine Chapel exchange. If art and beauty provide the 
imagination of egalitarian symmetry in society, the aesthetic attitude can also turn against 
that society. It risks becoming, in Georg Lukács’ words, “a violence done to the essence 
of everything that lies outside the sphere of art, and a desire to destroy it; an attempt to 
                                                          
59
 McCarthy (1971), 143. 
95 
 
forget that art is only one sphere among many, and that the very disintegration and 
inadequacy of the world is the precondition for the existence of art and its becoming 
conscious.”
60
 Beyond Peter’s either-or ism—either democracy or art—McCarthy’s 
politics as a writer commit her to criticizing the mass consumption that defined the Cold 
War horizon of democracy. 
Focusing on McCarthy’s cultural politics and the romantic critique of 
modernization implicit in the anti-consumerism of her main characters, Stephen Schryer 
argues that Birds of America is both a narrative taxonomy of professional-managerial 
class (PMC), or “new class,” intellectuals, and a polemical response to the social 
scientists of the Cold War. McCarthy’s time spent living in Hanoi during the war pit her 
against the modernization theorists who believed in a universal trajectory of social 
development mirroring North Atlantic modernity. Schryer writes that “by the mid-1960s 
McCarthy viewed the United States as an overtechnologized country that had destroyed 
its native traditions and replaced them with a debased mass culture that it was… 
exporting abroad.” The spread of markets, by force, was in the process of destroying 
land-based and subsistence societies whose life ways are understood as rooted in 
particular environments. For McCarthy, he writes “the worst feature of capitalism is its 
destruction of nature, which is the ontological basis of the world’s various traditional 
cultures.”
61
 The belief is that traditional societies, whether peasant or indigenous, are 
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more embedded in the reproduction of natural systems and because their cultural 
narratives contain a greater range of references drawn from their environment. Just as 
capitalism uprooted the social temporalities of Medieval Europeans, so the logic goes, 
contemporary imperial powers were now uprooting the third world—to say nothing of 
various communist and nationalist modernizers. For McCarthy, the loss of nonhuman 
nature is a threat to culture as the material basis for our being and as a source of shared 
meaning. 
This opposition to modernization abroad was shared by the PMC student left who 
opposed the high-tech artificiality of mass consumer culture at home. Barbara and John 
Ehrenreich identify the PMC’s concerns: (1) a struggle over the university and higher 
education as a site of PMC reproduction (particularly the complicity of American 
universities with the Vietnam war); (2) an effort to distinguish themselves from the 
working class by way of consumption. “Typically,” writes Barbara Ehrenreich, “this has 
meant an emphasis on things ‘authentic,’ ‘natural,’ and frequently imported;”
62
 and (3) 
the combination of political radicalism and elite modes of consumption often becomes a 
prejudice against the working class who are depicted as “anti-intellectual, authoritarian, 
‘square,’ and interested only in their material comfort.”
63
 These attitudes are based in the 
contradictory location of the professional middle class and Peter Levi personifies these 
contradictions. McCarthy asks whether or not one can properly hate mass consumption 
from the critical sphere of art while still remaining a radical democrat, since Fordist mass 
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production has made art available to people on a historically unprecedented scale. Peter 
confronts these contradictions in his exchanges with his advisor, Mr. Small, and shares 
the anxieties of many in the PMC student left, who found their universities and future 
professions complicit in an intolerable technocratic war. However, Peter’s politics of 
non-intervention is rooted in a spectator ethic that distances him from the world. 
Small suggests that Peter go talk to people and meet them where they are instead 
of sitting in his apartment ruminating on the failures of modernity to live up to its 
promises. “Widen your contacts with people. Talk to them in cafes, in museums, on the 
street. Don’t brood in your room about the world’s problems. Meet them, face to face.”
64
 
Small implies that Peter would be better served by interacting and exchanging ideas with 
people rather than encountering “humanity” as an abstraction through books and art. The 
problem is that Peter tends to regard people with contempt. He likes humanity, but actual 
people fail to adhere to his categorical imperative. In short, Peter turns out to be the sort 
of person he imagines his mother to be; only she has the excuse of being an artist. He 
does not. Small’s invitation to a “common world” is undermined by Peter’s self-admitted 
“snobbish” aesthetic politics and his hostility toward others when they are anything other 
than an abstraction. 
 
The Tragedy of the Cultural Commons 
McCarthy stages a debate over the politics of culture in the Sistine Chapel, which 
Peter and Mr. Small discuss through analogies to nature and national parks. As it 
develops, the characters rehearse one the most dominant environmental narratives of the 
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last half-century: Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.” Published by Science in 
1968, and circulated in the Sierra Club’s “Earth Day Handbook.”
65
 Hardin’s story goes 
like this: a society of pastoralists hold grazing land in common, yet it is in the private 
interest of each individual pastoralist to use as much of that grazing space as possible, 
therefore the commons is doomed. The conflict between mutual “good” is what lends this 
story its tragic character. Hardin’s tragic narrative has been used to justify neoliberal 
privatization with the belief that individual, small-property owners would be better 
stewards of resources. However, as Rob Nixon observes, in what has become a just-so 
story of the free market, Hardin was actually advocating for strong public regulation and 
protection of the commons.
66
 Quoting Hegel, Hardin writes that “freedom is the 
recognition of necessity;” he advocates “mutual coercion” as a means of regulating the 
social use of nature. The problem, in both the free-market and state-regulatory 
interpretations of this story, is that it assumes a fixed ecological space, so that “mutual 
coercion” is reduced to the management of fixed or depleting (degrading) resources in the 
face of population increases. There are no possibilities for what Bernard Stiegler calls an 
“economy of contribution.”
67
 The perception of the biosphere as a commons from which 
we can only consume obscures any potential for thinking of humans as co-producers or 
participants in the ecological commons, who are equally capable of increasing soil 
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health, restoring biodiversity, and becoming more than a collective draw-down on 
planetary carbon and nitrogen cycles.  
The image that lies behind the debate about culture is drawn from the Fordist 
image of nature, what Heidegger criticized as “standing reserve” of modern technics.
68
 In 
that great reserve of culture, the museum, both Peter and Mr. Small discuss the 
experience of culture as a spatial conflict, along the lines of national parks and wildlife 
reserves. Assuming that natural environments and cultural objects are fixed and limited—
and that they operate according to the same logic of consumption—Peter remains 
trapped. He is unable to imagine culture or nature as commons that are produced, and his 
socialist regulation scheme appears culturally conservative against Small’s defense of 
capitalist modernization which, for all its faults, contains a progressive element. In these 
passages Small sounds much more like that neglected half of Marx who celebrates 
capitalism’s profane acceleration and its ability to lay waste to entrenched cultural 
hierarchies, while Peter is remains the romantic anti-capitalist, melancholically struggling 
to preserve residual cultural forms against their dissolution.  
The discussion revolves around Peter’s disdain for fellow tourists. Small exposes 
Peter’s preference for class tourism over mass tourism.
69
 By class tourism, they mean the 
people who can afford to travel alone and do not take advantage of large package tours. 
Peter confesses that “the only tourists you don’t look on as gate-crashers are the solitary 
art-lovers you can put in the same class as yourself.”
70
 Mass tourism enables increased 
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access to high art, so the previous distinction between high and low culture is reproduced 
through academic discourses, which take up in theory where the old avant-gardes left off 
in practice. Small suggests that it is less about the object and more about cultivating 
particular attitudes and sensibilities of consumption. In this way, Small argues, the 
university discourse attempts to become the new gatekeeper of culture: 
“I’m aware of the new academicism. Entrenched interest groups resent the boom 
in museum attendance, the availability of cheap reproductions... They can’t accept 
the fact that art is now within the reach of the masses… there’s a drive on to 
restrict the understanding of art, if not the actual experience, to a tiny coterie of 
privileged and cultured dilettantes. They’d like to turn this wonderful spectacle 
over our heads into a private field of research, their own little hunting preserve—
‘Trespassers Keep Out.’ Why, if they had their way, they’d institute screening 




In Peter’s concern over the ruined experience of art, Small identifies a desire to 
limit the circulation and consumption of culture, and thus, preserve its scarcity. Here, 
culture and nature are linked as private property (e.g. hunting preserves, no trespassing 
signs) in which increased participation entails a drawdown of a scarce resource. The 
solitude afforded through encounters in the natural world is analogous to art in that both 
are believed to impart an ethico-aesthetic education on the viewer. If ethical vision rests 
on aesthetics, as Peter recognizes in the epistle to his mother, he is now forced to consider 
whether a solitary aesthetic education is capable of preparing one’s imaginative life for 
democratic mass society. Through these debates, McCarthy considers how aesthetic 
education of the kind championed by her fellow New York Intellectuals, in part relies on 
social hierarchies in other spheres.  
Peter accepts Small’s comparison of his concept of culture to a private nature 
reserve. “The nice thing about travel is the chance to be by yourself in an unspoiled, 
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pristine setting,” Peter says. “My generation doesn’t have experiences like that very 
often, which is why we come abroad, I guess. There isn’t much unspoiled Nature around 
any more, and the places where people like poets used to look for it—the mountains and 
the seashore—are all jammed up with humanity and bottle-caps.”
72
 Like tourists and 
nature lovers, he prefers his experience to be private and introspective, where his relation 
to the universe is unpolluted by the presence of others. Nature and culture are linked in 
his imagination as a commons which is destroyed as too many people try to appropriate 
the experience for their own edification. “If you love someone, you want to be alone with 
them,” Peter says, evoking his eco-oedipal New England landscape: “The same with art. 
There ought to be churches and museums where you don’t have to meet gangs of tourists, 
where you can just sit and contemplate.”
73
 Levi refers to tourists as “garbage dumped 
here by planes and sightseeing busses,” and then hesitates. “If you want me to say I’m 
part of the garbage, OK, I agree. I’m fouling up the element,” he admits. “When I’m in 
the Sistine Chapel, I hate my fellow-man. There’s something basically wrong with a 
situation like that. If a guy is in the presence of beauty, he should be having noble 
thoughts.”
74
 He begins to recognize that if this privatized experience of culture as an 
education in moral autonomy cannot stand up to the democratization of access, then it 
cannot serve as the basis for a common world. In this, McCarthy affirms the authentic 
desire for solitude and contemplation—Arendt’s “life of the mind”—but also 
acknowledges the institutional and practical limits it faces. 
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Peter’s misanthropic confession prompts a question from Small: “Do you accept 
democracy, Levi?” It is a simple, but loaded question: does he accept the consequences of 
democracy, for art and nature, even if this means that these concepts themselves must be 
transformed in the process? Peter responds with an elaborate socialist plan to distribute 
museums and art around the country, and then regulate admission by having the would-be 
tourists pass exams. He realizes some inevitable contradictions in his plans which are 
only voiced in the free indirect discourse. “Under socialism, i.e., in an ideal republic,” he 
thinks to himself, “just about everybody would be able to appreciate art, so that there 
would be no reasonable basis for exclusion, and the museums would be even more 
packed than they were now.”
75
 In short, Peter’s plan is to regulate the cultural commons 
as a fixed, inherited set of scarce objects and experiences. It is a Hardin-esque regulatory 
response, based on “mutual coercion” where freedom is found in the recognition of 
necessity.  
Like the Fordist consumerism he opposes, Peter can only consider the relation of 
art and democracy as one of consumption, never one of production. In a left-wing 
imagination limited to consumer choices, the only form of critical involvement resembles 
his mother’s—the creation of boutique consumption practices often limited to those who 
can afford them. It is a cycle which, as critics like Thomas Frank have documented, has 





 In a different ideal republic, one could argue, the means of 
cultural production would be more widely available and the pool of the cultural commons 
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would be enlarged because of it. People would be less likely to have the kind of alienated 
relationship toward culture and nature that Peter himself criticizes, but then again, the 
relation between the public and the commons will have been transformed. It is, as John 
Guillory argues, “the fact of class” and “how individuals gain access to the means of 
literary production” that is a “more efficient mechanism of social exclusion than acts of 
[aesthetic] judgment” in the realm of consumption.
77
 Unfortunately, Peter can only 
imagine culture and nature as fixed storehouses unable to be expanded or replenished. 
Nature’s death, in this regard, marks the limit of this imagination of the nonhuman 
environment as a repository of physical and creative resources for society. 
Having received this entire exchange as confirmation of his suspicions about 
“little hunting preserves,” Small dismisses Peter’s plan as “modish drivel” and accuses 
Peter of wearing socialism as a mask for elitism: 
Capitalism, if you were only aware of it, has shown itself to be the most subtle 
force for progress the world has ever known. In its post-industrial phase, an 
insidious, awesome force. Boring from within the old structures, leveling, creating 
new dreams, new desires, and having the technical know-how and the dynamism 
to satisfy them. You’re living in the midst of a vast global revolution originating 
in the United States and you seem not to take the slightest interest in it, except to 
go through some feeble motions of dissent. From your ivory tower, you look 
down disdainfully on that revolution and pretend to yourself that you’d welcome 
it if it bore the name socialism. I can assure you that you wouldn’t, my friend. 
‘Socialism’ is your alibi for rejecting the real progress capitalism has made, the 
leveling you abhor, if the truth were told. ‘Garbage,’ you said just now, in a 





Small’s analysis resembles several New York Intellectuals, like Daniel Bell, who 
were beginning to place their trust in “post-ideological” technocratic centrism, and who 
                                                          
77
 Quoted in Teres, 108. 
78
 McCarthy (1971), 302. 
104 
 
saw the “modernism in the streets” of the 1960s as a symptom of capitalist modernization, 
rather than a cause capable of reforming it.
79
 Small admits to having once had “a brief 
romance with that mythical animal called democratic socialism,” but now believes the 
political categories, left and right, if they still have any meaning, have effectively 
switched places in that the universities have become the locus of a cultural radicalism 
detached from working class concerns. In this, he anticipates the critiques of the “new 
class” by the first generation of neoconservatives in the 1970s who believed they were 
using socially conscious rhetoric to enrich themselves.
80
 Small’s panglossian theodicy of 
development is on display when he argues that capitalism will eventually “eradicate the 
slums” since it can’t afford “under-consumption.”
81
 He attributes a teleological 
rationality to historical change and places his faith in it, a better future that justifies 
current pain. However, an incident occurs in which Mr. Small’s “good faith” is exposed 
as a cover for naked self-interest. At dinner, Mr. Small tries to split the check so that he 
can collect double on Peter’s portion of the meal: once when Peter pays him his half, 
twice when he is reimbursed from his expense account for the entire meal. Recognizing 
this small gesture as an example of the way cynical appeals to abstract democracy, such 
as the sharing of food, mask the realities of unequal exchange, Peter affirms his inner 
snob and asks for separate checks. His “high cultural” values still have some ability to 
check economic philistinism.  
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Yet there is also some truth to Small’s criticism of Peter. His Arnoldian Leftism is 
limited those who can afford education and travel to appreciate art in a classed way. Gone 
are the days where a high modernism met with radical politics in the relative autonomy of 
little magazines. “Socialists think that art ought to belong to everybody and not to a 
favored few,” McCarthy writes, “That sounds right in theory, but in practice there is no 
way that that particular pie can be cut and distributed fairly… instead of belonging to 
everybody it belongs to nobody.”
82
 Perhaps this is the enduring argument for the novel: 
its portability and its capacity to provide a shared experience at the individual level. In 
her essay, “Living with Beautiful Things,” McCarthy recounts the controversies 
surrounding the Mona Lisa in Japan. No matter how bureaucratically and 
“democratically” organized—even with the Taylorist allotment of thirty seconds of 
viewing time per museum attendee, which was later cut to ten seconds—protestors 
always found an excluded population. Reading McCarthy’s catalogue of attacks on art in 
the early seventies, one wonders if they were not in fact attacks on the social conditions 
of its consumption. Finding no solution to this, McCarthy endorses the 19
th
 century 
practice of distributing reproductions to schools and towns. If the occupiers of the Odéon 
Theater had their way in the 1968 “revolution,” there would be a massive redistribution 
of social space and creative production within cities. “One doesn’t know whether to put 
that word [revolution] in quotes or not,” she writes Arendt regarding the events in Paris, 
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The image of the filthy communal toilet is an analogy for the loss of the common 
world of recognition that went by the name of Nature. Once the environment has been 
modernized, rolled over by industrial agriculture, the peasant classes urbanized, and the 
unconscious “colonized” by the media, there is nothing resembling an originary world as 
an extra-social repository of meaning. “Nature is not just the circumambient ensemble of 
non-human life but history on a grand scale—duration,” McCarthy writes. It “gives us the 
awareness of being an instant reverberant in time.”
84
 The Anthropocene marks the return 
of Nature as “history on a grand scale,” although it is a Nature we no longer recognize, 
entwined with our own histories and conflicts, and in which the human instant 
reverberates for much longer. In asking, “Could humanity be divided into people who 
noticed [the toilet filth] and people who didn’t?” Peter questions a model of humanity 
that relies on some underlying essential quality as the basis for solidarity. Rather than 
believing that the common world is a matter of uncovering, of cleaning away, getting 
“beneath the surface” or “behind the appearance,” of human differences, he begins to 
understand the common world as the name of a need to act in concert with others, to 
make matters of ecological concern recognizable. “The word ‘nature,’” McCarthy writes, 
“derives from nascere: birth, natality.”
85
 She is no doubt thinking of Arendt’s concept of 
natality, “the miracle that saves the world…from its normal, ‘natural’ ruin,” that is, the 
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ability of “new men” to be born, not through a recovery of lost origins, but through the 
universal human capacity for beginning.
86
 This is the Peter Levi’s unfinished task. 
Ecocritic David Mazel claims that for all their criticism of industrial capitalism, 
the New York Intellectuals “failed to produce much of anything resembling an 
environmentally informed criticism.”
87
 As the women of the New York Intellectuals have 
often been excluded from histories of the group, it is possible that Mazel may not be 
considering McCarthy. Her Birds of America announces the end of a politics that is able 
to rely on nostalgic appeals to nature as a de facto commons, whether they are agrarian 
pastorals that industrial modernity interrupts or a primitivist escape from history and 
society into an undiscovered wilderness. The black swan that bites Peter is a harsh 
reminder that beauty is no guarantee of ecological stability or sustainability, and that 
species conservation guarantees no immediate human benefit. Nature might be dead, but 
that swan is not. We might ask if (or how) the swan’s bite signifies politically; or whether 
it is affirming its particular existence against a dead universality that would reduce it to 
scenery. If McCarthy’s vision of the world rests precariously on the brink of nihilism, its 
social “taxonomy” of humans and the politics of their ideas locates us on the same plane 
as other beings in nature, with whom we share an existence that is increasingly without 
guarantees.
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ENERGY FUTURES: JOHN UPDIKE’S FINANCIAL PETROFICTION 
The world keeps ending but new people too dumb to know it keep 
showing up as if the fun’s just started. 




On the night of April 18
th
, 1977, Jimmy Carter addressed the American public. 
“Good evening,” he began, “tonight I want to have an unpleasant talk with you about a 
problem that is unprecedented in our history.”
2
 This unpleasant talk was about the 
present, past, and future use of fossil fuels. Titled “The Energy Problem,” this speech was 
intended not only to set a national agenda of energy and environmental reform, but was to 
shore up the mission of his presidency: to restore trust in American institutions after the 
Vietnam War, Watergate, and the Oil Crisis of 1973-4. For Carter, oil was not just a 
problem of history but a problem for history, which is to say that a projected shortage of 
non-renewable energy resources signaled a crisis in modern institutions, evidence that 
liberal democracy and capitalism are incapable of imagining and producing a desirable 
future. “To stay even,” he claims, “we need the production of a new Texas every year, an 
Alaskan North Slope every 9 months, or a new Saudi Arabia every 3 years.” In other 
words, to maintain itself in time the US would need to produce new spaces capable of 
filling the metabolic gap in material energy exhausted by its routine existence. “Staying 
even” with 1977 levels of consumption would entail the expansion of extractive 
industries and a loss of national sovereignty as increasing amounts of the precious 
resource lie outside its immediate territorial boundaries, and subject to the whims of a 
                                                          
1
 John Updike, Rabbit is Rich (New York: Fawcett, 1981), 78. 
2
 Jimmy Carter, “The Energy Problem,” Jimmy Carter and the Energy Crisis of the 
1970s, ed. Daniel Horowitz (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 36-42. 
110 
 
global market. Carter argued that by not changing the way the United States constitutes 
and reproduces itself through petroleum, the country will persist only by destroying its 
own future and its own sense of history. His successor’s solution, “morning in America,” 
was an evasion of history—a deferral—that replaced the material with the affective as 
the speculative economy of finance took hold under neoliberalism. 
John Updike’s 1981 novel, Rabbit is Rich, was written and set during the energy 
crisis of 1979. It won both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award that year and 
affirmed the post-Carter narrative of “malaise” and “morning in America” in real time. 
By linking the ambivalent pleasures of Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom’s aging and death with 
the futural anxieties provoked by the energy crisis, Updike lends an existential credence 
to the environmental and economic concerns of the Carter administration while exposing 
the short-sided speculative solutions of the Reagan era. Jonathan Yardley, who won the 
Pulitzer Prize for criticism the year Rabbit is Rich was published, predicted that the book 
would be “gone and quite forgotten” in “a quarter century… if not sooner.”
3
 The novel 
remains relevant because the conditions which it describes still obtain. Updike’s realism 
articulates private emotions with the emerging political and economic landscape since the 
1980s. As Melinda Cooper observes, “the operative emotions of neoliberalism are neither 
interest nor rational expectations, but rather the essentially speculative but nonetheless 
productive movements of collective belief, faith, and apprehension.”
4
 In Cooper’s 
affective read of neoliberalism, we hear the echo of Irving Howe’s commentary in 1986 
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that “the main achievement of the Reagan administration has not been institutional or 
programmatic,” but rather, “it has consisted of a spectacular transformation of popular 
attitudes, values, and styles.”
5
 Updike’s realist aesthetic catalogues these transformations 
in the mundane, producing a structure of feeling specific to an era of energy and financial 
instability animated by speculative attitudes.   
 Rabbit is Rich builds on the psychological and political concerns of the previous 
two “Rabbit” novels—Rabbit, Run (1960) and Rabbit Redux (1971)—to address energy 
and economic anxieties. In this novel, Rabbit inherits a Toyota dealership just before the 
energy crisis and engages in monetary speculation and financial leveraging in the housing 
market. He discovers ways to profit in the deindustrializing and inflationary landscape of 
post-Fordist America. Yet Rabbit’s acquiescence to the reality (or apparent naturalness) 
of the market, as well as to the abstraction of “energy,” prevents him from imagining a 
future beyond the crises of his moment. From our vantage point, after the 2008 financial 
meltdown and intensified reliance on “tough oil,” we can recognize Updike’s realist 
setting of the 1979 energy crisis as existing within a temporal horizon and field of 
experience that we still inhabit. Indeed, while many scholars in the environmental 
humanities are turning to science-and-speculative fiction, social realism can help 
historically situate the transformation of attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and ideas, that 
deeply inform environmental imaginaries. Updike’s signature style of finding the tragic 
or beautiful in the mundane—the poetry in the petroleum—offers what Amitav Ghosh 
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calls an “oil encounter” in the U.S. at a time when the identity of Americans and 
petrocultural life appeared to be coming to an end.
6
 
The energy crises of 1973-4 and 1979 left in their wake a horizon of diminished 
expectations, symbolized most prominently by media images of “Sorry, No Gas” signs, 
long lines of automobiles, and a nation-wide trucker strike.
7
 The US was becoming aware 
of itself as a society constituted by petroleum; its national future, or at least the stability 
of its present, would depend on access to a resource that increasingly lay in the hands and 
lands of others. Environmental scientists had projected limits to non-renewable resources 
in the early 1970s, and along with the acknowledgement of those limits came a 
recognition of a temporal horizon—a time internal to the social reproduction of the 
industrial world—which culminated in a late-countercultural feeling that technological 
modernity had already seen its approaching end. To say that society faces an energy crisis 
means a challenge to its ability to reproduce itself and thus, a crisis of temporality: a 
relation to its own end. This consciousness is expressed by the UK poet, Dominic Fox: 
“The [end of oil] narrative declares that ‘another world’ is not only possible but 
inevitable, since this world cannot go on as it is (and, indeed, has in a sense already 
ended, inasmuch as its condition has already been diagnosed as terminal.)”
8
 This type of 
statement is often dismissed as an eschatological mode of politics that supplements its 
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call for change with the threat of catastrophe. Yet it also enunciates the antagonism that is 
environmental consciousness itself: as the abstract knowledge of biophysical limits to 
industrial modernity finds no subjective recognition within daily life, it produces a 
modern form of “alienated” consciousness within “post-industrial” society. 
This sentiment is expressed in the literature of the decade. A year before the 
Limits to Growth report was published, the narrator of E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of 
Daniel (1971), sardonically intones: “We must preserve our diminishing energies insofar 
as we direct them to the true objectives. A certain portion of the energy must be used for 
the regeneration of energy. That way you don’t just die like a bird falling, like a rock 
sinking, you die on a parabolic curve.”
9
 The narration evokes images of resource curves 
and consumption projections, rejecting, perhaps in advance, the calls for discipline and 
austerity implied by their shape. Where Doctorow’s New Left narrator conflates the 
individual’s libidinal economy with the material (and moral) economy of American 
Fordism, Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), presents what will be called “the 
energy crisis” through the temporal figure of the addict. As if anticipating the OPEC oil 
embargo later that year, he writes that, 
The System may or may not understand that it’s only buying time. And that time 
is an artificial resource to begin with, of no value to anyone or anything but the 
System, which sooner or later must crash to its death, when its addiction to energy 
has become more than the rest of the World can supply […] Living inside the 
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In this passage a petrol-powered symbol of countercultural utopianism—Ken 
Kesey’s bus of Merry Pranksters—is converted into a symbol of suicidal and narcissistic 
decadence. The temporality the bus inhabits, like that of an addict, is immanent to its next 
fix; it is a futurity internal to the petrocultural economy. A raging mania for spatial 
movement is symptomatic of the inability to transcend one’s historical condition, or to 
imagine a future becoming which would change the conditions that force one to drift. As 
contemporary industrial life is constituted through its reliance on fossil fuels, Pynchon 
identifies the mode of transgression particular to the system, a transgression that 
expresses the logic of the whole. He presents time as an endless present in which pasts 
and futures are the products of speculation that enable the present to sustain itself for as 
long as possible before crashing. A fury of activity prevents an actual future from being 
constructed; in this situation, the future can only be imagined as apocalypse, catastrophe, 
or messianic revolution (e.g. Foucault’s infamous support for the Islamic Revolution in 
1979): all figures that appear to come “from outside,” all figures that haunt a modernity 
which has yet to be rationalized. 
Updike’s choice to place Angstrom in charge of a Toyota dealership creates a 
petrofiction specific to the transformations in US society at the beginning of the 
neoliberal era. The Toyota showroom gives Rabbit a vantage point from which to survey 
the post-Fordist social landscape as he lives out its contradictions. Angstrom benefits 
from the dislocation of the US as a leader in the automobile industry, yet he laments this 
development. As Toyotas offer better gas mileage, he benefits from the crisis at the gas 
pumps, which was widely interpreted as a symptom of the US’s weakened international 
standing. “The fucking world is running out of gas,” Rabbit declares in the novel’s 
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opening paragraph. The rising fuel costs and shortages in the wake of the Iranian 
revolution and oil embargo called consumer attention to the finitude of the resource and 
to the geopolitical relationships that make that resource possible: the contingent 
relationships (mistaken for material certainties) on which the modernity of the 
industrialized world depends. But these relations are quickly naturalized. If America is 
running out of gas, Rabbit reasons, the world must be running out of gas. The Earth is 
winding down but Rabbit is still comfortable; he’s not satisfied, but he’s happy in that he 
thinks he’s in a position to be happy. His attempt at sunny optimism is troubled with 
internal doubts because he knows this arrangement cannot last. 
The Toyota dealership’s showroom is made into a space where heightened affect 
can circulate parasitically on the national discourse. The novel opens one month prior to 
Carter’s “Energy and National Goals” speech, known later as the “Crisis of Confidence” 
speech. The president’s ominous tone hangs over the dealership and finds its way into the 
exchanges with coworkers and customers. Charlie Stavros, a familiar character and 
coworker, dialogically challenges Rabbit’s sunny view of their situation through half-
digested bits of contradictory news events, personal anecdotes, and speculations. When 
Harry remarks that “Mother Earth is drying up,” and that the crisis is “too big” for the oil 
companies, Stavros replies: “You know damn well Carter and the oil companies have 
rigged this whole mess. What does Big Oil want? Bigger profits. What does Carter want? 
Less oil imports, less depreciation of the dollar. He’s too chicken to ration, so he’s hoping 
higher prices will do it for him.”
11
 This bit of political economy seems lost on Rabbit, 
until he turns it into a conspiracy to sell a young couple on a car. “Did you notice in the 
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paper this morning,” he asks, “where Carter is taking gas from farmers and going to give 
it to the truckers? Shows the power of a gun, doesn’t it?”
12
  
Rabbit begins his sales pitch by playing up contemporary political fears and 
uncertainties around oil and eventually succeeds in selling the car to the young couple as 
an investment, a way to ensure stability in a turbulent future. While on a test drive, Rabbit 
makes a series of paratactic statements, each intended to increase the social anxiety of the 
couple. Evoking death and the “new industry of gas pump shrouds,” he remarks: “You 
know it seems gruesome to me, all these gas stations closed up like somebody has died.” 
Next: “Did you see in the paper where the Hershey company has had to lay off nine 
hundred people because of the trucker’s strike? Next thing we’ll be in lines for Hershey 
bars.”
13
 Each of these statements passively reinforces the prevailing consciousness of oil 
scarcity and systemic insecurity as well as national decline. As they drive downtown he 
remarks on how businesses have been “pulling out” and that people are afraid to go 
downtown for fear of crime. Back at the dealership, Rabbit tries his final appeal: 
identification.  
“We like to help young people out. I think it’s a helluva world we’re coming to, 
where a young couple like yourselves can’t afford to buy a car or own a home. If 
you can’t get your foot on even the bottom rung of a society geared like this, 
people are going to lose faith in the system. The Sixties were a lark in the park 




 Rabbit’s strategy mobilizes this uncertainty to make the sale. His pitch highlights 
the growing sense of social insecurity, signs that the future will not be bright, but 
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paradoxically, this insecurity, this lack of faith in the system, becomes the reason to buy a 
new Toyota. In Capital and Affects, the Swiss economist Christian Marazzi connects the 
“existential malaise” of the late 1970s to a “climate of pervasive insecurity;” “the ‘no 
future’ widely anticipated by some youth movements of the 1970s,” was generated by 
successive oil shocks, unemployment, and restructuring of the workforce.
15
 However, 
these ambivalent and disenchanted sentiments are, in the words of Paolo Virno, “put to 
work” in post-Fordist “offices of chatter.”
16
 Markets are able to thrive on the 
disenchantments they generate, implicating entire genres—from “transgressive” 
apocalyptic literature to punk music—in the process. 
In the previous novel, Rabbit Redux, Rabbit worked in a linotype factory, an 
industry singled out by Antonio Gramsci as the quintessential example of Fordist labor.
17
 
Industrialism stood opposed to an unruly “animality” in which the instincts were 
disciplined according to the logic of organized social reproduction.
18
 Fordism implied 
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more than high wages capable of supporting a consumerist economy, it was a mode of 
regulation that organized social, sexual (reproductive), gender, and communicative 
relations. In Gramsci’s description, linotype work necessitates a split between body and 
emotions: as the mechanical actions of the 20
th
 century Taylorist worker become 
divorced from the “human content” of printed communication material, language itself 
becomes reduced from an expression of subjectivity to what Heidegger, in his late 
writings, calls its “technical-scientific image.” The dream of Fordism culminates in the 
cybernetic circuit of labor, capital, consumption, production, and communication. 
Heidegger’s claim that “cybernetics transforms language into an exchange of news” and 
that “the arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information,” anticipates the 
instrumentalization of communication under post-Fordism.
19
 However, the news that 
Rabbit exchanges is chosen deliberately to create an environment of expectations—in 
other words, what is communicated is different than what is explicitly said. 
Rabbit’s job is to manage how the couple interprets their consumer choice as a 
competitive strategy within an uncertain horizon of expectation, mobilizing cynicism, 
fear, and opportunism, as engines of market exchange. His labor is humanistic; Rabbit 
constructs narrative contexts and his customers perform the proper interpretive acts. He 
has the ability to deploy a variety of contradictory discourses, as when he code switches 
between racist and anti-racist idioms as he encourages his son to buy a Toyota instead of 
a Ford.  
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Contrasted with the Fordist example of linotype work, post-Fordist labor is 
“increasingly communicative and symbolic,” and “based on the signs, images, and 
representations of a specific socio-cultural context.”
 20
 What has now come to be called 
the “Toyotaist revolution” was effectively the transformation of the alienated Taylorist 
assembly line worker into a team-based networked worker focused on communication 
and efficiency. In Western Europe and the United States, this meant “metabolizing” the 
“social and cultural critique of the Fordist model.” According to Marazzi, the new 
management philosophies “put to work the most common, most public (‘informal’) 
qualities of the workforce… language, communicative-relational action.”
21
 Rabbit 
produces what Maurizio Lazzarato, the philosopher of immaterial labor, calls an 




Rabbit believes “the cars sell themselves,” but this is a kind of open cynicism. 
Admitting to himself that “the Toyota commercials on television are out there all the 
time, preying on people’s minds,” he takes pleasure being a symbol—Chief Sales 
Representative—of that community recognition. The “airiness” he feels, “standing there 
in his own skin, casting a shadow,” is a sensation of blissful detachment, liberated even 
from the affects he circulates.
23
 This experience is mirrored by the Toyota commercials, 
which evoke a metaphysical freedom through images of “men and women leaping, 
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average men and women, their clothes lifted in cascading slow-motion folds like angels’ 
robes, like some intimate violence of chemical mating or hummingbird wing magnified 
and laid bare in its process, leaping and falling, grinning and then in freeze-frame 
hanging there, defying gravity.”
24
 Updike’s aging character embodies the newly 
dominant mode of immaterial labor; instead of manufacturing durable commodities he 
produces affects, desires, and interpretations. At the same time, Updike evokes the twin 
contexts of national feeling in 1979’s energy crisis: the utopian desire of economically 
strapped citizens to be free from material constraints and the drive of capital to overcome 
its own material barriers through financial mobilization. 
The higher gas mileage of Toyota represents a strategy for increasing consumer 
resilience at the pump. Timothy Mitchell remarks that “since most users cannot easily 
switch to alternative sources of energy” oil is different than other commodities in that its 
demand is not linked to price.
25
 Because of the fixed demand of industrial economies and 
infrastructures, oil tends to have a reverse elasticity; as price goes up demand for it goes 
up. Angstrom and Stavros witness the evidence of this in the erratic behavior of 
consumers in gas lines and at the dealership. As they pile up money, they express little 
hope for future generations. “I figure the oil’s going to run out about the same time I do,” 
Rabbit says; “Seems funny to say it, but I’m glad I lived when I did. These kids coming 
up, they’ll be living on table scraps. We had the meal.”
26
 Rabbit makes a living selling a 
future that he can’t imagine and doesn’t believe in. The ambivalence represented here, in 
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the shift from cynically believing in the crisis in order to sell cars, to cynical disbelief—
acknowledging that the crisis is very real but continuing on as before even with the 
understanding that one’s activity is part of the crisis—is the subjective “flexible” 
response to a situation in which no viable alternative presents itself. Rabbit’s efforts to 
overcome this instability through monetary and housing speculation become the very 
mutation through which capitalism was to sustain itself.  
Energy shortages are thus one source for Rabbit’s resigned attitude that there is no 
alternative. The other is generational anxiety over social reproduction. Harry is doubtful 
about the US energy future as the country is increasingly reliant on a volatile global 
market for the material it needs to reproduce itself. He’s uneasy about the role that his 
dealership, a foreign company whose banner reads “TOYOTA = TOTAL ECONOMY,” 
plays in his familial reproduction as his son, Nelson, goes to work in the showroom.
27
 He 
encourages Nelson, a college dropout who is ambivalent about his own future, to go into 
solar panels, saying “that’s where the future is,” and that “the party’s over” for cars; but 
one has the sense that neither he nor Nelson believe it.
28
 Melanie, pregnant with Nelson’s 
child, mouths an unconvincing green vitalism claiming that “as long as there are growing 
things, there’s still a world of endless possibilities.”
29
 Rabbit is Rich provides no positive 
images or articulations of the future, it only presents characters who try to extend the 
present through various strategies of short-term speculation, and through managing 
expectations. Updike’s realism registers what critics refer to as the financialization of 
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culture. It is a petrofiction of the United States at a time when energy shocks were 
becoming the motivating force behind the political and economic restructuring of post-
Fordism, and gives a narrative form to the atmosphere of uncertainty out of which 
emerged neoliberalism and its speculative relation to the future. 
 
From Postmodern to Petromodern 
Andrew Ross was one of the first cultural studies scholars to discuss the 
“futurological” implications projected shortages in reports like the Limits to Growth.
30
 
The report elicited utopian and apocalyptic responses across the political spectrum. The 
most hostile were those who rejected its call for rational planning, but the majority 
simply took it as a sign that the future—imagined as a progressive increase in standard of 
living and resource consumption—was receding before them. In effect, the material 
struggles of North Atlantic workers came into conflict with a new awareness of the global 
resource and labor base that made those gains possible. Ross revisited the Report in a 
paper given at the University of Bologna in 2010. Titled “Life and Labor in the Era of 
Climate Justice,” he looks back at its message and considers how it might be implicated 
in the political transition from postwar embedded liberalism to neoliberalism. His 
emphasis on the turn to speculation highlights the shift in temporality that normalizes the 
conditions of insecurity: 
Not long after the Limits to Growth report was issued, the norms of public 
provision, which had ensured a degree of social equity in the Fordist compact, fell 
under attack. Tax reform, fiscal austerity, deregulation and privatization, 
structural adjustment, crumbling of secure work, and the general shredding of 
social welfare dramatically eroded most of the postwar gains for workers, and 
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pushed them underwater. The only compensation on offer was a lottery ticket in 
the speculative housing market–sparking a highly unsustainable round of land 
development which ended in the worst global recession since the 1930s. In 





This structural and conceptual short-termism explains the failed efforts at long-
term investments in renewable energies. Long-term investment, nationally “embedded” 
capital, and regulated financial markets, were replaced by short-term contracts in a 
service economy as companies moved manufacturing overseas for cheaper labor, and to 
states with less environmental regulation. Neoliberalism, a belief that freedom consists in 
individual entrepreneurial agency and that government should intervene on behalf of 
market freedoms, came to power as a fully articulated ideology with the election of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Institutional neoliberalism, on the other hand, 
began during the Carter administration with the deregulation of the transportation sector 
and Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker, who “shocked” the economy out of 
stagflation by raising interest rates some twenty points overnight in October of 1979. This 
supply-side solution replaced the Keynesian assumptions that underwrote social 
protections in the Fordist interlude. “Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard 
the productive economy against the fluctuations of financial capital,” writes Melinda 
Cooper, “neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production.”
32
 By 
monetizing futurity, contemporary capitalism encourages short-term speculation that 
disrupts the ability of societies to address long-term problems like energy, economy, and 
ecology. This reorganization of life under the “real abstractions” of finance produces 
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effects of temporality—of historical change—but it amounts to a closure of an authentic 
future.  
David Harvey describes the “neoliberalization” that brought Fordist 
Keynesianism to an end as “the financialization of everything.”
33
 Melinda Cooper 
attributes this financial turn under neoliberalism to an “ambition to overcome the 
ecological and economic limits to growth associated with the end of industrial 
production, through a speculative reinvention of the future.”
34
 She articulates the 
historical relation between knowledge of limits to natural resources (and ecological 
reproduction) with the temporality of financial speculation; together, this combination 
produces a new relation to the future that allows the present conjuncture to be continually 
reorganized in the interests of continued accumulation. Capital accumulation stands 
opposed to materiality, except when it needs it. Horkheimer and Adorno criticize the 
universal reign of exchange value as it renders people, places, and even the planet 
“universally fungible:” just one more decaying stockpile on the way to the bank.
35
 The 
waves of inflation generated by the oil shocks of the 1970s were a harsh reminder of 
petroleum’s materiality—it was not just another commodity. In Cooper’s words “the very 
stuff of Fordist mass manufacture” was comprised of petroleum in the form of “plastics, 
fabrics… fertilizers and herbicides.”
36
 The factories and infrastructures that predated the 
oil crises, like virtually all forms of industrial technology, were built with certain fixed 
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requirements of energy inputs. According to Barry Bluestone, “the average age of 




This lack of flexibility contributes to the overall inelasticity of oil demand and 
introduces systemic bottlenecks in factories, machines, and vehicles. As Rabbit 
complains, “Oil going up takes everything up with it; in the five years I’ve been in charge 
heating costs have doubled, electricity is way up, delivery costs are up, plus all these 
social security hikes and unemployment to pay.”
38
 A price spike or “scarcity” introduced 
in one part of the industrial chain will have cascading effects throughout the system. The 
immensity of this edifice on which so much depends often appears to operate according 
to fixed, quasi-natural laws, becoming a kind of second nature.
39
  
This edifice represents an externalized economic logic that has taken on the 
appearance of the world itself, what Stephanie LeMenager has named 
“petromodernity.”
40
 Modernity, always more of a qualitative than chronological 
experience, has been shaped over the last century by readily available, cheap petroleum. 
Petroleum-based mobility and consumer products have become an inextricable part of 
contemporary experience of self-hood, temporality, and the world. Petroleum has defined 
the infrastructural contours of nation-states and defined the boundaries when it becomes 
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an object of contestation between them. High levels of resource use have generated a 
kind of petro-normativity, in which the material satisfaction of needs and desires are 
surpassed by aspirational levels of conspicuous consumption to produce what Matthew 
Huber describes as an infinitely mobile, entrepreneurial, neoliberal subject.
41
 For better or 
worse, the circulation of petroleum is thus linked with the imagination of historical 
progress as industrial development and freedom as a life beyond necessity guaranteed by 
that development. The crisis that energy presents to the imagination of history is unique 
in that it carries significance beyond the mere technocratic procurement of a resource. 
Here, Janet Roitman’s argument for a narratological understanding of the concept of 
crisis is useful:  
[C]risis is mobilized in narrative constructions to mark out or to designate 
‘moments of truth;’ it is taken to be a means to access historical truth, and even a 
means to think ‘history’ itself. Such moments of truth are often defined as turning 
points in history, when decisions are taken or events are decided, thus establishing 
a particular teleology. And similarly, though seemingly without recourse to 




What has come to be called the energy crisis is the laying bare of the normativity 
that defines petromodernity. It calls into question the materiality out of which 
contemporary global societies are made and through which they reproduce themselves; 
perhaps even more traumatically, it calls into question the narratives through which we 
organize historical experience. As petromodernity is called into question, individuals and 
societies are forced to confront the material horizon of their own subjectivity and face a 
decision as to how to remake themselves and the world they have known. It is tempting 
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for many on the left and right to dismiss events like the 1979 energy crisis and to say 
there was no real shortage, that was “politically contrived” by Big Oil (if you are on the 
left) or by Big Government (if you are on the right).
43
 But this misses the existential and 
phenomenological component of the crisis. Here, we might distinguish a crisis of 
petromodernity from a crisis of what some critics have started to call “petro-capitalism.” 
In an effort to link energy regimes with historical formations of capitalism, critics like 
Imre Szeman and Frederick Buell
44
 have tried to periodize our present cultural moment 
by attaching the prefix “petro” to capitalism. They contrast petro-capitalism with coal-
capitalism and wind-capitalism. The argument is that a crisis in the dominant form of 
energy signals a crisis in the reproduction of capitalism itself. However, this elides the 
fact that coal is still quite dominant in large parts of the global economy, not to mention a 
variety of other sources. Like “capitalisms” of the past, global finance operates across 
uneven and combined development. The recognition of a crisis for petromodernity may 
not mean a crisis in capitalism. Nevertheless, one cannot describe and conjuncturally 
locate contemporary experience without framing it in relation to petromodernity. 
Through a familiar trope of the Rabbit novels Updike reveals the cracks in the 
edifice of petromodernity. Angstrom conducts a narrative survey of Pennsylvanian towns 
like he has throughout the series. The free indirect style in these moments historicize 
changes in the social landscape, defining both the particular “scene,” in the words of 
Updike scholar Dilvo Ristoff, as well as Rabbit’s perspective as an “agent” in that 
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 Updike is thus able to offer descriptions of historically changing social landscape 
through the subjective and situated historical consciousness of the main character. These 
scenes now look over deindustrialized landscapes and evoke a melancholic acceptance of 
both decline and persistence that, when overlapped with the aging subjectivity and class 
position of the main character, enable a redemptive pleasure through the affirmation of 
decay. This narrative trope challenges the appearance of a transhistorical objective 
“natural” background and gives historical specificity to both the landscape and the 
subjectivity of the viewer.  
After the opening scene at the dealership, we find Angstrom behind the wheel of 
his 1978 Luxury Edition Toyota Corona driving through Brewer, PA. He is driving as 
much through personal memory and social history as his voice merges with the narration. 
“Railroads and coal made Brewer,” he says. “Everywhere in this city […] structures 
speak of expended energy.”
46
 The architecture and urban space contains the material 
traces of an abundance of fossil fuels and the might of industrial capital. Moving past old 
factories whose “shapely stacks have not issued smoke for half a century,” railroad yards, 
and old textile plants, he finds them replaced by ophthalmologist offices and discount 
clothing outlets lined with banners announcing to customers that they are entering a place 
“Where a Dollar is Still a Dollar,” perhaps pining nostalgically (or paranoiacly) for the 
stable referent which gave their previous lives value.
47
 The fixed capital—buildings and 
machinery—that produced the post-war abundance now lie empty and rusting, alongside 
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a population left precarious and bitter. At one time a victim of deindustrialization—
having been let go from the linotype factory when the industry became computerized—he 
now looks on the scene as a “silent movie.”  Trees were planted to obscure the view of 
the city from the suburbs; the unintended forest downtown, originally for beautification, 
has become a shelter for muggers and the homeless, as if to confirm the continuation of 
barbarism under the false image of nature.  
Updike temporalizes the experience of petro-shocked modernity by narrating it 
through the main character’s bodily decline. Through his own aging, Rabbit comes to 
identify with a planet growing old, a maturity associated with exhaustion and entropy. 
Angstrom is concerned about future generations, but his subjectivity is capable of 
becoming so inflated that it identifies its own decadence with the Earth itself. Rabbit 
treats the abundance of petroleum as a given, disavowing his knowledge of the industry’s 
transnational nature and that the US has built itself on a finite resource. The way of life 
that Rabbit’s generation enjoyed becomes newly visible and fragile in its moment of 
crisis, just like the American power that sustains it. And just as the petroculture 
naturalizes the existence of readily available and cheap resources, so too does it 
naturalize its decline: it becomes possible to think of the decline of petroleum (and 
American petroculture) as the decline of nature itself. This negative image of American 
life is what Harry, now passing middle-age, sees from the showroom of the Toyota 
dealership: “it gives him pleasure, makes Rabbit feel rich, to contemplate the world’s 
wasting, to know that the earth is mortal too.”
48
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The term for this specific pleasure is jouissance. Jacques Lacan expands its sexual 
connotation to describe the “paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his 
symptom, or […] the suffering that he derives from his own satisfaction.”
49
 Rabbit’s 
pleasure—his rich feeling—comes through the identification of his own death with the 
death of the world so that, paradoxically, his (generation’s) wasteful activity is redeemed 
by the world’s death. He contemplates “the world’s wasting,” but this ambivalent way of 
phrasing it draws out its dual meaning: the active wasting of the world’s resources on the 
one hand, and the world “passively” wasting away through cosmic environmental entropy 
on the other. In the same way that he mistakes the market scarcity of oil for “energy” in 
the cosmic sense, Rabbit understands the deindustrializing landscape of Brewer, PA, as a 
natural process of decay and ruin rather than a symptom of capital flight. The title itself—
Rabbit is Rich—references Harry Angstrom’s jouissance as he consciously profits off 
America’s “bad news,” redeeming his guilty conscious by affirming the death of the 
world. 
Back in the showroom, Stavros remarks that “people don’t care about 
economizing anymore,” and that “Big Oil has sold capitalism down the river, what the 
czar did for the Russians, Big Oil is doing for us.”
50
 The analogy is that the czars 
inadvertently prepared the ground for revolutionary upheaval, suggesting that America’s 
economic dependency on corporate-supplied cheap energy is undermining both 
democratic sovereignty and the individual as an economizing actor. Rabbit evades these 
conclusions, implying that both nation-states and oil companies are subject to the 
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irrationality of the global market, and must struggle in this larger atmosphere of risk. He 
finds these debates strangely distant from everyday affairs. Against the background of 
inflation, Carter’s voluntaristic calls to conserve energy echo as a new form of austerity. 
Rather than undermining the “economizing actor,” however, the low demand elasticity of 
the high energy economy is actually driving individualized forms of market discipline. 
During the US Papal visit, for instance, Harry frets over the energy requirements that 
accompany demands for better working conditions: 
[J]ust the [heating] oil for the showroom and offices and garage has doubled since 
‘74… and will double in the next year or two again and when you try to cut it 
down to where the President says, the men in the garage complain, they have to 
work with their bare hands… guys under thirty now just will not work without 
comfort and all the perks, a whole new ethic, soft, socialism, heat tends to rise in a 
big space like that and hang up there amid the crossbraces, if they built it now 
they’d put in twenty inches of insulation. If the Pope is so crazy about babies why 




In this passage, a class antagonism over heating energy displaces traditional 
figures of moral and political authority (church and state). Heat, when it becomes an 
issue, highlights the distinction between those who “work with their bare hands” and 
those who, like Rabbit, perform the communicative and emotional labor of selling cars. 
In one of the few passages where “the men in the garage” appear, Rabbit’s open 
hypocrisy is on display. Throughout the novel readers see how much he consciously 
values “perks” and the “soft ethic” of his comfortable income. Not wanting to share his 
comfort, he resents the mechanics as well as the yet to be born, understanding them as a 
material threat to his consumption of resources; he refuses an ethical relation to future 
generations and toward social reproduction generally. The energy crisis has weakened the 
normative force of traditional “reproductive futurity,” which appears quaintly inefficient, 
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certainly not befitting Toyota’s “TOTAL ECONOMY” ethos.
52
 Absent the promised 
legislation for developing renewable energy, Carter’s calls to action shift the 
responsibility of the crisis to the atomized consumer-manager, who is encouraged to 
adopt new strategies of belt-tightening at home and discipline in the work place. The 
diffusion of management from traditional bureaucratic institutions into the micropolitical 
sphere marks the transition to what Gilles Deleuze calls “societies of control,” as it 
embeds the discipline of austerity in the atomized workplace.
53
 This discipline is colored 
by a distrust of reproduction, as short-term survival overtakes long-term planning. In 
Rabbit’s case, survival means maintaining his degree of newfound comfort as he 
religiously reads Consumer Reports. 
 
Future Deficits 
I am reminded of how long-term data forecasting the correlation between 
energy reserves and the demographic curve of the earth’s population 
increasingly came to affect middle- and short-term planning data in 
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Rabbit turns to monetary speculation which becomes a way to both produce 
wealth and reinvigorate his and Janice’s flagging sex life. His seduction into monetary 
speculation occurs through the same communicative labor that he himself deploys on the 
floor of the showroom. These exchanges repeat the structure of his sales pitch: an 
authoritative statement followed by a dubious reference to world events that portends 
something significant, but that generates a sense that someone else knows something that 
one does not. It generates a perceived lack of knowledge, or structural information 
deficit, in the subject. The purpose is to instill a sense of uncertainty in the listener who is 
encouraged to profit in some way by recognizing and acting on this knowledge gap. This 
is more than a sales tactic. It represents a qualitative change in the discourse of the novel, 
one that marks its participation in what Cooper describes above as the “speculative 
reinvention of the future” under neoliberalism. The parallel speech patterns suggest an 
effort by Updike to represent the diffusion of this logic throughout the scene of the novel. 
Rabbit falls prey to these appeals when Webb Murkett convinces him to “get into” gold. 
“It’s up over sixty per cent in less than a year and I see no reason for it not to 
appreciate at the same rate as long as the world energy situation holds. The dollar 
is bound to keep leaking, Harry, until they figure out how to get gasoline cheap 




In this passage, oil, metals, and wheat are presented as stable, and it is the 
dollar—by extension US influence—that is “leaking” value. This echoes a thought Rabbit 
had earlier: “Money is like water in a leaky bucket: no sooner [stored] there, it begins to 
drip.”
56
 Since the dollar has been delinked from the gold standard there is no longer 
stable referent to “contain” the value of money and no global “supranational currency” 
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that could serve to stabilize value. For the characters to produce value, that is to make 
money, money itself must be called into question. In speculation, what is at stake is not 
the “fundamental value” of any particular thing, but rather the sheer movement of value 
across things. Staying “ahead of the curve”—a phrase that takes on new meaning when 
one considers resource curves—here, means exploiting any perceived lack in knowledge 
in others’ activity and working to take advantage of that difference. We see how this lack 
is produced when Webb convinces Harry to sell gold for silver. 
“The little man in America has caught the fever and when the little man climbs on 
the bandwagon the smart money gets off. Silver, now that’s another story: the 
Hunt brothers down in Texas are buying up silver futures at the rate of millions a 




In the above passage, the urge to stay ahead of the “little man” is simultaneously a 
fear of becoming the little man and a “fear of falling” out of the middle class.
58
 “Many 
individual investors,” observes Robert Shiller, “think that institutional investors dominate 
the market and that these ‘smart money’ investors have sophisticated models to 
understand prices, superior knowledge.”
59
 The Hunt brothers represent the power that 
comes with knowledge of the market and the behavior of its individual agents. 
“Financialization,” Marazzi writes, “depends on mimetic rationality, a kind of herd 
behavior based on the information deficit of individual investors.”
60
 Citing the studies of 
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behavioral finance theorists, he finds that these structural information deficits underwrite 
this form of imitative behavior. Individual investors submit to what they believe to be 
“nature itself” in the form of market forces. Really, they are submitting to something of 
their own creation, while their herd-like behavior becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Rabbit may believe he is out-smarting the “little man” but in actuality he is playing into 
the Hunt brothers’ attempt to corner the market on silver. 
Updike was almost certainly aware of this historical irony. The Hunt brothers 
were not fictional, and their 1979 attempts to corner the silver and silver futures market 
led to the “Silver Thursday” collapse (and subsequent bailout) in March of 1980. The 
narrative reference appears in December of 1979, in the five month bubble when silver 
went from nineteen dollars an ounce to a peak of over fifty dollars an ounce in January. 
Across the country people were “selling family heirlooms and other silver articles” to 
cash in on the high prices.
61
 After new rules were passed, however, prices dropped back 
to ten dollars an ounce within twenty four hours, leaving the Hunt brothers owing over a 
billion dollars. They were bailed out by other banks, with the “blessing” of Paul Volcker, 
in part by exchanging their offshore oil rights in the Beaufort Sea, north of Alaska.
62
 
Updike plays on the exuberance surrounding the Hunt brothers’ silver bubble with full 
historical knowledge of the collapse they will have caused. 
The “irrational exuberance” characteristic of the Reagan era has its economic 
corollary in what Marazzi calls momentum financing. Prices rise and fall on the basis of 
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what investors think other investors are thinking. Reflexivity, as Jodi Dean argues, is 
built into neoliberal exchange itself; it presumes a “critical” subject.
63
 Instead of acting in 
response to information, economic actors respond on the basis of how they expect others 
to respond. The rational kernel of speculative behavior, in Marazzi’s estimation, comes 
from the self-referential nature of value in the post-Fordist reality: money, as the value-
form, is no longer founded on gold or other material referent, but rather in the circulation 
of opinion and information. He argues that “the disassociation between economic value 
and exchange value is symmetrical to the disassociation between individual belief and 
collective belief.”
64
 In other words, as each individual believes they are acting against the 
wave of the collective, they are collectively individuated as competing subjects. In the 
same way, the discourse in the Toyota showroom is parasitic on the national discourse in 
that it relies on an imagined collectivity in order to encourage individuals to act in their 
perceived economic self-interests. “The modalities of communication of what the ‘others’ 
consider a good,” Marazzi continues, “count more than what is communicated.” 
This mode of communication is on display at the metal store, Fiscal Alternatives, 
when the clerk (who is no specialist on international affairs) persuades Rabbit to make a 
risky trade from gold to silver. “Precious metals aren’t a bubble,” she tells him, “Precious 
metals are the ultimate security. I myself think what’s brought the Arab money into gold 
was not so much Iran as the occupation of the Great Mosque. When the Saudis are in 
trouble, then it’s really a new ballgame.”
65
 Here, the Saudis occupy the position of the 
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Hunt brothers as an additional (perhaps meaningless) piece of information that upsets the 
listener’s previously held social interpretations. Each new piece of information could 
signal that the game has changed and one does not want to be in a position of playing by 
an obsolete set of rules and assumptions. Metals are again posited as a secure foundation 
beneath and beyond the flexible constructions of contemporary economic and cultural 
life. For Rabbit, it becomes a contradictory response to the country’s “bad news.”  
While lamenting US decline, his speculative efforts become a private retreat from 
identification with the country and with the national future that he can no longer imagine. 
These exchanges confirm the existence of an economy of knowledge, but it is not a 
“knowledge economy” in the way that Daniel Bell and others intended. From Rabbit’s 
sales pitch to his seduction into monetary speculation, each of these exchanges 
instrumentalize communication to generate a sense of uncertainty which becomes the 
affective condition of possibility for economic activity—a form of hedging against a 
future over which one has no claim except as a competitive individual in a naturalized 
market. Speculation, based as it is in vision, orients the viewer towards the world as a 
spectator. The world becomes reified as something against which one competes through 
submitting to larger forces rather than something that one participates in creating. 
Whereas this response reinforces a split between subjective viewer and objective 
conditions, Updike’s realism portrays Rabbit as all-too-much a part of the scene he 
surveys.  
By moving their money out of savings and into speculative markets, Rabbit does 
what many households were doing at the time. Critics like Randy Martin and Max 
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Haiven have referred to this as “the financialization of daily life.”
66
 For Marazzi, this 
began with “the diversion of savings from household economies to stocks and securities 
[which was] part of the trend shifting the financing of the economy from the banking 
sector to the securities sector.”
67
 After making quick trades on gold and silver, Harry and 
Janice use the money to put a down payment on a house. This becomes their “lottery 
ticket,” to recall Ross’ description, insofar as inflation continues. Re-establishing the 
household on this new basis becomes an occasion for Updike to eroticize this process. 
Harry and Janice rejuvenate their flagging and “post-productive” sex life through these 
speculative endeavors, allegorizing Cooper’s observation that the “speculative 
reinvention of the future” contained within it an “ambition to overcome” material limits 
associated with Fordist industrial production and familial reproduction.
68
 The futural 
imagination is no longer located in the bodily labor of making babies—reproducing the 
family unit—nor is it in the national future. Rather than saving and investing with a belief 
in a stable and growing US economy, the Angstroms’ financial future is wagered against 
stability. The production unit of the family has exploded beyond its traditional 
coordinates.   
The first sex scene in which they are mutually aroused occurs when Harry brings 
home the gold Kruggerands. He presents them to her as “a dead man reborn.” With gold 
as a guarantor of value against dollar depreciation, he again has a future; “No coffin dark 
                                                          
66
 Randy Martin, The Financialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia, Temple University 
Press, 2002); Max Haiven, Cultures of Financialization: Fictitious Capital in Popular 
Culture and Everyday Life (New York: Palgrave, 2014). 
67
 Christian Marazzi, Capital and Language, 21. 
68
 Cooper, 11. 
139 
 
greets his open eyes,” as it will with his granddaughter, “just his wife’s out-of-focus 
face.” “The beauty of gold is, it loves bad news,” he tells her; “as the dollar sinks, gold 
goes up. All the Arabs are turning their dollars into gold.” Rabbit combines the image of 
alchemy—turning things into gold—with a hint of lavish orientalism. Their bodies are 
described in ugly and comical terms. Janice’s body is breakable, old, fragile, while his 
body is “massive and bearing down.” The sheer weight of their bodies is foregrounded—
“the depressions their interlocked weights make in the mattress”—against the bodiless 
promise of value contained (though not exhausted by) the gold coins, which move about 
the bed. “A kind of interest compounds,” as they command each other not to orgasm; 
their activity is sustained for as long as Rabbit is able to think about “the recent hike in 
the factory base price of Corollas.”
69
  
It is incorrect to say that the financial economy is “non-productive” or 
“fictitious.” It is a very real part of the economy; it produces value, enables accumulation, 
and has very tangible social and political effects. For instance, the profits from gold and 
silver trading allow Harry and Janice to put a down payment on a house. They wager that 
increased inflation will eventually turn them a profit in the housing market. This type of 
speculation and risk—the high of profiting off of generalized misfortune—is also 
eroticized: 
“That’s the beauty of inflation,” he says seductively to Janice. “The more you 
owe, the better you do… You pay off in shrunken dollars, and the interest Uncle 
Sam picks up as an income tax deduction. Even after buying the Krugerrands and 
paying the September taxes we have too much money in the bank, money in the 
bank is for dummies now. Sock it into the down payment for a house, we’d be 
letting the bank worry about the dollar going down and have the house 
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appreciating ten, twenty per cent a year at the same time.” Her cunt is moistening, 




This process is commonly referred to as leveraging. Rabbit is willing to risk his 
down payment on a house against the chances that inflation will continue, which will 
cause the dollar value of the house to increase, and that the bank will assume the risk of 
loaning money at fixed interest rates against the unstable value of the dollar. Like the 
gold and silver that increase in value (against the dollar’s value) when there is “bad 
news,” and like his Toyota dealership that profits from US energy instability, Rabbit 
finds a way to prolong his richness through speculative endeavors. Eroticizing this 
process of leveraging gives a new meaning to the so-called “post-productive” economy, 
where value is generated as people exploit information deficits and “post-material” 
conceptions of value. This subjective response is very much a historical part of the “real” 
economy. To the extent that the traditional novel has often posed “biographical solutions 
to systemic contradictions,” through its realism, Rabbit is Rich demonstrates that this 
mimesis can hold up for critique the kind of imitative behavior which naturalizes the 
neoliberal economy.  
 
National Narratives 
The intended effect of Carter’s speeches was to reconfigure US history around a 
collective project. His vision was framed by the energy project—developing renewable 
sources and retrofitting infrastructure—but it also contained a cultural project. The 
cooperation and discipline (i.e. solidarity) this would require, he believed, would restore 
the traditional values that had been dissolved in consumer capitalism. He was in close 
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contact with two social theorists—Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch—with whom he 
had dinner immediately before penning his “Energy and National Goals” speech. 
Whereas Lasch diagnosed American culture as a “narcissistic” personality structure, Bell 
sought to locate current events within what he called “the cultural contradictions of 
capitalism.”
71
 In Bell’s analysis, 20
th
 century capitalism produces a contradictory culture 
that demands discipline in the workplace and wildness in the market, which has led to an 
individualistic cultural modernism that undermines the values associated with public 
responsibility. The rebelliousness of the late 60s counterculture, in his estimation, was 
itself an expression of capitalist desire. Both thinkers had been leftists who moved to the 
center and now believed the country’s social problems (and solutions) were to be found 
in culture rather than political economy.  
Carter’s speeches appear in the free indirect speech of the characters. The 
culturalist sentiments of Bell and Lasch manifest themselves in Angstrom’s attitudes 
toward the younger generation and toward his marriage with Janice, which he describes 
as “a real crisis of confidence.”
72
 Carter sought to give the United States a historical 
purpose, to redefine time through a national narrative, and to posit a horizon of the 
energy crisis as, in Roitman’s phrasing, “a temporality on which one can act.”
73
 It would 
be through collective action that historical progress would be re-established. “On the 
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battlefield of energy,” Carter asserts, “we can win for our Nation a new confidence, and 
we can seize control again of our common destiny.”
74
 Rabbit has no such battlefield to 
restore his confidence; he has no leverage over the political circumstances that dictate the 
price of oil, he can only opportunistically profit off of fluctuations. As a character, the 
contradictions he embodies can only be resolved at a higher level. By conflating 
technology with history—the urgent need to master the instruments of our mastery—
Carter’s appeal announces a new dialectic of modernity itself.  
Rabbit is Rich challenges similar postwar narratives. The narrative of white baby 
boomers is challenged, for instance, during an exchange between Rabbit and Webb 
Murkett when Webb suggests that that the younger generation has “seen the world go 
crazy since they were age two, from JFK’s assassination right through Vietnam to the oil 
mess now.” The “oil mess” is serially included into a list of defining historical blunders. 
Rabbit responds with a grunt and remembers his friend and co-worker, Skeeter, an 
African American character who loomed large in Rabbit Redux, who had been recently 
killed by police in Philadelphia and whose experience confirmed that the world had never 
been a “pleasant place.”
75
 This exchange, although subtle, suggests that national 
narratives are by no means homogenous; they are often based on specific generational, 
racial, and class experiences, as well as circulated through particular mediums. An 
exchange like this is one way that Updike calls attention to the particularity of Rabbit’s 
perspective as a middle-class, middle-aged, white, middle-American, a perspective we 
find challenged through the form of the novel itself; constitutively polyphonic, it is open 
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to other perspectives despite the main character’s narcissism. Although Carter speaks 
through the medium of television his speech contains a heteroglossic acknowledgement 
of differential national history as he recollected comments he received while on a 
speaking tour.  
Carter narratively organizes these voices, with their distinct concerns, around the 
common concern of energy. A “young Chicano” tells him: “Some of us have suffered 
from recession all our lives. Some people have wasted energy, but others haven’t had 
anything to waste.” “A black woman who happens to be the mayor of a small Mississippi 
town” draws attention to local and embodied aspects of energy, reminding the President 
that “‘you can’t sell anything on Wall Street unless someone digs it up somewhere else 
first.’” Others make declarative informational statements: “‘We can’t go on consuming 
40 percent more energy than we produce. When we import oil we are also importing 
inflation plus unemployment;’” “We’ve got to use what we have. The Middle East has 
only 5 percent of the world’s energy, but the United States has 24 percent.” Carter quotes 
someone who tells him that America’s “neck is stretched over the fence and OPEC has a 
knife,” before quoting someone who references Carter’s earlier speech “the moral 
equivalent of war:” “When we enter the moral equivalent of war, Mr. President, don’t 
issue us BB guns.” This range of voices, however constructed it may be, contains the 
range of local, particular reactions to the energy crisis, and to the efforts at creating a 
national narrative out of a collective project that promised to solve social antagonisms at 
the heart of American life. Using the word “future” nine times in the 1979 speech alone, 
Carter reminds the viewing public that “we’ve always had a faith that the days of our 
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children would be better than our own.”
76
 Nothing could be further from the lack of 
generational faith the energy crisis generates at the dealership. 
 The official energy narrative is simultaneously accepted, challenged, and mocked, 
in the exchanges at the Toyota dealership. First, in the form of jokes; “you can’t beat 
Christopher Columbus for mileage,” Rabbit says, “look how far he got on three 
galleons.” The “cheerful plane of dwindling energy” becomes a frame for reinterpreting 
prior narratives of North American and US history. Harry continues, recapitulating 
Carter’s history lesson of his 1977 speech as he looks back, first on wood and then coal, 
marking the centuries “like a football field.” Through the free indirect discourse of the 
narration, Updike gives narrative form to the process by which people become conscious 
of petromodernity. However, the topic, almost as soon as it is raised, feels exhausted to 
him. Discussions of energy, we are told, “in private conversation and even on the 
television where they’re paid to talk it up, run dry, exhaust themselves, as if everything’s 
been said in this hemisphere.”
77
 For Rabbit, both the form of energy and the narrative of 
its crisis are geographically specific, and temporally worn out. A different hemispheric 
perspective is what is missing from his local conversations. 
Yet Angstrom’s anxieties are not assuaged by US-Middle East relations. Against 
the backdrop of the Iranian Revolution and the taking of American hostages, Rabbit feels 
a strange affinity with the Ayatollah Khomeini. He sees in him the mirror of Carter, both 
of them are “trapped by a pack of kids who need a shave and don’t know shit;” he muses 
that “if you could get the idiotic kids out of the world it might settle down to being a 
                                                          
76
 Carter, 110-111. 
77





 This one-way solidarity is better understood as a displacement of his 
own frustrations, as he attempts to dampen the younger generation’s utopian 
imaginations. Harry’s attitude eventually boils over as he mocks protesting students on 
television: “‘Energy is people,’ they sing. ‘People are en-er-gy!’ Who needs Khomeini 
and his oil? Who needs Afghanistan? Fuck the Russkis. Fuck the Japs, for that matter. 
We’ll go it alone, from sea to shining sea.”
79
 This sarcasm is directed at those who do not 
appreciate the interconnectedness of global oil markets and the transnational economy, 
which includes his Toyota dealership. He takes the younger generation’s easy dream of 
national and individual sovereignty as a naïve insult to those of the older generation who 
must negotiate a world of fraught relationships, contradictions, and responsibilities. 
When Angstrom hears about energy he thinks of it in precisely the terms Amitav Ghosh 
describes the way Americans “smell” oil: “unavoidable overseas entanglements, a 
worrisome foreign dependency, [and] economic uncertainty.”
80
 In his mockery, Rabbit 
anticipates and criticizes, thirty years in advance, current rhetoric surrounding so-called 
“energy independence.”  
The “energy is people” attitude is echoed by Melanie who expresses a 
representative viewpoint of the younger generation. “I believe the things we’re running 
out of we can learn to do without” she says. “I don’t need electric carving knives and all 
that. I’m more upset about the snail darters and the whales than about iron ore and oil… 
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as long as there are growing things, there’s still a world with endless possibilities.”
81
 
Melanie’s vitalism reframes the industrial economy so that priority is given to its 
ecological underpinnings, but in doing so she writes off the immense social disruptions 
that would accompany a sharp decline in readily available petroleum. Like Rabbit, she is 
not optimistic about the future of industrial economies and nation states, but unlike him, 
she anticipates a contingent world of vibrant freedoms in place of the confining world 
that Rabbit has throughout his life tried to escape. Presenting no genuine alternative and 
no historical subject that might bring it about, Melanie can only speculate about a world 
of negative freedoms, a world in which “growing things,” much like commodities, will 
offer themselves seemingly of their own volition and with every appearance of freedom. 
When his granddaughter is presented to him in the novel’s final paragraph, Rabbit sees in 
her the innocent and terrible future whose arrival puts the “nails in his coffin.”
82
  
Rather than locating his future in and through the baby, the baby becomes, for 
Rabbit, a positive sign for the absence of a future. If indeed, “energy is people,” it is an 
energy future that does not include him. Just as much as he desires “the new” in the form 
of new products and appetites, Rabbit’s anxieties over social reproduction represent a 
fear of the authentically new. The arrival of the baby is the narrative culmination of 
Rabbit’s earlier showroom observation that “the world keeps ending but new people too 
dumb to know it keep showing up as if the fun’s just started.” His comment is as much an 
observation on modernity itself which, as Peter Osborne observes, is “everywhere 
haunted by the idea of decline” because of its “perpetual desire to transcend the 
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 This goes double for petromodernity, in that the awareness of temporal and 
biophysical limits to our form of life coincides with the deindustrialization and 
financialization of the American landscape after Fordism. Dominic Fox, we might recall, 
observes that the “end of oil” narrative merely announces that another world is inevitable, 
whether or not we believe it is possible, and that it leaves us with a “terminally 
diagnosed” present. Rabbit, as the fictional embodiment of national sentiment, recognizes 
the finitude of the world oil has produced—and even recognizes himself as part of that 
world—yet he is fearful of a genuine alternative. Within the horizon of the present, his 
own death is much easier for him to accept than Carter’s promise of a different national 
future through a project of eco-modernization.  
 
Conclusion 
He loves Nature, though he can name almost nothing in it. Are those 
pines, or spruces, or firs? He loves money, though he doesn’t understand 





Not long after the publication of Rabbit is Rich, Updike released a collection of 
poetry on nature and natural processes titled Facing Nature. One of the poems, “Energy: 
A Villanelle,” was first published in 1981 and speaks to the antagonisms of Rabbit is 
Rich.
85
 Closely associated with the pastoral genre, the villanelle’s fixed patterns and 
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refrains evoke rustic folk songs and the timeless reproduction of nature. Here, Updike 
contrasts the natural cycles of solar energy in wood fires with the linear, inflationary 
economy of petroleum energy. By the end of the poem, the linear accumulation of the 
petrocultural economy appears as an apocalyptic convergence with the mythic repetition 
of the pastoral solar/wood economy.  
The juxtaposition of solar fire in the refrain—“the logs give back, in burning, 
solar fire”—with the alternate refrain—“nothing is lost but, still, the cost grows 
higher”—draws out the contradictions between energy as it exists materially and energy 
as it exists represented and mediated through the economy. Each stanza addresses a 
different aspect of contemporary energy and attempts to draw out its contradictions. The 
“solar fire” is released by the most primordial form of human energy use—fire—as the 
logs give off the solar energy “processed” by the green leaves of the tree’s branches. This 
is followed by the prospect of lunar powered wave energy: “The ocean’s tons of tide, to 
turn, require / no more than time and moon.” These examples are contrasted with “the oil 
rigs in Bahrain” that “imply a buyer” and a “Good Gulf” that “gives it faster; every tire.” 
The cost of this energy continues to grow higher even though the sun and the moon 
continue to serve as a practically inexhaustible source for plant and animal life. The final 
stanza evokes a dark future that disrupts the perpetual energy cycle. “So guzzle gas,” the 
poem contemptuously invites the reader, “the leaden night draws nigher / when cinders 
mark where stood the blazing sun.” The sun, as a transcendent source of energy, has been 
blacked out and replaced by earthly cinders and “microörganisms,” “quite a few” of 
which “became petroleum.”  
149 
 
The way that energy becomes naturalized gets in the way of understanding how 
our lives are bound up with it. The leap from its historical and material specificity to 
cosmic ontology renders it unhelpfully metaphysical. Lacan, for instance, exposes the 
idealist formulations in the way people talk about energy while making a larger point 
about the circulation of libidinal desire in Seminar IV: 
To say that the energy was in some way already there in a virtual state in the 
current of the river is properly speaking to say something that has no meaning, for 
the energy begins to be of interest to us in this instance only beginning with the 
moment in which it is accumulated, and it is accumulated only beginning with the 




The image of machines being “put to work in a certain way” denaturalizes 
discourses of energy. When people talk about an energy crisis, they are not only referring 
to the technical and social infrastructures of accumulation, organization, and distribution, 
they are often implicitly referring to the historical imaginaries predicated on those 
machines—machines that are “put to work” in a historically specific way. We imagine 
stores of energy existing in the universe because machines have been organized to 
capture and make use of specific processes. Alongside these energy imaginaries exist the 
temporalities, expectations, and anticipations associated with the “real abstractions” of 
the cultural economy. Sunlight and waves may be free, but the infrastructural 
concentrations of knowledge (labor) necessary to transform and organize sunlight from 
virtual to actual “energy” are mediated by historical economies. An authentic materialism 
recognizes this abstract dimension of the real, which literature can help in providing.  
The history of the oil industry is replete with examples of how companies had to 
create a material need and cultural desire for petroleum. Technologies had to be invented 
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and socially disseminated so as to create a market for their product.
87
 The social character 
of American petroculture was organized by Fordist investments in social reproduction—
fixed capital in the forms of factories, schools, and hospitals—as well as the expanding 
satisfaction of needs via consumerism. The energy crisis called the material basis of this 
arrangement into question. Given the tremendous energy required to transform the 
presently existing material infrastructures in the United States, let alone other societies, 
we find ourselves with Doctorow, wondering how best to expend our energies so that we 
at least die “on a parabolic curve.” Like the river in Lacan’s example, energy in the 
abstract “meaningless” sense of the term is not an issue, but putting machines to work in 
a new way is. The prefix on petromodernity serves to give the material energies 
organized by industrial capitalism a new visibility, opening the possibility of a future 
transformation that includes both ecological modernization and the new rationalities that 
will have overcome neoliberal speculation.  
 “It may be,” Szeman writes, “that the disaster of oil is already prefigured in the 
temporal shift of the capitalist economy that goes by the name neoliberalism.” This 
temporal shift is not just the historical effect of large-scale economic restructuring, but 
“inward” as well: “subjectivity announces… a temporal recalibration away from the 
future to the present.”
88
 This temporal recalibration is the effect of machines being put to 
work in a way that reorganizes desire according to the rhythm and moods of 
neoliberalism. It represents the “overcoming” of the temporalities associated with 
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industrial production in the wake of Fordism precisely by turning its back toward the 
future. In the move from the objective to the subjective, Szeman’s analysis confirms what 
Bernard Stiegler argues, namely that neoliberal speculation has replaced Fordist 
investment and “structurally prevents the reconstitution of a long-term horizon.”
89
 
Narrative arts, as LeMenager suggests, can help reconstitute such long-term 
horizons in the historical and environmental imagination. In this sense, literatures 
themselves can become machines which produce new virtualities capable of being 
harnessed and put to work organizing yet more machines. However, efforts at 
implementing large-scale projects of energy reform in the political sphere, even modest 
ones like Carter’s, find themselves overdetermined and undermined by the speculative 
temporality of neoliberalism. The practical impotence of speculation can produce a 
symptom homologous with the rejuvenated sex life of Harry and Janice Angstrom, in 
which deferral itself becomes the object of desire. Here, even criticism is implicated. At 
its best, literary and cultural theory is the first to acknowledge its complicity with the 
world it critiques, and yet, as Jeffrey T. Nealon argues, much criticism during this period 
has also participated in the production of speculative moods and outlooks. 
As postmodernism reoriented the disciplines of economics, art, or architecture 
around speculation, and not knowing (more specifically, about not-knowing what 
really counts as value, art, or good design), so too has “theory” remade literary 
and cultural studies as that thing dedicated to the open-endedness of 
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In Nealon’s estimation, postmodernism has been transformed from a critical into a 
positive project. Just as not knowing and uncertainty become the motivating affects in 
economic behavior, theory now resembles Marazzi’s “structural information deficits” in 
its continuous deferral. Instead of a future, we are left with futurity, the vague feeling of 
openness and contingency that substitutes not knowing for a revolutionary potential. 
What it actually signifies is a refusal to make claims on the future, associating these 
claims with a totalitarian closure of possibility—as if such a total closure has ever been 
historically possible. More often than not, this attitude affirms a position of virtuous 
powerlessness as if it were a choice. Not unlike Rabbit Angstrom, the cultural left often 
sustains its energies through sublime moments at the limits of knowledge, deriving its 
jouissance in an oscillation between euphoric affirmation and spectatorial melancholy.  
A recent example of this would be Speculate This!, an Occupy-inspired manifesto 
written by the “Uncertain Commons” collective and published by Duke University 
Press.
91
 Its anonymous authors argue that speculation is the contemporary Zeitgeist as it 
has come to define a range of social discourses, from economics to the sciences and 
policy think tanks. They write that speculation “project[s] into and stake[s] claims on the 
future;” “whether the lasso thrown across time is thought or money, speculation always 
constitutes an attempt to draw the future fully into the present.” They claim that the 
speculative relation to the future has become instrumental in colonizing both the temporal 
imagination and material relations for capital. In their words, speculation is “a modern 
apparatus for erasing the future by realizing it as eternal present.” The manifesto’s 
authors refer to this as firmative speculation, in that it solidifies the range of future 
                                                          
91
 Uncertain Commons, Speculate This! (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).  
153 
 
possibilities as well as the corporate firms that benefit. Against this, they endorse an 
affirmational speculation, which seeks to “multiply uncertainties” as a way of exploding 
what the discourses of “risk” try to bracket or contain. “To speculate affirmatively,” they 
write, “is to produce futures while refusing the foreclosure of potentialities, to hold on to 
the spectrum of possibilities while remaining open to multiple futures whose context of 
actualization can never be fully anticipated.”  
As we have seen in Updike’s portrayal of Rabbit’s (and others’) economic and 
emotional strategies, this anticipation of multiple possible futures already describes the 
conscious activity of individuals living in the chronic contingency of post-Fordism. At 
times it is hard to see how Uncertain Commons’ response to the financial crisis of 
neoliberalism differs from the horizontal and “disruptive” management philosophies that 
administrate its techno-cultural industries. Affirmational speculation “is a consistently 
modifying practice that seeks to act in shifting, multiscalar worlds. It mandates intuition, 
creativity, and play.” “In this sense,” they continue, “affirmative speculation affords 
modes of living that creatively engage uncertainty.” While affirmational speculation is a 
necessity for artistic and literary practice, one might ask if this radicalism is a privilege 
reserved only for those who can afford to creatively engage uncertainty, or alternately, if 
it is the abject freedom of those with nothing to lose. In the following chapter, I address 





“LIFE FINDS A WAY:” SCIENCE FICTION’S DEREGULATORY FANTASIES 
Depending on which aspect happens to be paramount at the time, ideology 
stresses plan or chance, technology or life, civilization or nature. As 
employees people are reminded of the rational organization and must fit 
into it as common sense requires. As customers they are regaled, whether 
on the screen or in the press, with human interest stories demonstrating 
freedom of choice and the charm of not belonging to the system. In both 
cases they remain objects.  




[W]hen we look a bit more closely, we may of course hear it as a kind of 
more or less Rousseauesque return to nature… a “Vitalpolitik,” a politics 
of life. But what is this Vitalpolitik… of which this is an expression? 
Actually, as you can see, it is not a matter of constructing a social fabric in 
which the individual would be in direct contact with nature, but of 
constructing a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have 





Empire does not confront us like a subject, facing us, but like an 





 It is not often that the Union of Concerned Scientists issues a response to a novel.
4
 
Michael Crichton’s State of Fear (2004) became infamous not only for its sub-par 
dialogue, but for the way it utilized the rhetoric of complexity to obfuscate the consensus 
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of climate scientists across the globe.
5
 Crichton’s thesis is that the world is too complex, 
the effects are too distributed and the causes to diffuse, for us to ever be fully comfortable 
acting with our limited knowledge. Given that the world always exceeds our knowledge 
of it, Crichton believes we can never hope to effectively regulate human activity. 
Moreover, our efforts at regulation and intervention in the world (with the aim of 
producing desired results) will only intensify the unpredictability of the world’s chaotic 
systems. Crichton’s thesis combines a soft anti-humanism with new age titillations; 
leaping from cosmic chaos to sublunary politics, he merges a romantic catastrophist 
worldview with a non-interventionist “wisdom” that passes for environmental thinking by 
virtue of its reduction and de-centering of human intentionality. We find this argument at 
work in his most famous novel, Jurassic Park (1990), which attempts to reconcile his 
skepticism of regulation against the unchecked boom of the biotechnology industries.
6
 
In many respects, Crichton’s thought aligns with the neoliberal philosopher 
Friedrich Hayek, who in the late eighties outlined what might now be called a neoliberal 
philosophy of Nature in the first volume of his collected lectures: The Fatal Conceit.
7
 For 
Hayek too, complexity is the order of the world, and the only possible regulatory 
mechanism for such a world is the market. Hayek argued that only price signals and free 
market exchange are able to give us knowledge of the world as it evolves in all its human 
and nonhuman complexity, precisely because capitalism evolved to do just this. Efforts at 
industrial and economic regulation, social justice, and redistribution, in this view, are 
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attempts at “social engineering” that are doomed to fail because, as a form of control, 
they stand against the evolutionary emergence of markets in human societies. Rather than 
understanding markets as “embedded” in societies, as Karl Polanyi argued, Hayek sees 
societies embedded within markets.
8
 This move of the market—and the category of “the 
economy” itself—from the inside to the exteriority, i.e. nature, is the hallmark of most 
forms of neoliberal thought. What emerges out of Crichton’s chaos and complexity 
narrative is an anti-regulatory attitude that emphasizes a vague scientific and 
technological humility in the wake of spectacular violence. Similarly, environmental 
discourses that speak the language of complexity and humility contribute to the 
construction of the neoliberal consensus. 
Octavia Butler is another science fiction writer who came to prominence in the 
late eighties and nineties. Since her death in 2006, Butler’s award-winning novels have 
become canonical examples of the genre’s ability to speak to issues of race, gender, and 
social inequality through a range of imaginative biological and ecological conceits. In her 
1993 novel, Parable of the Sower, Butler too turns chaos into cosmology, naturalizing the 
decaying and violent social order that surrounds her characters. Her invention of a poetic 
religious text, “Earthseed,” allows the small survivalist group surrounding the narrator to 
start a commune and negotiate a world that seems to have lost its metaphysical moorings. 
As I’ll argue in this chapter, this conceptualization of “God as Change” naturalizes the 
chaotic social order of the characters; however, the narrator’s insistence that our task is to 
“shape God” is an invitation to intervene in the chaos and shape it into a humane, 
environmentally sound order. Butler’s fiction, like Crichton’s, naturalizes the 
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deregulatory landscape (i.e. reifying “community” against other members of society who 
are flattened into an obstacle that is to be overcome). However, where Crichton’s fiction 
takes aim at—or is at best ambiguous toward—state and public intervention that would 
impose environmental regulations on business and technology, Butler depicts the future 
trajectory of the unregulated capitalism of the nineties.  
This chapter examines the complicities of science fiction’s “deregulatory” 
fantasies within the cultural politics of neoliberalism. Reading Michael Crichton’s 
Jurassic Park alongside and against Octavia Butler’s Parable novels, I argue that each 
writer takes failed state regulation as the basis of their narratives; each deploys 
naturalistic metaphors and allegorical images of Nature that attribute cosmic meaning to 
the political-ecological breakdowns that surround them. In doing so, each author evokes a 
vitalistic chaos only to recuperate it for different ends. Each makes an appeal to vitalism 
as a response to an unpredictable situation. However, even if this vitalism asserts a will to 
“life” against its biopolitical organization in the market, it is just as easily appeal to a will 
to “life” as competition in the naturalized market. In the discourses of neoliberalism, 
markets themselves are often described as living entities which explode the boundaries of 
public and state regulation.  
Where Horkheimer and Adorno argued that Fordist capitalism appeals equally to 
civilization (control) and nature (wildness) depending on whether one is in the workplace 
or the marketplace, Foucault identified the merging of life and economy as a vitalpolitik 
under neoliberalism, and the rise of an “entrepreneurial subject” which views the self as a 
biopolitical enterprise in the naturalized market. Central to these concerns is the category 
of control, and its romantic, individualist refusal in favor of a naturalistic image of self-
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organization. “By capturing the ideals of individual freedom and turning them against the 
interventionist and regulatory practices of the state,” David Harvey argues, “capitalist 
class interests could hope to protect and even restore their position.”
9
 This deregulatory 
narrative is the ideological terrain—both left and right—on which the “construction of 
consent” under neoliberalism is accomplished. Crichton and Butler are responding to the 
uneven combinations of techno-social pessimism of the nineties. Rather than reading 
speculative fiction as “possible worlds,” I argue that it remains the best genre for critical 
reading; in other words, it is the genre that most readily displays the contradictory 
fantasies which animate the political imaginary of a given moment. In light of this, we 
may wish to temper the recent investment in speculative fiction as a genre, and consider 
the social implications for interpretive theories. 
“Most literary theories,” writes Terry Eagleton, “‘foreground’ a particular literary 
genre, and derive their general pronouncements from this.”
10
 The genre of ecocritical 
theory in recent years has been undoubtedly science fiction. It lends itself to imagining 
what it may be like to live through the environmental projections of scientists. For better 
or worse, science or speculative fiction is becoming the dominant literary form of our era 
of environmental and political crises. In 1971, the yearly years of post-Fordism, J.G. 
Ballard declared that “everything is becoming science fiction,” and that more 
conventional narrative forms, notably the social realism of “Saul Bellow and John 
Updike,” is no better than the worst science fiction. “The social novel is reaching fewer 
                                                          
9
 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 42. 
10
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1996), 44. 
159 
 
and fewer readers,” he claims, “for the clear reason that social relationships are no longer 
as important as the individual’s relationship with the technological landscape of the late 
twentieth century.” Ballard argues that “the reading of science fiction should be 
compulsory.”
11
 Just why something so inevitable should also be made compulsory is 
inexplicable. More to the point, however, is the dubious distinction Ballard draws 
between the “technological landscape” and “social relations.” If there is any truth to the 
description of this period as “post-industrial” it rests the “social character” of the new 
technologies of communication, affect, information, and infrastructure. It is the 
industrialization of the social, even the biosocial. The technological landscape is the 
reification of social relations. The extent to which these technologies intervene at the 
level of biology and genetics rewrites bodily and ecological nature as a social relation 
subsumed into the reproductive cycles of capital.  
 Ballard’s recognition that “social relationships are no longer as important as the 
individual’s relationship with the technological landscape” is both a description and a 
prescription for his favored genre of literature. If this is taken as the foregrounded genre 
of literary ecocriticism, the consequence would be to jettison the analysis of social 
relations and historical conjunctures through which technological organizations develop 
and spread. It would be to mistake particular organizations of production for a 
transhistorical “spirit” of technology, as Heidegger did, which often makes for an equally 
metaphysical approach to politics. The additional effect of not addressing the social 
relations which technological arrangements reproduce is a flattening of the human social 
world and nonhuman nature which reduces both to a generalized instrumentalism in the 
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practice of theory. In “Toward a Phenomenology of Opportunism,” Massimo De Carolis 
argues that, 
One of the most incisive effects of recent technological development has been to 
subvert this distinction between community and environment—first by rendering 
ever weaker the ties of the community, then by colonizing the environment in an 
ever more massive way, and finally by generating theoretical and practical 
paradigms capable of being applied indiscriminately to social reality no less than 




In the Introduction chapter, I attributed this flattening to the emergence of a 
professional-managerial class aesthetic which supplements the naturalistic turn to 
evolutionary-biological forms of neoliberal economics, and one that excises the class 
antagonism from production chains of human and nonhuman actors (e.g. ANT). While 
the latter holds the possibility of an environmental justice logistics which makes visible 
the nonhuman actants that compose assemblages of oppression and exploitation, unless 
this empiricist approach is situated within a historical context it risks becoming another 
“post-political” management discourse that obscures the role of states and multinational 
corporations in structuring social and environmental, which is also to say technological, 
relations on a global scale. For De Carolis, the concept of the umwelt signals a new 
experience: the naturalization of post-Fordist technology and the biopolitical logic of 
contemporary capitalism which dominates humans and nature alike. 
In The Death of the Posthuman, Claire Colebrook addresses this conflation of 
biology, economy, and governmentality, in the contemporary ideology of life. “When 
cultural production turns directly (as it does occasionally) to the problem of life,” she 
writes; “it is precisely at that point that the question of life refuses to be asked.” It is 
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a “question of what we accept and do not accept, what we can consider or question 
and what remains beyond question.”
13
 What form of life is implicated in Jurassic 
Park’s singular phrase, “Life finds a way?” What form of life is being affirmed and 
what question about what is acceptable or unacceptable is being refused? Colebrook 
identifies a false antihumanism at work in many contemporary philosophies. “In 
place of man as a body with the additional capacity for reason, one distributes reason 
or thinking throughout life,” she writes. The projection of one’s humanism onto all 
biological and ecological life as a “mindful, creative, [and] self-organizing” 
intelligence becomes a neo-Darwinian, “just so” story.
14
 This same neo-Darwinian 
antihumanism is taken up by Hayek, who appeals to “autopoiesis, cybernetics, 
homeostasis, spontaneous order, self-organization, synergistics, [and] systems theory” to 
argue that capitalism has evolved appropriately against our purported values of “social 
justice” precisely “because of its superior capacity to utilize dispersed knowledge.”
15
  
Our values and institutions are determined not simply by preceding causes but as 
part of a process of unconscious self-organisation of a structure or pattern. This is 
true not only of economics, but in a wide area, and is well known today in the 
biological sciences. This insight was only the first of a growing family of theories 
that account for the formation of complex structures in terms of processes 
transcending our capacity to observe all the several circumstances operating in the 
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Hayek’s argument against central economic planning, and in favor of the 
“spontaneous order” of the competitive market, rests on an evolutionary biological 
claim that life, society, and the world, is too complex to have total knowledge of and 
is therefore impossible to regulate. Max Horkheimer once described the anarchy of 
capitalist society as a process that “is accomplished not under the control of a conscious 
will but as a natural occurrence;” in which “everyday life results blindly, accidentally, 
and badly from the chaotic activity of individuals, industries, and states.”
17
 However, he 
understood this as justification to change it. Indeed, as Nigel Thrift argues, capitalism has 
figured out ways of “knowing itself,” whereby reflexivity increasingly becomes another 
instrument of accumulation within this unpredictable atmosphere.
18
 Jodi Dean links this 
shift in capitalism toward complexity, reflexivity, and the production of unknowing, as a 
signal that that the dominant cultural logic has shifted from the psychoanalytic subject of 
desire to the subject of the drive. Whereas the subject of desire seeks the object to satiate 
desire and return to steady-state equilibrium, the subject of drive desires the repetitive 
failure to attain the object and thus, the repetition becomes an open feedback circuit of 
“accumulation, amplification, and intensification.”
19
 Her examples are the rise in 
derivatives trading and the rationalized endangering of value through the financialization 
(and packaging) of risk. In the 2008 financial collapse, banks appealed to complexity and 
the inability to comprehend the complicated processes in order shirk responsibility. 
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“Complexity displaces accountability onto knowledge,” Dean writes, citing Foucault’s 
argument that “the economic rationality of liberalism” is that “limits on knowledge are 
limits on government.”
20
 Complexity contributes to the instrumentalization of 
speculation, which indefinitely suspends both governance and accountability (see chapter 
two). We cannot know everything, so the reasoning goes; therefore we can—and 
ought!—do nothing. At the same time, she writes, “the appeal to complexity is a site of 
convergence between despotic financialism and critical theory.”
21
 
Critical humanists have traditionally appealed to moral, if not material, 
complexity of the world, yet now find themselves having “run out of steam” as the 
hermeneutics of suspicion has pervaded public life.
22
 Dean writes that both “academic 
and financial types share a weak ontology of interconnectivity, mutual causality, 
contingency, and singularity (the unique qualities of individuals, persons as well as non-
persons).” She considers the work of Jane Bennett,
 23
 a new materialist who is “attuned to 
the complexity of assemblages constituted out of human an nonhuman actants… mixing 
‘coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, profit motives, 
heat, lifestyles, water, economic theory, wire, and wood.’” Bennett argues that “In a 
world of distributed agency… a hesitant attitude toward assigning singular blame 
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becomes a presumptive virtue.”
24
 For Dean, this “hesitation” participates in the same 
structuring affect as neoliberalism. Dean offers the recent example of BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon disaster as a case where the multinational corporation’s appeal to complexity, 
distributed agency, and epistemic finitude, became a means to deflect accountability. 
Indeed, the New York Times uncovered a memo by the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) which outlined their plan to invest millions of dollars in media so that “recognition 
of uncertainty becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom.’”
25
 ExxonMobil and others 
have contributed millions of dollars to think tanks like the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute (CEI) and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to promote uncertainty around 
climate change and other energy-related issues. 
Crichton was the literary darling of the American Enterprise Institute. In 2005, he 
gave an AEI sponsored lecture titled “Science Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” in 
which he attacked representations of climate data, notably the “hockey stick” graph. AEI 
president, Christopher Demuth, introduced him and is quoted as saying that Crichton 
delivers “serious science with a sense of drama to a popular audience.”
26
 In his various 
speeches, Crichton puts his narrative skills to work; he critiques crypto-religious 
environmentalist narratives and evokes the historical imagination as he lists of some fifty 
commonplace objects and concepts that Teddy Roosevelt, “godfather” of American 
environmentalism, could never have imagined. When it comes to genetics, Crichton 
appeals to government saying that scientists, drug companies, and journals cannot be 
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relied on, and that legislation should be written to prevent monopolies, especially on 
“facts of nature” like genes.
27
 At other times, however, particularly around climate 
change, he argues that government should not “politicize” science, and that the language 
of consensus has no place in science. In “The Case for Skepticism on Global Warming,” 
Crichton chastises consensus as the language of politics while also demanding that 
politicians come up with “mechanisms to insure a much, much higher standard of 
reliability in information in the future.”
28
 This contradictory demand prefaces his remarks 
on the “complexity of non-linear systems” whose “inherently chaotic” unpredictability 
implies that there is no knowable relation to a future that might inform contemporary 
legislation. Rather than debating economic policy, these petroleum-funded think tanks are 
debating the science, or rather, raising the controversy in order to make uncertainty the 
new conventional wisdom. Crichton never addresses this source of potential corruption, 
but aims his hermeneutics of suspicion outwards. “Much has been said about the 
postmodernist claims about science to the effect that science is just another form of raw 
power, tricked out in special claims for truth seeking and objectivity that really have no 
basis in fact,” he writes. “Recent events have made me wonder if they are correct.”
29
 The 
appeal of complexity on the right lies in its justification for deregulation based on 
inherent limits to knowledge.  
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The appeal of complexity on the left has been mixed, and is often set against 
either the romantic socialism of the guild and the farm, or more recently, in the nostalgia 
for comparative employment security under (unionized) Fordism. Remarking on E.P. 
Thompson’s endorsement of William Morris’ vision of socialism, Raymond Williams 
argues that “the extent to which the idea of socialism is attached to… simplicity is 
counter-productive.” “It seems to me,” he continues, “that the break towards socialism 
can only be towards an unimaginably greater complexity.”
30
 The most vigorous defense 
of complexity as both an ontological condition and a socio-aesthetic trajectory to pursue 
has come from Wendy Wheeler who evokes Williams’ vision in her biosemiotic account 
of culture.
31
 More recently, “accelerationists” like Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams, and the 
authors of the Xenofeminist Manifesto, have pushed for intensified technological 
complexity and increased abstraction through digital platforms and infrastructures.
32
 It 
remains a fundamentally Marxian insight that the political power of workers often 
depends on the concentration of production materialized in infrastructure (e.g. 
autoworkers, steel worker unions, energy workers, dock workers). That the major labor 
struggles of the present involve teachers unions, healthcare, and communication workers, 
might be evidence that the location of power has shifted. Post-Fordist decentralization 
and singularization of production may offer a high tech route back to the artisan/guild 
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ideal, but has thus far materially weakened workers while concentrating the power of 
elites.  
Closely aligned with popular interpretations of chaos theory, complexity becomes 
a quasi-spiritual metaphysics, a vision of nature and society, in which a highly 
aestheticized crystalline, fractal order is believed to emerge out of the spontaneous 
activity of free agents. As a social imaginary, it is the most recent attempt to reconcile 
conflicting desires for freedom and order; in pop culture, it is a new age philosophy that 
restores wonder to a mathematized universe; as a research methodology, complexity is 
the banal observation that history, science, politics, nature, and art do not develop in 
teleological fashion that culminates in a final vocabulary or reconciliation of ends. 
Images of nature deeply inform economic thought, and therefore, that the narratives of 
nature in popular and scientific culture shape the way economists develop, explain, and 
justify their models. If writers are the “unacknowledged legislators of the world,” as 
Shelley wrote, what kinds of regulation might they imagine? 
 
Jurassic Park’s Double Narrative   
Jurassic Park is an ideological masterpiece, which accounts for the success of the 
franchise. It tells two stories simultaneously. The first story it tells is the one that we are 
familiar with; it is the story that the characters themselves tell about their situation. It is 
the chaos narrative. In this narrative, nature is inherently chaotic and thus breaks through 
all attempts at control and regulation. As part of nature, human societies are part of this 
chaos; we are meant to know our place and not act hubristically toward the earth with our 
sciences and technologies. The collapse of the park is, as charismatic mathematician Ian 
168 
 
Malcolm repeatedly assures readers and other characters, bound to happen. It was an 
inevitability confirmed in the very nature of things. The fact of the park’s collapse is 
offered as evidence of Nature’s unpredictable complexity and of our doomed efforts at 
controlling that chaos which, we are led to believe, unleashed the instability to begin 
with. Implicit here, is the utopian specter of a harmonious nature that human intention 
disrupts. The chaos narrative is the narrative of Steven Spielberg’s 1993 film, which 
presents Hammond as a hapless idealist concerned with the happiness of children. Chaos 
happens, and sometimes our best intentions make it happen. The enemy here is the desire 
for control. The reader takes a perverse pleasure in watching the park’s systems fail, as 
the living creatures explode the mechanisms of control. Changing the sex they were 
assigned at birth (or rather, in the petri dish at the lab), they prove that they are not 
commodities or simulations, but agents in a clawing and biting vitalist insurgency: life 
finds a way.  
There is a second story that I call the regulatory narrative. While the novel 
contains all of the chaos narrative, Jurassic Park is also a story about a biotechnology 
company that avoids state regulations and creates an off-shore experimental 
entertainment park, expected to produce billions in profits, and which ends in catastrophe 
due primarily to acts of corporate espionage/sabotage compounded by an extreme 
weather event. It is precisely the deliberate avoidance of regulations, of “control,” that the 
park is able to exist in the first place. In the regulatory narrative, the collapse of the 
park’s own regulation systems serve to confirm the broader cynicism of the park’s CEO, 
John Hammond, who believes neither in public, state-funded and regulated, 
biotechnology, nor in the humanitarian ends of this research. The park exists as a state of 
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exception, a place “outside” control or public oversight. And yet the novel’s internal 
chaos narrative relies on the perverse affirmation of “life” as a sublime force which 
sunders any attempt to shape or control it. The park’s collapse thus becomes an allegory 
for the failure of the regulatory state which was meant to contain it. If the regulatory 
narrative depicts the park as a dangerous evasion of public responsibility (i.e. limits), the 
chaos narrative allows readers to celebrate the transgression of those limits.  
“Life finds a way” is the franchise’s most memorable phrase as it appeals to the 
post-sixties libertarian left as well as the neoliberal right. As Paul Lauter puts it, “Life 
will find a way” offers “a kind of primitive hopefulness, an inert optimism that, in our 
age, sometimes passes for progressive politics.”
33
 With respect to governmental ideology, 
readers may condemn Hammond and Wu’s explicit evasion of regulatory institutions, but 
in the rest of the novel they will be enjoying the dinosaurs’ transgression of the park’s 
regulatory institutions. By conflating the evasion of control with “life,” radically different 
organizations of biological and economic life are elided and naturalized. Critical 
companions to Crichton’s work often depict the novel as a critique of scientific hubris, or 
offer a kitsch Marxist reading, in which the dinosaurs are an “exploited class” that 
overthrow the capitalist company.
34
 Americanists like Susanne Hamscha, have 
interpreted the film as a narrative about the American rediscovery of wilderness. She 
interprets the park itself, which is located in Isla Nublar, Costa Rica, as a Thoreauvian 
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space free from a native population that might trouble the sense of wilderness as a blank 
space to enact social reinvention.
35
 What these readings miss is the real-world context of 
multinational globalization that Crichton uses to stage the conflict between control and 
life. This market vitalism is central to the neoliberal modernization of the social state; at 
the same time this vitalism infuses the ideology of the biotech revolution, which Melinda 




 In the rhetoric surrounding the dismantling of the welfare state, no figure loomed 
as large as the dinosaur. The dinosaur stood for all that is outmoded and evolutionarily 
obsolete; it was a lumbering figure whose size left it ill-adjusted for a world that had been 
transformed around it. Douglas Hague, economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher, argues 
that “the lesson of the dinosaurs is that creatures which cannot adapt to external change 
do not survive.” “The same is true of organizations,” he continues, “especially in the 
private sector.” Hague saves the bulk of his evolutionary recommendations for a list of 
public sector “dinosaurs” that need to be transformed, among them, health, education, 
and the universities. “Privatization does not mean closure,” he writes, “but it does mean 
shaking off the civil service culture.”
37
 The culture of civil service and the ideal of the 
public good was the ethic of social democratic programs on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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Hague’s article, “Transforming the Dinosaurs,” was published by DEMOS in Life After 
Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-First Century. DEMOS was a UK think tank 
founded by former director of Marxism Today, Geoff Mulgan. Its journal became central 
to Tony Blair’s “Third Way” policies in the 1990s, and it increasingly moved to the right. 
Angela McRobbie once described it as “a rather stuffy gentleman’s club whose doors are 
shut to those who do not want to sit down to high table with the ‘radical right.’”
38
 The 
Life After Politics collection serves as an example of the way that organizational 
imaginaries were being restructured alongside the emerging techno-industries to promote 
individualized, flexible, and uncertain modes of “life” after the burden of politics in a 
new “post-ideological” age. 
In a similar way, InGen’s scientific project is made possible by an argument 
against the public university. Here, Crichton anticipates the increasing privatization of the 
American university and the development of what Jeffrey Williams calls the “post-
welfare state university.”
39
 Henry Wu, InGen’s chief geneticist, was recruited from 
Stanford by Hammond. “Universities are no longer the intellectual centers of the 
country,” Hammond tells Wu, then a struggling grad student. 
“Universities are no longer the intellectual centers of the country... Universities 
are the backwater… Since World War II, all the really important discoveries have 
come out of private laboratories. The laser, the transistor, the polio vaccine, the 
microchip… the personal computer, magnetic resonance imaging, CAT 
scans…Universities simply aren’t where it’s happening any more. And they 
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haven’t been for forty years. If you want to do something important… you don’t 




For John Hammond, universities are outmoded in that they require too many 
checks and regulatory hurdles, and because they are publically funded with a view toward 
the public good. “What must you go through to start a new project?” Hammond asks. 
“How many grant applications, how many forms, how many approvals? The department 
chairman? The university resources committee? How do you get more work space if you 
need it? More assistants… A brilliant man can’t squander precious time with forms and 
committees. Life is too short, and DNA is too long.” “If you want to get something 
done,” he finishes, “stay out of universities.” Hammond’s criticism of the university 
borrows the university’s own promise of professional autonomy in the pursuit of 
knowledge. However, instead of justifying the pursuit of knowledge in the service of a 
common good, Hammond presents it as the autonomous pursuit of knowledge itself, only 
in the service of private enterprise. Whereas the promise of public funds comes with 
numerous strings attached, for instance, that the research might be put to medical rather 
than entertainment uses; the private corporation, on the other hand, can offer unparalleled 
freedom. “What does a scientist need to work,” Hammond asks Wu. “He needs time, and 
he needs money. I’m talking about giving you a five year commitment, and ten million 
dollars a year in funding. Fifty million dollars, and no one tells you how to spend it. You 
decide. Everyone else just gets out of your way.”
41
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This is a prime example of what sociologist Steven Brint describes as the shift 
from “social trustee professionalism” to “expert professionalism.”
42
 In his history of 
professionals, intellectuals, and the American middle class, Brint identifies a shift in 
postindustrial society in the relation of intellectual labor to the market. Rather than 
justifying the professions in terms of a public good, professionals began marketing their 
expertise over a body of knowledge as a commodity. Economic sociologist Philip 
Mirowski goes into greater detail in his book, Science-Mart: Privatizing American 
Science, to trace the emergence of a new regime of American science since 1980.
43
 
Whereas the postwar and Cold War era was organized around mass education and the 
production of democratic citizenry, the dominant sciences—“physics, operations 
research, formal logic”—had been primarily funded by military, think tanks, and national 
laboratories.
44
 This regime had been displaced by global corporations and hybrid startups 
between universities and contract research organizations (CROs). The new dominant 
sciences are “biomedicine, genetics, computer science, [and] economics.” The inclusion 
of economics as a science signals the instrumentalization of the field by finance and, not 
coincidentally, the financialization of the life and computer sciences. These fields are 
linked by the new, non-equilibrium mathematics of chaos theory. It is perhaps ironic then 
that Ian Malcolm, the novel’s spokesperson for chaos, possesses Brint’s professional 
ethic of “critical rationality” and “moral commitment,” evoking the public and ecological 
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good despite his outward bad-boy image.
45
 Malcolm is the quintessential figure of the 
“rock star academic”—down to the leather pants and transgressive charm—who uses his 
expertise to craft a personal brand while the university cashes in on his prestige. 
We might contrast Wu’s offer with the situation of paleontologists, Alan Grant 
and Ellie Sattler, whose work Hammond has been funding for several years. Hammond 
calls on them to serve as consultants in Costa Rica. The narration informs the readers 
that, “although many fields of science, such as physics and chemistry, had become 
federally funded, paleontology remained strongly dependent on private patrons […] 
Grant understood that, if John Hammond asked for his help, he would give it. That was 
how patronage worked—how it had always worked.”
46
 Where a patron of the arts would 
invest in either a particular artist’s work (an object) or invest in an institution that would 
allow the continuation of production, Hammond’s monetization of paleontological 
knowledge production is a financial enterprise. Their role was to make paleontological 
knowledge of past bio-geological epochs actionable. By using their interpretive 
knowledge of past environments they are to advise and assist in reconstructing those 
environments for genetically recombined species. They understand the environments, but 
they are clear that evidence of how particular dinosaur species might have inhabited those 
environments is speculative at best. No one knows what the dinosaurs are like as agents 
within those environments. As we will see, the debates over whether or not the dinosaurs 
in the park are authentic will be eclipsed by the necessity of not being eaten by them. 
Grant and Sattler see their fields transform from archeological and interpretive 
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reconstructions of sedimented bio-evolutionary archives to a project of constructing new 
environments for Hammond’s financial enterprise.  
“The commercialization of molecular biology,” represents for Crichton, “the most 
stunning ethical event in the history of science.” In the introduction to Jurassic Park, 
Crichton distinguishes the biotech revolution from past scientific breakthroughs. The 
atomic revolution was the product of a single, government funded, research institute; the 
digital or computer revolution consisted of a “dozen companies,” whereas biotech 
revolution is “now carried out in more than two thousand laboratories in America alone,” 
with over “five hundred corporations” globally. It is not taken up with a specific end in 
mind but the results instead “emerge” out of the distributed, individual actions of various 
agents. It is less a revolution that overturns, than it is a phase shift in the relations of 
human and nonhumans. However, as Crichton observes, this distributed technological 
process is the product of transnational and unregulated finance. “The work is 
uncontrolled,” he writes. “No one supervises it. No federal laws regulate it. There is no 
coherent government policy, in America or anywhere else in the world… no watchdogs 
are to be found among the scientists themselves… nearly every scientist in genetics 
research is also engaged in the commerce of biotechnology.” Simply put, “there are no 
detached observers.”
47
 The lack of public oversight and the fluidity of finance is the 
condition for the proliferation of research, with scientists acting as entrepreneurs on 
corporate campuses.  
Here is where the novel begins to diverge from its popular interpretation. The 
ultimate conflict in Jurassic Park is not primarily between human technological hubris 
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and the dinosaurs who give them their comeuppance, but rather between the financial, 
governmental, and corporate infrastructures that make this commercialization of 
knowledge possible. Jurassic Park stands as Crichton’s warning against the 
commercialization of science, rather than its popular reception as a warning against 
interfering with the “natural order,” which is imagined as harmonious so long as humans 
do not enter the frame. The novel allows for both readings; however its success as a 
commercial franchise is linked to the latter narrative. This is the narrative that is in line 
with contemporary ideology, I argue, in that it celebrates transgressive vitalist freedom 
while simultaneously cautioning epistemic, technical, and governmental humility. Instead 
of a natural order of stable harmony, Crichton posits a natural order of chaos and 
uncontrollability. In this vision, the world and nature are so complex that knowledge of it 
always supersedes our grasp and therefore any attempt to control human or nonhuman 
behavior, or regulate activity, is doomed to failure. The novel speaks in two registers, out 
of both sides of its mouth.  
Before discussing the broader implications of chaos and agential dinosaurs, let us 
examine the exchanges between Malcolm and Hammond, which are so central to the 
novel’s internal dialogue on the events as they unfold. The injured mathematician rises 
when he hears Hammond describe the situation as “simple.” He chastises the CEO for the 
actions of his chief geneticist, Henry Wu, who knows neither the names of the dinosaurs 
he creates, nor what they are, nor what they are capable of. He characterizes the power of 
interventionist science as a form of “inherited wealth.” Whereas disciplines like martial 
arts or the attainment of political power require years of practice in which one develops a 
respect for the practice.  
177 
 
“Scientific power is like inherited wealth: attained without discipline. You read 
what others have done, and you take the next step… You can do it very young. 
You can make progress very fast. There is no discipline lasting for decades. There 
is no mastery: old scientists are ignored. There is no humility before nature. There 
is only a get-rich-quick, make-a-name-for-yourself-fast philosophy. Cheat, lie, 
falsify—it doesn’t matter… No one will criticize you. No one has any standards. 




 Malcolm criticizes the transformation of science from the pursuit of knowledge, 
disinterested to the extent that it serves the public good, to the sciences pursued as a 
commercial enterprise, with all the competition and sabotage that entails. For Bernard 
Stiegler, this brings out the pharmacological relation between savoir-faire, “knowledge of 
how to make or do,” with savoir-vivre, “knowledge of how to live.”
49
 Malcolm is 
describing the conditions that drive individual behavior. In the economy of information, 
savoir-faire or know-how is stripped from savoir-vivre or the knowledge of how to live 
with that know-how and use it responsibility. The production of information as 
commodity allows this knowledge to circulate as the object of financial speculation and 
undisciplined consumption. Malcolm continues: 
“Because you can stand on the shoulders of giants, you can accomplish something 
quickly. You don’t even know exactly what you have done, but already you have 
reported it, patented it, and sold it. And the buyer will have even less discipline 
than you. The buyer simply purchases the power, like any commodity. The buyer 
doesn’t even conceive that any discipline might be necessary.” “A karate master 
does not kill people with his bare hands,” he says, “He does not lose his temper 
and kill his wife. The person who kills is the person who has no discipline, no 
restraint, and who has purchased his power in the form of a Saturday night 
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The purchaser here is the corporation, the enterprising firm, rather than the social 
or political community of the nation-state. From the perspective of the enterprise, it does 
not matter if the commodity is biological or consumer electronics. Lewis Dodgson, for 
instance, is characterized as the “most aggressive geneticist of his generation.” He is 
known for reverse engineering competing companies’ products, looking for the 
“biological equivalent of a Sony walkman.”
51
 As the walkman embodies the post-Fordist 
shift to miniaturized and individualized Japanese consumer products, the boutique 
biogenetic experiments seek not only to add to existing culture but to create new cultures 
of their own. Crichton singles out entertainment as a particularly undisciplined use of 
biogenetic intervention.  
 The theme park was the consumer model of reality which philosophers like 
Umberto Eco and Jean Baudrillard termed the hyperreal.
52
 The argument was that in the 
new technologies of simulation have become real through their effects even if the objects 
and processes they are believed to model never existed. In this new condition, signs 
without referents circulate in an economy which has lost its claim to represent social 
exchange: social exchange itself shapes the way life is represented and understood. The 
critique of hyperreality follows political and cultural concerns over the location of 
authenticity in consumer economies. It builds off of the Situationist critique of spectacle 
as the mode through which postwar capitalism reproduces its relations. The model of 
hyperreal is Disney World—or, the theme park in general—whose purpose is to produce 
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a landscape of entertaining consumption through replications of really-existing peoples 
and places, through simulations, fantasy, and enjoyment. The distinction between 
simulation and the real melts into a generalized performativity. Jurassic Park anticipates 
the end of the Disney model of hyperreality.  
What disrupts the representation within the narrative of the park is “life” itself. 
Amidst the debates about the authenticity of the dinosaurs, their DNA (e.g. genetic / 
phenotypic / behavioral authenticity), and the efforts of the park’s technicians at 
biological control through sexual selection and amino acid dependency, the dinosaurs 
themselves surpass the reach of the park’s control mechanisms. As the narrative 
illustrates the ways that computer representations of the park fail to adequately 
correspond to the number and distribution of dinosaurs, it also illustrates how these 
representations (computer models) are interacting with and shaping the actions of 
characters within the park. It anticipates a turn to new forms of realism and materialism 
that position representations as acts within a world. John Arnold, the computer systems 
analyst, draws similar distinctions between living and non-living (mechanical) systems 
through what he calls “resonant yaw.” Like temperature in the body, he argues, biological 
and living systems “are never in equilibrium;”
53
 in fact, it means that they are “healthy 
and responsive.” He contrasts it with mechanical systems, in which a small wobble can 
intensify and lead to cascading collapse.
54
 Living systems cannot ever be fully 
represented and controlled, he suggests. “This is life, not computer models,” he says as he 
points at his own malfunctioning mechanical system in the control room. One of the 
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major turning points in the plot occurs when the characters realize that the computer’s 
search protocol is only showing them exactly what they are searching for, not for the 
actual numbers of dinosaurs in the park who are changing sex and reproducing 
uncontrollably.  
Part of the thrill of the theme park is stepping “back in time” to when the planet 
was populated by reptilian life, and to be seen by that life. To say that it is ancient implies 
a shared, even mammalian, temporality; this world is other. In the gaze of the 
velociraptors, Grant has the decentered experience of himself as an object of prey. “For a 
mammal like man, there was something indescribably alien about the way reptiles hunted 
their prey,” Grant observes. “The stillness, the coldness, the pace was all wrong. To be 
among [them] was to be reminded of a different kind of life, a different kind of world, 
now vanished from the earth.”
55
 To be seen by this threatening life behind the fences 
offers a sublime disorientation of the very human mastery which made it possible. The 
same cannot be said for the Afro-Costa Rican workers whose anonymous deaths populate 
the construction and collapse of the park. Malcolm’s question to Grant, “Is this a 
persuasive animal to you? Is it in fact a dinosaur?,” turns the novel’s discussion toward 
authenticity, or rather to what might be called the correspondence theory of dinosaur 
production, elaborated in a debate between Hammond and Wu.
56
 Hammond is upset 
when Wu suggests that park visitors will have been culturally conditioned to expect slow 
moving dinosaurs, and that slower dinosaurs would be easier to manage. “We haven’t re-
created the past here,” Wu says. “The past is gone. It can never be recreated. What we’ve 
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done is reconstruct the past—or at least a version of the past. And I’m saying we can 
make a better version.” Hammond interjects: “Better than real?”  “But they’re not real 
now,” Wu replies, “That’s what I’m trying to tell you. There isn’t any reality here.”
57
  
Because Wu understands the dinosaurs as constructed, his distinction between 
real and artificial is predicated on intervention alone. Hammond, the idealistic non-
specialist, is closer to the park visitor whose distinction between real and artificial is 
based on how closely the dinosaurs resemble his imagination of them as shaped by 
popular culture and loosely on scientific projections. In the free indirect discourse Wu 
imagines trying to explain to Hammond the problem with his thinking. “The DNA of the 
dinosaurs was like old photographs that had been retouched, basically the same as the 
original but in some places repaired and clarified.”
58
 Hammond does not understand how 
much intervention was necessary to make these dinosaurs “real.” On top of this, the 
metaphor Wu must use—photography—operates on a similar representational logic in 
which DNA contains a miniature image of the dinosaur in a one to one correspondence. 
With no reference to the mediation of the camera (laboratory) or photographer (Wu), this 
metaphor also cannot take into account the dinosaurs as living, social beings, whose 
environment presents behavioral and even chromosomal opportunities for adaptation. In 
short, there is quite a bit of “reality” there, only it is a reality that is becoming in excess of 
the imaginations and constructions of the park’s genetic architects. The dinosaurs’ agency 
upends the distinctions on which the concerns over hyperreality and simulation are based. 
As feral velociraptors and “compys” escape onto mainland Costa Rica they devour crops 
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rich in the lysine enzyme to fulfill their engineered need. After the artificial barriers come 
down, a new post-natural and performative ecology establishes itself.  
Jurassic Park’s narrative anticipates a move beyond philosophies of the real and 
its representation while remaining formally conventional. Even as “chaos” is disrupting 
the characters and events, Crichton’s narrative is itself tightly controlled. It jumps from 
location to location, dropping in on expository conversations that give context to what is 
happening elsewhere in the park. The only representation of “chaos” is in the increasingly 
complex fractal shapes that develop on the chapter-heading pages. Indeed, one might 
claim that chaos is the narrative means through which the events are made sensible and 
managed. While it may be tempting to read the novel as a shift from what Donald 
Worster has called the “ecology of order” to the “ecology of chaos,” Jurassic Park is 
ultimately a narrative about the failure of an entrepreneurial project in the opening decade 
of the current cycle of capitalist globalization.
59
 Ian Malcolm argues that the emergence 
of risk and chaos theory is proof that the world we know is in the midst of being swept 
away like the medieval order that Enlightenment science displaced. The passing from one 
paradigm to the next is dramatized by Malcolm’s death. With his final words he mumbles 
about paradigms and how everything looks different on the other side. He fulfills his 
prophetic function by asserting a vision of the new world that is displacing the old, and 
gives his life as a final “I told you so” to the old world that wouldn’t listen.   
The Jurassic Park franchise has arguably been so influential that it not only 
reflects the DNA discourses of the day but, as Sarah Franklin argues, has helped to 
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construct the “global genetic imaginary,” which conflates radically different conceptions 
of “life itself.”
60
 Melinda Cooper articulates vitalist affirmation of biological possibilities 
of life in the context of the financial turn under neoliberalism and the new economy of 
biogenetics. “The expansion of commercial processes into the sphere of ‘life itself’ has a 
troubling effect on the self evidence of traditional economic categories,” she writes. 
“Where does (re)production end and technical invention begin, when life is put to work at 
the microbiological or cellular level,” Cooper asks; and “what is the relationship between 
new theories of biological growth, complexity, and evolution and recent neoliberal 
theories of accumulation?”
61
 Extending Foucault’s influential analysis of the shift in 
governmentality from the power “to kill” to the power to “let live,” she argues that the 
production of life—and the image of life—as that which surpasses boundaries has 
become instrumental in neoliberal economic models.
62
 These models were a response to 
the “limits to growth” studies of the seventies, in which the Keynesian steady-state 
regulatory model of “embedded liberalism” came into conflict with capital’s need for 
new frontiers of accumulation. Disruption replaced balance as an ideal order of nature 
and society, as the Fordist interlude came to a close and “ordinary capitalism” returned.
63
 
“Even in the work of Prigogine and Stengers,” Cooper observes, “the new political 
economy of nature sounds suspiciously like the new political economy of 
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 Old, “big nature” style conservation (and science) in the service of the 
public good became the “grey flannel suit” in the new cultural politics, while chaos came 
wearing leather pants and a libertarian attitude like Ian Malcolm, clothing the new 
paradigm in rebellious fashions as it set about philosophically undermining the legal 
concepts—like wilderness—central to really-existing environmental restrictions on 
corporate extraction and pollution. In its place was a free market “wise use” principle 
reliant on individual responsibility. Cooper insists that “in the absence of any substantive 
critique of political economy, any philosophy of life as such runs the risk of celebrating 
life as it is.”
65
  
Crichton’s narrative chastises a biogenetic company for not heeding the very 
emerging paradigms that spurred the growth of the biotech industry and deregulatory 
incentives to begin with. His narrative registers a critique of deregulated biotechnology, 
but the sublime chaotic vitalism that disrupts InGen’s project is the same vitalism that is 
instrumentalized in the biotech imaginary of neoliberalism. Jurassic Park’s deployment 
of “life” in this way is another instance of its instrumentalization. This produces the 
“double narrative” effect of simultaneously lamenting deregulation while naturalizing the 
resistance to regulation. Life finds a way both around (market) barriers to expansion and 
it finds a way to get ahead in a generalized “precariousness” which, in Franco Berardi’s 
description, is “the desert of the world returned to jungle.”
66
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In what I called “kitsch marxist” readings of Jurassic Park, the dinosaurs represent 
an oppressed proletariat who overthrow the corporation.
67
 If one is looking for an 
allegory, I would claim that the dinosaurs more closely resemble the image of flexible, 
infinitely demanding, consumers in the marketplace, whose agency is affirmed alongside 
that of the entrepreneurial subject. Sam Binkley suggests that “where the Fordist 
compact… demanded the production of ‘docile’ bodies, smiling organization men happy 
in their modest functions as appendages of large, remotely administered bureaucratic 
machines, the culture of post-Fordism demanded the insurrectionary body.”
68
 “Life finds 
a way” becomes an adventure slogan which appeals to the post-sixties libertarian left and 
free-market conservatives alike, instilling a disruptive, antiregulatory impulse into the 
very building blocks—the matter—of life. As a slogan, it speaks to the desire to 
transgress the law, which is also to say a desire for the law, while at the same time 
assures one of the resilience of “life” amid austerity and deregulation (and the sixth mass 
extinction). Leaving aside the questions of whether the dinosaurs consciously conspire to 
abolish themselves as objects of a set of biopolitical arrangements, they do manage to 
abolish themselves as the simulation of others’ fantasies. However, this agency is made 
possible by planned acts of corporate espionage which sabotaged the park’s security 
systems, which was then compounded by an extreme weather event. Once again, the 
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desire to focus on the “chaos narrative” rather than the “regulatory narrative” contributes 
to the obfuscation of social and economic conditions, e.g. competing “post-national” 
biogenetic firms, which made the park possible—technologically, financially, and 
geopolitically. I turn now to Octavia Butler’s Parable novels, which address the 
“sentimental” and affective response to naturalized chaos.  
 
Octavia Butler’s Affirmation Of Chaos 
“…stability disintegrates / as it must”
69
 
–Earthseed: The Books of the Living  
 
 Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) and Parable of the Talents (1998), 
affirm the chaos that surrounds the narrator’s dystopian future. Her novels describe a 
United States that is an exaggeration of our own in which environmental and social 
disruptions are exacerbated by deregulated business practices, a crumbling infrastructure, 
and the return of unfree labor.
70
 In Butler’s words, these novels take the form of a 
warning: “an ‘if this goes on…’ story.”
71
 She bases her vision of the future economy as 
an extension of the “Maquiladora Plants in Mexico,” which had amassed along the border 
of the US and Mexico in free-trade zones. These dramatically expanded with the signing 
of NAFTA. In a 1994 interview Butler refers to the maquiladoras saying that, “the 
opposite of slavery is also in evidence now: throw-away labor… American companies 
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going down there to take advantage of cheap labor and unenforced environmental 
regulations.”
72
 She connects the economic and environmental logic of this globalization: 
“If you can get labor for a dollar an hour or eighty cents an hour… you’re going to be 
able to lower wages where you are by threatening to move down there.”  “And if you can 
spew filth into rivers down there,” she continues, “you can always threaten to move down 
there if the environmental regulations get a little fight up here.”
73
 Butler’s novels depict a 
world in which spaces of exception in the global economy, like the maquiladoras or 
Crichton’s fictional Isla Nublar, have become the norm. She “imagine[s] the United 
States becoming, slowly, through the combined effects of lack of foresight and short-term 
unenlightened self-interest, a third world country.”
74
 Butler, like Crichton, is confronting 
a rapidly globalizing modernization, but where Crichton presents modernity as a problem 
of technology and knowledge, Butler’s avowedly “sentimental” characters experience the 
deregulated landscape as one comprised of human relationships and cosmological 
attitudes. 
The Parable novels follow the life and writings of Lauren Olamina, a young 
woman who invents a new religion in response to a United States that has been reduced 
to quasi-apocalyptic landscape of drug addicted pyromaniacs and racist corporate towns. 
Her own gated community becomes unsafe and she is forced to flee to the north. Where 
the twentieth century African-American migration narrative moved from rural, agrarian 
south to the urban, industrial north, Butler’s characters move from gated ex-urban spaces 
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of southern California to the rural landscape of Humboldt County. Long seen as a hippie 
stronghold of alternative, New Age, and back-to-the-land communities, this location 
(Acorn) becomes a means for the characters to establish lives in relative autonomy from 
the dangerous urban environments, a means for survival, and an opportunity to form a 
community around a cosmology that is both agrarian and space age. Butler’s vision 
shares much in common with Sam Binkley’s account of post-sixties, professional-
managerial class narratives of “loosening” as a way to negotiate the flexible modernity of 
post-Fordism.
75
 Using Binkley’s exploration of New Age and communitarian print 
cultures of the seventies, and drawing on Rebecca Wanzo’s location of Butler within the 
“New Age boom” of the nineties, I examine the lineage of Butler’s affirmation of chaos, 
and deification of “Change,” within the deregulatory landscape.
76
 
The Parable novels are unique in that they are composed entirely of journal 
entries, so that the events are always interpreted through a particular perspective. The 
glue that holds these entries together are the poetic fragments and epigrams from 
Olamina’s religious text, Earthseed: The Books of the Living. Olamina’s poetic writings 
are collected and presented as Earthseed: The Books of the Living. The passages from 
Earthseed hover above each journal entry of the narration. In postmodern fashion, the 
fragmented aphorisms serve as paratexts for both the reader and the characters alike as 
the latter make reference to the book and attempt to explain their situation through its 
vocabulary. The Earthseed passages provide examples within the novel of ways that texts 
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are composed and circulated. Beyond the representativeness of fiction or realism, these 
texts intervene at the level of action by shaping the characters’ affective responses to 
situations—and, by extension, the reader’s. Within the world of the novel, Earthseed 
circulates as a religious and practical text. It influences the characters’ interpretation of 
their situation and is meant to be instructive in the way that the Parable novels are 
themselves meant to be instructive for contemporary readers, serve as a warning and a 
guide to potential transformation. They provide a parallel situation through which readers 
can understand their own struggles within a social order that feels like it is disintegrating. 
Earthseed’s dominant message is that “God is change” and its members are to 
“shape God.” The fragments combine an affirmation of change with a will to adaptation 
and overcoming. “We adapt and endure, / For we are Earthseed / And God is Change.”
77
 
Individual and community formation is elided with biology, and civilization with 
intelligence. “Intelligence is ongoing, individual adaptability. / Adaptations that an 
intelligent species may make / in a single generation, other species make over / many 
generations of selective breeding and / selective dying.”
78
 “Civilization is to groups what 
intelligence is to individuals.”
79
 Intelligence is linked with behavior and adaptability, the 
ability of groups to make decisions and build institutions through instrumentalized 
knowledge. It is less about knowledge per se, but intelligence, meaning what people are 
to do with the knowledge and where to go with it. Earthseed members are told to be 
“Opportunistic / Tenacious / Interconnected, and / Fecund. / Understand this. / Use it. / 
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 Above all, the charge is to “Shape God,” by which they mean, “shape 
change,” or change the change.  
In The Parable of the Talents, Olamina’s husband describes the beliefs of 
Earthseed as a theology of chaotic processes without shape. 
Her god is a process or a combination of processes, not an entity. It is not 
consciously aware of her—or of anything. It is not conscious at all. “God is 
Change,” she says and means it. Some of the faces of her god are biological 
evolution, chaos theory, relativity theory, the uncertainty principle, and, of course, 




Olamina’s imagination of God as Change is a naturalistic religion derived from 
late-twentieth century mathematics and post-Newtonian science. In a sense, it can be read 
as the religion of modernity itself—as ceaseless change which requires the perpetual 
“making new” of individuals, cultures, and societies. It is a conscious shaping of the 
change that simultaneously changes the shaper, ala Marx’s historical materialism. It is an 
immanent deism that is both pragmatic and Darwinian in the sense that its outcome is not 
known in advance, but rather, its trajectories are directed along the way by collective 
acts—which may or may not coincide with any collective will. At the same time, 
Earthseed resembles many New Age philosophies that attempt to find a consilience 
between the advanced sciences and the romanticized—agrarian, tribal, communal, pre-
modern—past.  For Andrew Ross, New Age practitioners desire “a kinder, gentler 
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science” over which they have some agency in modernity: “New Age addresses its 
adherents as active participants, with a measure of control over their everyday lives and 
not as passive subjects, even victims of larger, objective forces.”
84
 That Butler’s 
Earthseed registers on so many levels is part of its narrative appeal; and within the story, 
the religion’s malleability enables community identity to be maintained in a harsh world 
of compulsory adaptation.  
Earthseed’s demand that its followers shape the change that surrounds them is 
starkly contrasted with Lauren’s brother, Marcus. “My Uncle Marc… hated the chaos,” 
writes Olamina’s daughter. “It wasn’t one of the faces of his god. It was unnatural. It was 
demonic. He hated what it had done to him, and he needed to prove that he was not what 
it had forced him to become. No Christian minister could ever hate sin as much as Marc 
hated chaos. His gods were order, stability, safety, control.”
85
 Marcus’ belief system 
stands direct opposition to the worldview of Earthseed, however it is presented as another 
response to the same chaotic situation. The narration reduces the two worldviews and 
approaches, as well as the politics that seem to flow from them, to individual 
psychologies. Marcus “was a man with a wound that would not heal until he could be 
certain that what had happened to him could not happen again to anyone, ever.” Even 
when it comes to shaping change, it would seem that there are political differences in 
how to shape it based on different interpretations of the situation, as much as on the 
psychologies of those implicated. 
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One of the contradictions of Earthseed is an inability to distinguish between good 
and bad processes in favor of a vague affirmation of “life.” “Any entity, any process that / 
cannot or should not be resisted or / avoided must somehow be / partnered. Partner one 
another. / Partner diverse communities. Partner / life.”
86
 As in Jurassic Park, “life” 
comes to stand for a generalized and affirmational process without subjects. For instance, 
the plot of the second novel is centered on the takeover of Acorn by authoritarian 
Christian fundamentalists who operate as a kind of blackshirt force in support of an 
authoritarian populist president, Andrew Steele Jarret, whose campaign slogan is “Help 
us to make America great again.”
87
 Olamina describes Jarret’s effort at “making America 
great again” as a threat of war against Earthseed and Acorn, who are seen as un-Christian 
heathens by the fundamentalists.
88
 Several members of Acorn are drawn away from the 
community to join Jarret. By locating the religious authoritarianism as outside the 
Earthseed belief system, Butler misses the opportunity to illustrate that even “good” 
belief systems are prone to authoritarianism in their practices—her daughter’s later 
experience of the bureaucratic hierarchy of Earthseed notwithstanding. How does one 
determine which entity or process needs to be avoided or resisted? What does it mean to 
partner with a process that one wants to resist? Is the resistance itself a form of systemic 
partnering at the level of a higher process? This deliberate vagueness lends itself to broad 
interpretation in which “life” includes bad things which must be affirmed so as to be 
overcome in the name of survival. 
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Rebecca Wanzo situates Butler’s Parable novels within the tradition of American 
sentimentalism and New Age literature. For Wanzo, Lauren Olamina, who suffers from 
“hyperempathy,” is a figure of the liberal sentimentalist whose vision of community 
strives toward a harmony of interests, while her internal text, Earthseed: The Books of the 
Living, falls into the genre of New Age literature. Butler’s novels correspond with the 
1990s boom in the sales of books classified as “New Age, Mind Body Spirit, Spirituality, 
Occult, Self Help, and Western variations of Eastern traditions.” Since the early 
seventies, she argues, New Age texts have been concerned with the “suffering ‘I’” who 
must create a sense of self without contributing to the suffering of the world.
89
 Butler 
reconfigures these therapeutic texts from the individual to the community to encourage a 
sense of resilience. Clarence Tweedy III eschews this New Age connection and reads the 
Earthseed text within the Black Theological tradition of the Black Church in America. 
“By negating the politics of victimization with a doctrine of self-agency,” Tweedy 
argues, “Lauren creates a clear distinction between the other-worldly faith of her father 
and the this-worldly doctrines of Earthseed.”
90
 This is not a theology of transcendence to 
be reunited with a distant patriarchal father, he suggests, but rather a participation in the 
earthly becoming of an immanent god concerned with the social fate of the community. 
As New Age literature is a postmodern genre that recombines incredibly diverse 
traditions with varying degrees of “authenticity”—experience itself is held as the only 
measure of authenticity—it can certainly incorporate elements of the Black Church. One 
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can argue that Olamina rejects her father’s spiritual tradition because it had failed to 
maintain the community. She resuscitates the sustaining functional role of the Black 
Church, albeit through a new theology. 
Butler may indeed be updating the theology of the Black Church, but does so 
through a narrative particular to the post-sixties countercultures of those who moved 
“back to the land” and adopted philosophies in opposition to the dominant Fordist, mass-
consumer model of society. Cultural sociologists of the New Age phenomenon link its 
emergence to professional-managerial class discontentment with bureaucratic corporate 
liberalism, apocalyptic high technology, and the impersonal “conformist” nature of 
contemporary society. For Sam Binkley, New Age narratives of “self-loosening” helped 
members of the middle class to negotiate the flexible modernity of the 1970s, with its 
crises of environment, war, and restructuring of work and family. “Modernities,” Binkley 
writes, “develop in their conjunctural specificity, at the interstices opened up by emerging 
and receding patterns of life.”
91
 A set of amorphous attitudes emerged which were 
prefigured by more politically articulate documents like the 1962 Port Huron Statement. 
Resisting the strictures of industrial society meant not only opposing this or that policy, it 
meant attempting to embody the world one desires by “letting one’s hair down” and 
“going with the flow.” Andrew Ross sees a shared social critique between the New Age 
discourses of the seventies and nineties, and the field of cultural studies, a description that 
characterizes many of the positions Butler adopts in her fiction. 
The small-scale imperative of New Age’s cooperative communitarianism brings 
with it a host of potentially critical positions: against big, centralized 
bureaucracies; against big, transnational business conglomerates; against large-
scale, and environmentally destructive technologies; against the imperialist claims 
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made on the basis of strong nationalism; and against monolithic institutions in 




 In both its content and in the way it circulates in the world of the novels, Butler’s 
conception of Earthseed: The Books of the Living, bears a striking resemblance to the 
worldview and print culture of the New Age literature in the seventies. Binkley considers 
the “book as tool” in much countercultural discourse. Books, newsletters, and magazines 
became focal points for bringing together lifestyle communities interested in “remaking 
real life through print.”
93
 The publication was a therapeutic manual for the self and 
society, capable of aligning the romantic project of self-creation with the outward 
commitment to the social good. Accompanying this was the rise of the “intimate 
professional.” This new form of “loose” expertise “had to be humanized and 
individualized, and the basis for his knowledge had to be dislodged from the distanced, 
remote, and abstract pedagogy of the old Fordist managerial supervisor and fashioned 
again as real intimate knowledge—the kind that can be gained only from direct 
experience, learning, and personal growth in one’s life.”
94
 Lauren Olamina’s 
“hyperempathy” equips her with a special ability to feel other’s mental and physical 
anguish and her diaries accompany Earthseed as quasi-religious text that testifies to the 
personal experience and authenticity of its author. Wanzo observes that, for Olamina, 
“hyperempathy” abolishes the distinction between delusion and fiction, and the real is the 
domain of feeling, which tells us how Butler understands fiction working on people and 
intervening to produce the liberal community of feeling. 
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 Books are depicted as incredibly useful, but ultimately reliant on the reader to put 
it to use through interpretation and action in a context. In Parable of the Sower, Olamina 
convinces Jo to look through her family’s books. “Books aren’t going to save us,” Jo 
replies. “Nothing is going to save us. If we don’t save ourselves, we’re dead,” Olamina 
counters: “Is there anything on your family bookshelves that might help you if you were 
stuck outside? […] Any kind of survival information from encyclopedias, biographies, 
anything that helps you learn to live off the land and defend ourselves. Even some fiction 
might be useful.”
95
 Olamina’s apparent disregard for genre is actually a respect for the 
diverse sources from which knowledge might be attained. Later, she remarks that her 
“grandmother left a whole bookcase of old science fiction novels.”
96
 Reading these 
prepared her to recognize the trope of the “company-city” in the town of Olivar and to 
recognize how the heroic overthrowing of “the company” never happens in real life. Her 
only option is to escape her “disintegrating neighborhood” to found Earthseed. “I used to 
wait for the explosion, the big crash, the sudden chaos that would destroy the 
neighborhood,” she writes, recognizing the failure of traditional narratives to map her 
reality: “Instead, things are unraveling, disintegrating bit by bit.”
97
 While the plots of 
these science fiction novels proved unrealistic, their content inspired her to follow reports 
on the Anglo-Japanese cosmological station’s discovery of “life-bearing” worlds and to 
imagine Earthseed’s mission to “take root among the stars.” “Life alone is enough,” she 
writes. “There is life out there… just a few light years away, and the United States is 
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busy drawing back from even our nearby dead worlds.”
98
 Olamina’s use of “old hat” 
science fiction lies in its ability to speak simultaneously to the earthly and extra-terrestrial 
imagination, even if the plots offer unrealistic narratives. Here, Butler is responding to 
the failure of conventional plots in which the hero that overcomes the chaotic event; she 
writes of disintegration and slow violence, distributed heroics and small acts. 
Butler often speaks of the relevance of fiction to political movements. Her 
negative examples are Andrew Macdonald’s The Turner Diaries, and The Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion. These racist fictions created speculative narratives, e.g. race war or 
Jewish conspiracy, which readers were invited to either carry out or prevent from 
happening.
99
 Parable of the Talents is in many ways a narrative of the how a community 
utilizes a particular text in order to resist a fascist movement. The status of fiction and the 
“truth” of Earthseed is raised in a conversation between Olamina and her brother, 
Marcus, who is influenced by Jarret’s propaganda and thinks it is a cult. Olamina 
describes it as “a collection of truths… just one collection of thoughts that are true.”
100
 To 
which he replies, “But you made Earthseed up. Or if you didn’t make it up, you read it or 
heard about it somewhere.” She gives him a rock. “If I were to analyze this stone and find 
out exactly what it’s made of, would that mean I made it up?” Blending scientific and 
social-humanistic description, Olamina situates Earthseed outside of the traditional 
genres of writing. “All the truths of Earthseed existed somewhere before I found them 
and put them together. They were in the patterns of history, in science, philosophy, 
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religion, or literature. I didn’t make any of them up,” she argues. Marcus accuses her of 
making “Earthseed up the same way you would have made a novel up if you wrote one.” 
She replies: “Except by that definition, a novel is fiction. Don’t call Earthseed fiction.”
101
 
For her characters, this genre blending text gives them a common narrative that enables 
their project of community building amidst repression. Butler understands her own fiction 
as serving a similar purpose—a narrative intervention that readers will have to make real. 
In interviews about the utility of fiction in Parable novels, Butler links fiction with 
religion as a tool to shape and direct societies. She suggests that a forward-looking and 
naturalistic religion might direct humanity’s cultural evolution toward sustainability and 
exploration of outer-space, and that, “if we are to be anything other than smooth 
dinosaurs we’d better get out there.”
102
 
Here, dinosaurs are again the environmental figures of obsolescence in general; 
however, taking into account the fact that African Americans and non-whites have often 
been absent from fictional futures of space, this obsolescence is racialized and 
underscores the importance of a black futurist imaginary. Gil Scott-Heron wrote “Whitey 
on the Moon” in 1970, highlighting the contradictions between high technology and 
urban poverty. It might be read in response to Richard Brautigan’s 1967 poem, “All 
Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace,” which imagined a pastoral “cybernetic 
ecology / where we are free of our labors / and joined back to nature.” Butler’s work 
infuses the utopian ideal with the urgent consciousness of bodily injustices, articulating a 
modernity for the uneven present. “Modernities are never the property of one group,” 
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Binkley writes, “much less the unconditioned spirit of an age, but the articulation of 
moments and temporal trajectories at the reconfigured boundaries between groups.”
103
 
The thread which connects the countercultural politics and New Age lifestyle 
consumption to the yuppie consumerism of the eighties and nineties is the role it has 
played in the professional-managerial class navigating (and creating) the niche economy 
of post-Fordism. Butler repurposes the tropes of this often white-coded discourse to 
speak to the anxieties of the neoliberal nineties, fashioning a survival ideology and what 




Butler’s science fiction has taken on increased political importance. The recent 
publication of Octavia’s Brood: Science Fiction Stories from Social Justice Movements, 
testifies to the continued, and increasing, relevance of the speculative genre for reform 
and revolution minded writers and activists. “Whenever we envision a world without war, 
without prisons, without capitalism, we are producing visionary fiction,” writes editor, 
Walidah Imarisha. “Organizers and activists envision, and try to create, such worlds all 
the time.”
105
 Here, the explicit utopian desire of fiction becomes a tool for activists to 
imagine worlds besides this one. The affirmation of utopian desire offered by the editors 
of Octavia’s Brood, however, differs slightly from thinkers in the historical materialist 
tradition. Adorno recognized that all art carries a utopian dimension, or promise of 
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fulfillment, implicating the present society for its contradictions and erasures of suffering. 
Even the experience of injury or “damaged life” implies a normative conception of health 
or wholeness. Speculation may also be prone to becoming a battle over competing ideal 
images of the world, which may scuttle the very effort to organize people around 
collective projects. Rather than situating people by way of speculative visions of 
fulfillment, we might instead situate speculation by way of people. If Earthseed serves as 
Butler’s example of how a speculative text might serve the interests of a particular 
community—rather than vice versa—then the question of who should have a larger 
presence in the speculative and imaginary work of social movements is answered by 
collections like Octavia’s Brood. 
Recent books like Carolyn Finney’s Black Faces, White Spaces: Reimagining the 
Relationship of African Americans to the Great Outdoors, and historical case studies like 
Andrew Hurley’s Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in 
Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980, have joined a chorus of scholarship in writing African-
American historical experience back into the cultural economy of nature.
106
 Ecocritics 
have revisited Harlem Renaissance writers like Jean Toomer and Zora Neale Hurston, as 
well as later chroniclers of alienation in industrial capitalism, such as William Attaway’s 
Blood on the Forge.
107
 Working against notions that African Americans either do not care 
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about the environment, or are so destitute as to be unable to create imaginative and 
meaningful relationships with the natural world and its inhabitants—which, for Butler 
includes outer space—these authors complicate and situate blackness in the past, present, 
and future of environmental thought.  
Finney’s book closes on a story of her family’s former home in New York. 
Sometime after they had moved away, they received a letter informing them that their 
land had been included in a trust and would be protected watershed habitat for the 
extensive wildlife. “What caught my attention,” she writes, “was how the author of the 
letter thanked the current owner for his ‘generosity and conservation mindedness,’ but 
says nothing about my parents, who cared for that land for fifty years, with no 
‘conservation easement’ or other environmental incentives.” “I believe,” she continues, 
“that my parents are part of a larger story of people seen and unseen whose relationship 
to the environment is one forged in sweat, ingenuity, necessity, and a little true grit.”
108
 
This touching tribute to her parents’ unrecognized labor of conservation shares in the 
spirit of Wendell Berry, whose small-is-beautiful, property-owner ethic of conservation 
speaks to the scale of daily life in the discourses of environmental justice: “the places 
where we live, work, and play.” However, this environmental ideal—the small property 
owner / farmer as the basis of a democratic social order—inherits the Jeffersonian vision 
of democracy whose agrarian and rural basis relied on unfree pools of labor, and, as 
Bayard Rustin argued in his promotion of industrial democracy,
109
 is not a workable or 
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effective model for the 20
th
 century urban political economy, let alone millennial 
neoliberalism which relies on atomized entrepreneurialism as the basis of its flexible 
extractions of resources and wealth. Neoliberalism is often said to promote a “racially 
enlightened” meritocratic ethos while intensifying inequality and a nostalgic green 
moralism that speaks of “sweat, ingenuity, necessity, and true grit,” would make itself 
rhetorically available in naturalizing austerity.
110
  
Butler’s Earthseed vision of sustainable community resilience may already be at 
work in food gardens and urban agriculture projects across the country. However, as Jodi 
Dean provocatively puts it: “Goldman Sachs doesn’t care if you raise chickens.” Dean’s 
underlying assumption is that small-scale urban farming is not a challenge to the financial 
order. It is, in many instances, a boutique practice which blurs the line between radical 
project and backyard hobby. However, in the case of cities like Detroit, urban agriculture 
has become a necessary matter of people feeding themselves and providing community-
building opportunities in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008—an event which 
brought into sharp relief the long-term destruction of the black middle class in the decline 
of Fordism. For Butler, survival is itself a heroic act of overcoming both nature and 
society, each of which exhibit processes that one must shape to one’s own ends, content 
with the knowledge that one will be changed in the process. It is a shame that it only 
becomes a practical alternative, or adaptive strategy, in the wake of catastrophe.  
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Life finds a way, but which life? Horkheimer and Adorno write that “the great 
artists were never those whose work embodied style in its least fractured, most perfect 
form but those who adopted style as a rigor to set against the chaotic expression of 
suffering as a negative truth.”
111
 It is in this light we can situate the turn to vitalism—in 
examples like Parable’s Earthseed and Jurassic Park—as a will to affirm adaptation and 
flexibility in the face of economic-environmental hardship. We can read this desperate 
vitalism as the “negative truth” of the deregulatory era. In their critiques of the Fordist 
dream of total administration, the Frankfurt School thinkers shared with their opponent, 
Martin Heidegger, an understanding of vitalism as “a protest against reification that 
became complicit with reification.”
112
 Daniel Bell would later recognize the “cultural 
contradictions of capitalism” which require disciplined comportment in the workplace 
and wild rebellion in the ethos of market consumers.
113
 As the seventies came to a close, 
Foucault anticipated a neoliberalism that constructed the self as an active, even 
disruptive, entrepreneurial project, a vitalpolik in which the “basic units” of life have 
become an enterprise, while the Italian philosophers of post-Fordism have argued that 
melting distinctions between society and the natural world has resulted in a generalized 
biopolitical opportunism that clothes those already within the networks of privilege with 
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a naturalized legitimacy. For some, this may be a romantic project of self-creation, but 
for the majority, the compulsion to flexibility is a market-driven response to an inflexible 
social environment.   
John Rieder argues that science fiction cannot be separated from the context of 
colonialism and the scientific ideas that continue to inform the imagination of difference. 
“Evolutionary theory and anthropology, both profoundly intertwined with colonial 
ideology and history, are especially important to early science fiction from the mid-
nineteenth century on,” he writes.
114
 “The complex mixture of ideas about competition, 
adaptation, race, and destiny that was in part generated by evolutionary theory,” was a 
focal point of nineteenth and early-twentieth century politics. It should come as no 
surprise then that both Crichton and Butler take the natural sciences, now with updated 
chaos, complexity, and “postclassical theory,” as the basis for new models of thinking 
community, the individual, race, and the environment.
115
 Crichton’s depiction of the 
professional/expert was tied to a critique of commercialized knowledge and technical 
ability to intervene into “life,” while Butler’s “intimate professional,” Lauren Olamina, 
derives her expertise from empathy, a liberal social value, which has become the inborn 
biological condition, “hyperempathy.” Crichton articulated his appeals to complexity 
with a broadly antiregulatory politics, and his own speeches assisted in materially 
constructing the obfuscating discourses of corporate-funded climate change denial. 
Butler’s readers must ask themselves with what politics her vision of complexity might 
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be articulated, or whether it will become another personal cosmology of lifestyle 
consumption amid the broader market multiculturalism. 
By staging the conflict as control vs. life, radically different conceptions of life 
are elided: life as biology, life as meta-biological evolutionary “striving,” life as 
metaphysical will of individuals or collectives, and life as transgressive, self-organized 
“emergent” markets against the “embedded” markets of Keynesian welfare states. This 
elision transforms life—as an idea of nature—into an ideological pivot point. “Life finds 
a way” characterizes the social attitude of neoliberal transformations of the public and 
private sectors, its affirmational character. In Life after Politics, John Gray reminds us 
that Thatcherism and Reaganism were essentially “a modernizing project with profound 
and irreversible consequences for political life.”
116
 Gray would later argue that Hayek’s 
vision of unregulated markets failed to engender the spontaneous development of order 
and has proved to be the final twentieth century utopia to have enlisted life in the service 
of the destruction of life.
117
  Like earlier modernizations, the maelstrom of activity 
required in the formation of new markets is presented as the means to escape the 
boundaries of tradition and history. For Adorno, this vision of chaotic dynamism 
complements “bourgeois ‘a-historicity,’” meaning that the concept enables production to 
be divorced from social need. Activity itself becomes the desired object, with no 
necessary end that is pursued.  
The conception of unfettered activity, of uninterrupted procreation, of chubby 
insatiability, of freedom as frantic bustle, feeds on the bourgeois concept of nature 
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that has always served solely to proclaim social violence as unchangeable, as a 
piece of healthy eternity… It is not man’s lapse into luxurious indolence that is to 
be feared, but the savage spread of the social under the mask of universal nature, 




A post-historical vitalism that naturalizes the economic disruptions and precarious social 
experience of the present can be countered with a literature capable of revealing what 
remains unchanged. This is what Adorno meant when he wrote that “the task of art today 
is to bring chaos into order.”
119
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RETERRITORIALIZING NORTH AMERICA: WILLIAM T. VOLLMANN’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEMORY 






Without a past, no matter how controvertible, the present cannot be 
anything other than a tumble through darkness towards the darkness which 





One of the hundreds of footnotes in William T. Vollmann’s Imperial, a non-
fiction novel set in the agricultural borderlands of California and Mexico, is a quote on 
“infinity” from The Great Soviet Encyclopedia: “The presence of a boundary or measure 
necessarily implies the possibility of exceeding it.”
3
 Being able to make a distinction 
means that one has already in some sense internalized what lies beyond the distinction; 
the territory is the after-effect of the mark. In this Hegelian wisdom from an artifact of a 
now defunct empire, one can perhaps hear the echoes of Napoleon’s cannons. Theodor 
Adorno famously turns this “infinity” on its head. The implication of his Negative 
Dialectics lies in what he calls “the preponderance of the object.”
4
 It is the world, in other 
words, and our relations within that world, which are always in excess of our efforts to 
measure and bind everything into concepts—attempts, Adorno believes, to violently 
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impose identities on the non-identical, if not the multiple. Vollmann’s plunge into 
history, as evidenced in his transnational and historiographic metafiction, stages a 
confrontation with the non-identity of the past and the multiplicity of the present.  
In this chapter, I argue that Vollmann’s metafictional approach to history 
reconstructs the environmental memory of North America, a memory of a world already 
in excess of its borders and identities. He creates what Nancy Fraser refers to as “frames 
of justice” in that he foregrounds the political nature of the narrative act. For Fraser, 
narrative framing, or what Vollmann calls “delineation,” is a necessary third dimension 
that underlies, and is often excluded from, the discourses of recognition and 
redistribution.
5
 Vollmann’s writing dramatizes the work of composing a common world, 
what Raymond Williams calls “a knowable community,” at the beginning of the 21
st
 
century. He offers a social and environmental consciousness capable of negotiating the 
multiple and often conflicting frames through which the transnational struggles over life, 
land, and labor will be waged. 
William T. Vollmann (b. 1959) is known for his wildly prolific career. He has 
published copious works on subjects like gender in Japanese Noh Theater, to Copernicus’ 
uncentering of the Earth, ethnographic journalism on global poverty, and a seven volume 
treatise on violence. His novels are fragmented and self-referential, and often take an 
international scope. He won the National Book Award in 2005 for Europe Central, his 
novel on the totalitarian imaginaries of World War II. In addition to being a novelist, he 
has served as a war correspondent and a travel writer touted with having a “post-tourist 
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 Jeff Williams identifies Vollmann as a member of “Generation Jones.” Alongside 
writers like Jennifer Egan, Jonathan Franzen, Chang-Rae Lee, Richard Powers, Ruth 
Ozeki, Louise Erdrich, Percival Everett, Sandra Cisneros, and David Foster Wallace, he 
shares in the answer to the question of what comes after postmodernism, namely the 
contemporary: a “renewed realism” of the moral and aesthetic kind, “multicultural” and 
forgiving rather than “adversarial” and nihilistic.
7
 Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
Vollmann’s work has rejected the disappointed idealism and apocalyptic cynicism that 
accompanied the postmodern cultural moment, and participates in what is now somewhat 
unaffectionately called “the new sincerity.” His use of postmodern literary techniques 
couples antifoundationalism with a democratic and pluralist ethos. Combining humility 
and responsibility, along with playfulness, beauty, and yes, even irony, Vollmann 
exposes the gap between intention and effect in a deeply social world whose brutal 
intransigence often tests the limits of individual agency and understanding. 
Vollmann writes in a post-textualist universe, that is, a world that has always been 
both real and profoundly shaped by our narratives and descriptions of it. As Linda 
Hutcheon argues, “the conventions of narrative in both historiography and novels are not 
constraints,” but are rather the “enabling conditions of possibility of sense-making.”
8
 
This fidelity in Vollmann’s writing to both the narrated and non-narrated world is 
alternately described by Lawrence Buell as a “dual accountability” in the ecocritic’s 
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analysis of nonfictional aesthetics.
9
 By writing in a historiographic genre that contains 
“the intratextual, the intertextual (the world of other texts), the autorepresentational (the 
text figured as a text), and the outer mimetic (the world outside the text),” Vollmann’s 
literary sensibility reflects the complex array of reference deployed in environmental 
literature broadly.
10
 As a surveyor of violence and abjection in the global economy, his 
writing situates knowledge as first an act within the world, and second, a representation of 
the world. This pragmatist distinction informs both the ethical and epistemological 
project at the heart of his books. The continuous awareness of his embeddedness 
approaches an intensity that borders on the scientific, as if the endeavor to categorize and 
manipulate the diverse array of reference is a constant effort to master reality. Yet this 
same impulse can also be read as an expression of fidelity to what exists—to the people 
and places out of which he composes his stories—the kind of fidelity needed if one is to 
discover how to properly betray it so that it might be transformed. 
Vollmann’s reconstruction of North American environmental memory re-maps 
the political imaginary of belonging and exclusion in the post-Fordist era. It is the time of 
NAFTA, neoliberalism, and what Nancy Fraser calls the “post-Westphalian order” that 
has replaced the Keynesian welfare state. In Fraser’s analysis, the transnationalization of 
production as well as the globalization of crises (e.g. climate, AIDS, water) has been 
contested by similar transnational movements that operate both within and beyond the 
nation-state. Thus, while earlier conceptions of justice based on (economic) redistribution 
and (cultural) recognition fought it out within the nation-state, a third dimension is now 
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needed: justice at the level of framing, or (political) acts of representation. The first two 
dimensions focus on the “what” and the “who” of justice, she writes in New Left Review, 
while the frame of representation focuses on the “how.”
11
 Fraser’s “politics of framing” 
thus reconfigures the political space itself—it draws attention to how political space, 
memory, and identification is constituted, what is included and excluded in that frame, 
and how those frames are deployed in the service of diverse ends. Similarly, by 
foregrounding his techniques of literary production, Vollmann exposes the “delineations” 
of the past that served, and continue to serve, the interests of the powerful. “This book,” 
he writes referring to Imperial, “represents my attempt to become a better-informed 
citizen of North America.”
12
 His attention to material history creates an environmental 
memory for readers out of conflicted and hybrid experiences of the past, now obscured 
by hardening of borders and identities under neoliberalism.
13
  
Vollmann is hardly the first US author to concern himself with redefining 
America. Henry James took up the international context of American identity in his 
novels, and argued that the novel was the very “art of representation.” The novel, James 
writes, continuously expands “round us in a widening, not in a narrow circle”.
14
 For 
Williams, the modern novel that James represents is a response to a “crisis of the 
knowable community” in which social experience is no longer evenly distributed, nor 
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transparent to all members of a society.
15
 The expanded art of representation expands the 
moral, ethical, and political imaginations of readers. Richard Rorty, channeling John 
Dewey, has this in mind when he speaks of “justice as a larger loyalty” and the 
importance of telling “sad stories in the public sphere.”
16
 Aldo Leopold’s land ethic was 
infused with narrative: Odysseus’ execution of slave girls as property is juxtaposed with 
brutal treatment of land as property. Without posing an eternal definition of justice, 
literature can encourage the expansion of recognition, solidarity, and broaden frames of 
consideration beyond the limits of current institutional contradictions. It does this through 
reframing the locations and perspectives of the primary actors, laying bare the unjust 
“enabling conditions” of the narrative descriptions and categories that maintain the 
present order. In what follows, I outline the concept of environmental memory and how it 
serves as a “frame of justice” in two Vollmann texts: The Ice-Shirt and Imperial.  
The concept of “environmental memory” has been, as Lawrence Buell observes, 
“used and abused.”
17
 Memory is often thought to be more authentic and closer to interior 
experience than history, yet both memory and interiority are made possible by technical 
prosthetics such as texts, images, objects, and languages.
18
 Environmental memory is as 
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much a prosthetic invention, subject to its own rules of selection and historical 
transmission, as it is the accumulation of unmediated encounters in a particular place. 
This transmission, as Axel Goodbody suggests, can be understood by taking a “cultural 
memory approach to environmental texts,” that is, by examining how texts narratively 
reconstruct past social relationships with nature. Goodbody takes an interest in 
geographic realities as “symbolic entities” which are “remembered and imagined, which 
play a central role in subject constitution, and serve crucial political, social, and cultural 
functions.”
19
 Guarding against the myopic particularism of the local and the false 
universality of the global, Goodbody argues that recompositions of the past can rewrite 
previously unquestioned spatial identifications in ways that expand the realm of ethics 
and politics to include those who were previously viewed as not belonging or unworthy 
of consideration. For Fraser, this exclusion is based on “misframing” and constitutes a 
“meta-injustice” as it becomes the basis for later claims.
20
 Thus, Goodbody turns to 
writers who attempt to redress these exclusions, and who reconstruct cultural memory by 
calling attention to “their own authorial strategies of representation and construction,” 
unpacking the process of individual and collective memory formation itself: 
[M]emories are not stores of complete sets of sense data, but consist rather of 
fragments of experience…which must be reactivated in processes linking them up 
into coherent patterns of information. This process of “re-membering” the raw 
experiential data explains why memories are subjective and context-dependent, 
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and why they often tell us as much about the present needs and desires of the 
remembering subject as they do about the past.
21
  
For Goodbody, memory describes a compositional process that binds disparate 
elements of information and experience into meaningful patterns which are part of the 
larger movement of subject formation within a historical—that is to say, narrative—
context. This is environmental and cultural memory at the individual level. Lawrence 
Buell’s categories of environmental memory, on the other hand, are not tied to an 
individual experience or medium. Instead, his categories allow environmental memory to 
be defined by its formation and use across multiple time-scales and constellations. These 
timescales are: the biogeological, which frames human life-spans and meaning within 
planetary ecological time; the personal, defined by individual experience of places; the 
social/collective, that is, narratives that relate people to their generational and 
intergenerational experience in their environs; and finally, the national, which draws on 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” defined by circulating media whose 
timescale emerges with its sense of shared identity and relation to place as political 
territory.
22
 Buell avoids reducing environmental memory to any one of these particular 
time-scales so as to focus on the different social processes and media through which that 
memory is formed and circulated. Paul Ricoeur formulates this well, arguing that “we are 
not capable of producing a concept of time that is at once cosmological, biological, 
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historical and individual.” It is only through “the activity of narrative,” he continues, that 
we can construct “coherent temporal ensembles: in order to configure time.”
23
 
Memory is understood here as a narrative act of framing with the capability of 
composing new subjects and new histories. Just as Rorty argues that “the principle 
backup for historiography is not philosophy but the arts,” the role of the artist is not to 
passively reflect but to actively compose new frames.
24
 Historiographic metafiction is a 
genre that consciously foregrounds its own narrative conventions as an element of the 
history it interrogates; as such, it is the ideal medium for explicitly reconfiguring the 
differing timescales and range of references that compose environmental memory, and 
the political frames that memory serves. Linda Hutcheon warns, however, that although 
this mode of writing “reinstalls historical contexts as significant and even determining… 
in so doing it problematizes the entire notion of historical knowledge.”
25
 It carries with it 
a certain danger, a danger we might call the political. Rather than accepting history as 
given it explores the empirical construction of that history, the retroactive creation of 
memory, and auto-ascription of social meaning. Vollmann expands the environmental 
identifications of contemporary subjects by recapitulating Goodbody’s process of “re-
membering” in the provisional and contingent nature of his metafiction.  
 
Environmental Memory and The Ice-Shirt 
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The Ice-Shirt is the first of seven novels in Vollmann’s as yet unfinished project, 
Seven Dreams: A Book of North American Landcapes. He began writing after the signing 
of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the US and Canada in 1988, and published 
two volumes by the time NAFTA was extended to Mexico. While the economic 
consolidation of the continent may provide political motivation for re-imagining its 
cultural and environmental history, it takes on new geo-historical relevance in the 
Anthropocene. The Ice-Shirt tells the story of the “coming of the frost” to North America, 
a material and environmental symbol of violent competition over resources. Inspired by 
medieval Icelandic manuscripts like the 14
th
 century Flateyjarbók, The Ice-Shirt rewrites 
the 13
th
 century Greenlanders’ saga and Eirik’s saga, adding imaginative detail to the 
Norse “discovery” of America and their interactions with the indigenous “Skraelings” in 
the late 10th century. Vollmann’s retelling combines the family sagas with the mythology 
and oral traditions of the Greenlandic Inuit and Newfoundland Micmac. His novel is a 
hybrid of history and fiction, contemporary travel writing, and speculative ecology, in 
which a cacophony of physical, spiritual, and human agencies come into conflict and 
anthropogenically inaugurate the “little ice age” of the 13
th
 century. 
In the most recent wave of globalization, the attempt to re-write the eco-cultural 
history of North America has been taken up by writers like Leslie Marmon Silko and 
Karen Yamashita. However, Buell argues that Vollmann’s “septet of novels on the 
(dis)arrangement of North America over the thousand-year period of Eurosettler-Native 
contact… qualifies as the hands-down boldest attempt ever launched at fictionally 





 Each novel in this “disarrangement” depicts a different moment 
(terrain) of conflict and exchange between the indigenous inhabitants of what we now 
call North America and people of European descent. Beginning this history with the 
Vinland Vikings offers a non-Columbian genealogy of contact. These clashes are 
semiotic and material, and are as much over land itself as over the social aspirations the 
land represents. The goal of Seven Dreams, as Vollmann writes, “has been to create a 
‘Symbolic History’—that is to say, an account of origins and metamorphoses… whose 
untruths further a deeper sense of truth.”
27
 This symbolic history speaks to the 
continuities that define North Americans as the heirs of these struggles in the present. 
The Ice-Shirt is not altogether different from the sagas it re-imagines. “The 
blending of truth and fiction in The Ice-Shirt,” argues Peter Christiansen, “continues the 
tradition of the sagas themselves.”
28
 Christiansen sees Vollmann as “updating Icelandic 
traditions” in that the saga manuscripts, being themselves a series of reproductions with 
little claim to an original source beyond question, simply pre-date modern distinctions 
between fact and fiction on which the generic conventions of realism, and the modern 
novel, rest.
29
 Of course, medieval Icelanders had notions of truth and falsehood; but they 
also had “synthetic truth” as Steblin-Kamenskij claims, which is different than post-
Enlightenment divisions between natural knowledge and cultural construction. Similarly, 
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Hutcheon argues that “historiographic metafiction refuses the view that only history has a 
truth claim, both by questioning the ground of that claim in historiography and by 
asserting that both history and fiction are discourses, human constructs, signifying 
systems, and both derive their major claim to truth from that identity.”
30
 What this means 
is that just as environmental historians today attempt to fill out their history by turning to 
hybrid texts like the sagas, they—like the writers of the sagas themselves—are involved 
in a creative project, producing narrative knowledge out of numerous sources and 
accounts. When Vollmann disrupts his narrative with references to particular saga 
manuscripts and openly considers his authorial decisions within the text, he challenges 
the “truth claims” of received history. At the same time he includes the reader in a similar 
project of reconstructing and reframing the “synthetic truth” of the sagas and North 
American history.  
Larry McCaffery observes that Vollmann’s “elaborate series of source notes and 
footnotes” in The Ice-Shirt go beyond mere listing of sources, but include “discussions 
about his intentions in employing his sources and correspondence with experts in the 
field who comment on (and occasionally disagree with) specific interpretations.”
31
 He 
employs “William the Blind” as The Ice-Shirt’s internal author to foreground his hand at 
work in recomposing the world of the sagas. Introducing contingency in his telling of the 
story is also a way of introducing contingency into the past itself, which may not coincide 
with the reader’s imagination of that past. Different manuscript accounts—e.g. 
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—contain alternative details of events 
and place descriptions. Add to this William the Blind’s dabbling in Micmac orthography 
and their mythology of shapeshifters, and Vollmann has not only challenged the image of 
a settled past, but has undone the very notion of stable beings and the correspondence of 
language (or writing) with the world. More “realistic” passages sometimes include badly 
drawn illustrations of flowers and artifacts (e.g. Freydis’ bone comb), as if to remind the 
reader that the written word is yet another variety of badly drawn reality. Illustrated 
maps, for instance, include explanatory notes like: “A highly unreliable sketch-map of 
places mentioned in the sketch-map of this sketch-map;” and trace anachronistic routes 
and modes of travel: “Seth Pilsk (by Boeing 747)” and “Freydis Eiriksdottir (by Ship).”
35
 
One of the central themes of Seven Dreams is that geographical environments are a 
palimpsest of imagination, technology, and power. If the past is not settled, if it really is 
“a different country” and open to interpretation, then the present isn’t as settled as it 
appears. 
William the Blind’s version of the Vinland sagas places greater emphasis on 
Freydis Eiriksdottir, a figure traditionally maligned for having murdered other colonists 
and infamous for frightening off Skraelings by slapping her naked breasts with a sword.
 
Freydis is granted an interiority that is previously absent, but this emphasis on her 
motivation comes at a price. She becomes the primary human agent of the “coming of the 
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frost.” Her mysterious pregnancy, which only appears in one of the “original” sagas, is 
explained by her love/hate relationship with demonic glacier beings, Blue-Shirt and 
Amortortak, as well as by her seduction of the mythical Micmac hero, Kluskap. “What do 
you really want?” Kluskap asks her, “I want to be rich,” she replies. After he recalls the 
timber, game, grapes, and skins that her people have enriched themselves with—even 
offering to smooth things out with his “People” over the Skraelings she had killed—
Kluksap asks what more she could want. “I want everything,” she replies.
36
 He implants 
the Frost-Seed in her, marking the passage from coldness as a physical agency of nature 
to an affect and a relation that circulates among humans within the landscape.  
This “exchange” between Nordic woman and Micmac hero is followed by 
Freydis’ dream in which various personified earthly forces across the North Atlantic do 
battle: Kluskap; the Mountain; the Hill; Blue-Shirt’s sea trolls; EARTHQUAKE; 
COOLPUJOT—the Power of the seasons; Sun; and finally, AMORTORTAK, who 
attempts to remove Kluskap’s shirt so that “the Plant People and Animal People would 
fade and die and Vinland would become a dull grey rock of lifeless neutrality, which he 
could then clothe in the Ice-Shirt.”
37
 By personifying geo-physical forces with names 
drawn from would-be European colonial settlers and indigenous North Americans the 
narrator is able to “explain” an otherwise massively distributed climatic process in 
anthropogenic terms. Were this written in 2014, Vollmann might have included an 
Indonesian volcano named Lombok, whose eruption in 1257 CE is now attributed with 
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the drop in temperatures across the North Atlantic.
38
 His imaginative explanation does 
not reduce the coming of the frost to any singular act or natural occurrence. However, 
since Freydis’ intercourse with spirits of both Indigenous and Icelandic tradition initiates 
the “little ice age,” the asymmetrical responsibility lies with the Nordic Greenlanders. 
Freydis embodies the economic and environmental motivations driving 
transnational expansion. An economic relation to place pervades the characters’ 
interactions, such as Thorvald’s death scene. Thorvald spends his final moments with his 
son discussing the economic prospects of Breidafjord. “This place will not bring any 
profit to you,” he tells Eirik, “When I die let the glacier creep down over this house.” 
This exchange is followed immediately by a quote from an Iceland Vacation Planner 
brochure from 1987. It reads: “We’re Rich in Viking Heritage, We’re Uncommon Good 
Fun and… We’re Very Affordable.”
39
 A section epigraph from Thoreau’s Walden 
reminds readers that coldness is not simply a natural fact, but also a social relation: “The 
poor man is wont to complain that this is a cold world, and to cold, no less physical than 
social, we refer directly a great part of our ails.”
40
 In other words, to the poor person 
coldness is experienced as a social relation as much as an absolute condition. Adorno 
would often use “coldness” to characterize the affect of bourgeois morality. The 
metaphorical slippage of coldness between environmental experience and social affect in 
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Vollmann’s work suggests a historical mediation by an economy that transforms human 
relations into a new “state of nature.”  
Indeed, environmental memory is bound up with economic rationality, as we see 
in the forty year period (ca. 1010-1050) in which timber scarcity in Greenland is 
supplemented by violent Vinland harvests.
41
 A passage written by a visitor to L’Anse-
aux-Meadows, Newfoundland, in 1987, describes the mossy, peaceful ruins in a treeless 
landscape; unidentified bones lay under slabs, close to the surface. “The sun in late 
afternoon best illuminates thoughts which are melancholy,” the visitor observes, “What 
takes root on this great cold plain of historical remembrance, with its snowdrifts and cold 
hard outcroppings… Nothing but trees grown bad and grey; and seagulls, icebergs, half-
dead grass. The rest is buried or blown away.”
42
 The abandoned land now seems to bear 
little capable of engendering either memory or history. This stark absence is its own 
content in that the trace of past environmental exploitation threatens even the memory of 
it ever having occurred.  
The Ice-Shirt demonstrates that environmental memory is not just something 
“outside” culture, in the landscape, but is profoundly social and carried through material 
culture. William the Blind’s reference to Flateyjarbók—the urtext of The Ice-Shirt—as 
“that poor dead bundle of a hundred and thirteen calfskins,” evokes the materiality of 
environmental memory as it is fashioned out of “elements” of the environment itself.
43
 
Environmental memory is constitutively bound up with melancholy, a mood that comes 
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from being unable to properly mourn for the lost object, perhaps because it is not lost. 
“Do we carry our landscapes with us locked in our ice-hearts,” his Newfoundland 
narrator asks, “and can we fit them over what was there just as we can clothe ourselves 
forever in the stiff and crackling cloaks that lie in the churchyard permafrost at 
Herjolfsness?”
44
 Herjolfsness is a Greenland settlement that contains an archive of 
preserved clothing that had been re-fashioned into burial shrouds. Vollmann writes to 
make this transformation of the material into the metaphorical (and back) visible across 
time and space. “Carrying our landscapes with us” is environmental memory. The 
internalized material and affective responses to past environments are carried into new 
terrains; however, these lived attachments to material places and objects can just as easily 
become death shrouds if they are meant to preserve an unchanging subject. In this way, 
Vollmann’s fiction asserts the prosthetic nature, whether textual or textile, of 
environmental memory.  
  
Framing (In)Justice in Imperial 
Whereas Seven Dreams is historiographic metafiction that adds a materialist 
component to the “symbolic history” of North American environments, Imperial is 
metafictional historiography that exposes the politics of frame-making. Ostensibly a non-
fiction novel, Imperial attempts to tell the history and to represent the entity—the spatial, 
temporal, geographical, peopled, racialized, farmed, financialized, irrigated, polluted, 
diverted, policed, bordered, militarized, and undocumented, entity—known as Imperial 
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Valley, California: the “continuum between Mexico and America.”
45
 It is as much about 
the agricultural and labor history of the valley, and the border cities of Mexicali and 
Calexico, as it is about Vollmann’s efforts to tell its story. This encyclopedic novel took 
over a decade to write and, at over 1300 pages, it “reads” at the very limits of narrative 
itself. The book is a fragmented and halting assemblage of “post-natural” nature writing, 
interviews, ethnography, photographs, and short stories, shot through with legal 
documents, disembodied quotations, and archival ingenuity that builds a composite 
mosaic of past and present. Vollmann’s reconstruction of Imperial’s history interrogates 
how societies and their environments condition one another, and how the memory of that 
conditioning is created, who creates it, and for whom. 
Imperial began as an attempt to tell the story of migrant farm workers seasonally 
smuggling themselves back and forth across the border but sprawled into a textual 
monument that threatens to undo itself with each additional vignette and chapter. The 
central problem of the novel is established in a section titled “Delineations.” After having 
documented the military securitization, violence (both slow and fast), and agricultural 
pollution that has served to spatially delineate Imperial valley, Vollmann turns his 
attention to the political implications of Imperial, the book. He describes Imperial as “an 
entity invisible everywhere except in its representations, whose substance is comprised of 
equal parts imagination, measurement, memory, authority and jurisdiction!” 
“Delineation,” he continues, “is the merest, absurdist fiction, yet delineation engenders 
control”
46
 By this he means to question the existence of Imperial apart from its 
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imbrications in the designs of those who have represented it and organized it in their own 
interests.  
As his book is in part a compilation of the ways the valley has been framed in 
order to exploit it, so too must he include his own effort within that genealogy. Like the 
valley, Imperial the book can also be said to be “invisible everywhere except in its 
representations,” in that the documentary realism of nonfiction often appears as an 
invisible or transparent mediation. It is not until it is represented as such that the writing 
becomes visible as writing, that is, situated, enmeshed, or mutually determined in some 
way by what it is attempting to describe. Vollmann relies on past descriptions and not-so-
subtly integrates them into the main text, often italicized, as he does in one of many 
water-related examples. “A century earlier,” he writes, “it had been like this…” He then 
enters a passage lifted from a 1902 letter published in the Santa Ana Herald:  
The contrast was noticeable. North of this imaginary line were modern structures, 
stores, shops and the commodious offices of the Imperial Water company, with 
vegetation on all sides, while on the south of it the eye rested upon a few Indian 
brush teepees scattered among the mesquite bushes that spread over a vast desert 




Recognized as an “imaginary line” back in 1902, the border becomes a 
delineating instrument for producing and organizing environmental difference instead of 
separating already distinct social entities according to their “naturalized” geo-political 
territory. The border produces an appearance of causality, in that differences of 
development are seen as the cause of the border rather than an effect of the border. The 
Imperial Water Company did not settle there because the ground was already lush; the 
lushness in the otherwise dry terrain is the result of irrigation brought by Imperial Water, 
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irrigation that diverts water north of the border before it continues south to Mexico 





centuries under New Spain. After quoting a 16
th
 century Spanish judge who knowingly 
plotted the destruction of Indian society through land policy, Vollmann wants his readers 
“to understand the role which delineation plays in all this—or redelineation, I should say, 
for doubtless each Indian pueblo had its own shape before it gets enclosed, transected, 
shattered.”
48
 “How could the results of redelineation be any different,” he asks, 
implicating his own writing.
49
 Vollmann critically understands the mediating role of 
artistic production within what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari describe as the 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing activity of all societies; his writing is attentive to 
the acceleration of this movement in capitalist modernization, and the accompanying 
effects of proliferating technologies of representation. 
The understanding of deterritorialization has been muddled by cultural critics who 
are too quick to associate deterritorialization solely with modernization and global 
capitalism. Even ecocritic Ursula Heise, in her groundbreaking formulation and defense 
of (deterritorialized) eco-cosmopolitanism, receives her reading of Deleuze and Guattari 
second hand, through various modernity theorists ranging from Arjun Appadurai to 
Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck.
50
 The resulting effort repeats a familiar romantic 
narrative: non- or pre-modern societies (or sometimes just poor people) are implicitly 
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figured as embodiments of wholeness and interconnectedness, and “tribal peoples, 
peasants, or hunters of past centuries, whose subsistence depended on their familiarity 
with the surrounding ecosystems,” are disrupted by the various mobilities of global 
modernity.
51
 While Heise challenges this narrative—familiarity with the surrounding 
ecosystems is quite different than the Romantic pact between the beautiful soul and the 
noble savage—the implicit identification of deterritorialization with modernization 
obscures the territorializing work of the societies in question and risks becoming another 
iteration of the naturalized “people without history” by positioning subaltern peoples as 
the static half of a binary: “their” nature to “our” history, “their” being to “our” 
becoming.  
Deleuze and Guattari attribute the conception that “primitive” or non-European 
societies are “dominated by archetypes and their repetition” to ideologists of “a tragic 
Judeo-Christian consciousness” that understands the invention of history as a fall. “If 
what is called history is a dynamic and open social reality,” they write, “in a state of 
functional disequilibrium, or an oscillating equilibrium […] comprising not only 
institutionalized conflicts but conflicts that generate changes, revolts, ruptures, and 
scissions, then primitive societies are fully inside history, and far distant from the 
stability, or even from the harmony, attributed to them.”
 52
 Understanding the historicity 
of traditional practices and knowledge as something that is actively constructed is what 
separates the concept of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) from the racist trope of 
the naturalized non-European. Without such active territorialization, what Deleuze and 
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Guattari call a “primitive territorial machine,” a socius would be impossible.
53
 Not unlike 
Marx’s primitive accumulation, which was never historically fixed but appears in 
neoliberal form as “accumulation by dispossession,” the primitive territorial machine is 
the continuous writing and rewriting of bodily, cultural, and environmental relations 
within social production. It “injects production into desire, and… inserts desire into social 
production and reproduction.” Rather than juxtaposing history to nature, they argue that 
memory is the primary means of territorialization. Paraphrasing Nietzsche, territory is 
described as “a matter of creating a memory for man; and man, who was constituted by 
means of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli), by means of a repression of biological 
memory, must create an other memory, one that is collective, a memory of words 




In Vollmann’s writing, one discovers a continent of conflicting territories, in 
which memory is passively and actively lost as well as reconstituted through documents 
and through the traces of signs. The most visible of these is the book’s dedication to a 
man whose story we later learn: “In memory of Serafín Ramírez Hernández, unknown, 
missing, illegal, Mexican,” across the page from an Imperial County death certificate of a 
John Doe, age “about 38,” occupation “apparently labor,” found dead of heat stroke. The 
individual accounts of particular struggles over land, water, labor, and life, are 
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simultaneously struggles over representation. The presence of legal documents, 
certificates of ownership, advertizing slogans, and newspaper reports, intervene into and 
rewrite the lived relations of the place. Rather than an objective mapping of Imperial and 
all its relations, Vollmann situates himself inter-subjectively. His time spent there over a 
decade has only complicated his knowledge of the place. Instead of Imperial, it is the 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, “the cabbage-pickers legal and illegal,” he writes, 
“whom it is slowly becoming my privilege to know.” “Imperial is what I want it to be, 
but they are ones who are what they are. The desert is real, as they are,” he writes, “but 
there is no such place as Imperial; and I, who don’t belong there, was never anything but 
a word-haunted ghost.”
55
 Here, as he often does, Vollmann constructs himself as a figure 
of memory—a writer suffused with his experiences as a journalist and a traveler who 
carries the ghostly presences of the people he has known into the places he visits.  
The artist is identified as the primary agent of territorialization. Be it pueblo 
society or imperial Spain, artistic production is linked with possession. “The expressive is 
primary in relation to the possessive;” Deleuze and Guattari write, “expressive qualities, 
or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more 
profound than being. Not in the sense that these qualities belong to a subject, but in the 
sense that they delineate a territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces 
them.”
56
 This provocative passage describes the creation of environmental memory as an 
appropriation of territory, based on delineation. If reterritorialization is implicit in the act 
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of writing, an invention of despotic rule, one could argue that a transparent despot is no 
better, and that even where Vollmann quotes and includes other voices, they are still 
being appropriated by his own literary imagination. However, if the act of expression that 
is territory is simultaneously an act of possessing a situation or arrangement as a kind of 
property or attachment, this also means accepting responsibility for it—belonging to it in 
a way that makes one accountable. In striving to be a “better-informed citizen of North 
America,” Vollmann reframes his ethical responsibility to those beyond state borders as a 
political relationship, not in the sense of a relation based on power, but one that takes the 
freedom and well-being of the other as central to one’s own identity and ability to belong. 
His continuous writing and re-writing of Imperial county illustrates the sheer variety of 
ways of looking and remembering, of organizing historical and environmental 
knowledge, that he undoes—from within—the notion of a single delineation or frame on 
which authority and justice may ultimately rest.  
Vollmann repurposes postmodern aesthetic techniques and sensibilities in the 
service of an empirically informed politics. His unwillingness to a settle on a particular 
frame as an uncontested foundation for truth is shared with the high modernists, who 
were, as Heise argues, “redefining the parts of an aesthetic work in their relation to the 
whole as something other than subordination.” This refusal to subordinate parts to wholes 
(or vice versa) is taken further in Vollmann’s account of Imperial; rather than seeing the 
fragments as fractured parts of an absolute whole, his writing illustrates a shifting whole 
made possible by partial accounts and perspectives. As in pragmatism, beliefs and 
experiences are not understood as getting in the way of truth, but rather taken as the 
enabling condition of inquiry. Vollmann’s approach contributes to Heise’s “eco-
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cosmopolitan aesthetic” in that it does “justice both to the sense that places are inexorably 
connected to the planet as a whole and to the perception that this wholeness encompasses 
vast heterogeneities… a kind of collage in which all the parts are connected but also lead 
lives of their own.”
57
 For Vollmann’s contemporary subjects, it is primarily poverty that 
marks them—to others—as falling outside modernity, exacerbated by varying degrees of 
national, ethnic, and sexually defined labor. Rather than relying on sociology that 
understands “the local” and “the global” as an epistemic problem, readers of Vollmann 
encounter an ethico-political problem—between particularity and universality—explored 
through aesthetics. 
Vollmann experiments by writing Imperial from different genres and disciplines. 
There is the xenophobic noir of the border guard who detained him, for instance. He 
impersonates Flaubert to write the story of his friend, Maria, a well-educated woman 
from Mexico who now performs manual labor in the US. And there is John Steinbeck’s 
naturalist take on recent confluences of agriculture, racialized labor, and high finance in 
California. These perspectives allow him to try on different generic constraints, to 
explore how fiction adds an element of truth to daily life, and to playfully test the literary 
traditions that might claim Imperial as their future heir. These experiments evoke the 
language of science. “When a scientist embarks on a series of experiments…it is likely 
that most of them will ‘fail,’” he writes, “reality being more complicated than even the 
most torturous assertion.” “In this respect,” he continues, “writing is more like science 
than the other arts…because we can replace one word by another as many times as we 
like…whereas I have only so many chances to paint over my bad oil painting before it 
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turns into a sticky brick.”
58
 Imperial weighs as much as a brick, and it is sticky in the 
sense that one cannot easily pull out or isolate one part without dragging the rest with it. 
The sheer excess of Imperial, like empire itself, threatens to overwhelm the reader’s 
ability to make it cohere.  
To alleviate this, Vollmann offers “reprises” that build a “metadata” archive of 
phrases, sayings, quotes, references, and verbal images, drawn from his fragmentary 
vignettes and chapters, which become environmental memory for the reader. The 
“Preface,” which appears in chapter 10, opens with an epigraph from the Salton Sea 
Atlas: “The concept of metadata—or data about data—which describes source, method, 
and appropriate uses… is a growing priority.”
59
 Through frequent sections titled 
“Imperial: Reprise,” he recollects repeated phrases like “I think we all feel sorry for ‘em,” 
“WATER IS HERE,” and “The Desert Disappears,” that evoke smaller narratives. 
Each phrase is a verbal short-hand to mobilize clusters of environmental, historical, and 
affective experience. Vollmann consolidates “Imperial” by playing these phrases off each 
other in subsequent iterations of the reprise. The fragmented experiences are transformed 
into a memory of Imperial. In this way, the text performs the act of memory creation (or 
sedimentation/consolidation) described by Goodbody. Environmental memories, like 
other types of memory, are never complete but “consist rather of fragments of 
experience…which must be reactivated in processes linking them up into coherent 
patterns of information.”
60
 In these “reprises” one sees what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
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refrain, which they variously liken to a territorializing rhythm or an abode: “there are 
consolidations that are made afterward,” they write, “and there are consolidations of the 
keystone type that are constituent parts of the ensemble.”
61
 Making this consolidation 
process a keystone part of the ensemble is Vollmann’s way of doing justice to Imperial as 
a transnational space, as story, as representation, and as act; it is a story that could appear 
radically different if framed by other people, and yet would still remain incomplete. 
Ever since An Afghanistan Picture Show, or How I Saved the World (1992), 
Vollmann has made the failure of good intentions and cynical sentimentality a theme of 
his work.
62
 Chapter one of Imperial opens with an epigraph that exemplifies the way that 
the liberal politics of empathy, and what might loosely fall under the category of 
“recognition,” can be mobilized against the suffering party. “I think we all feel sorry for 
‘em,” says Border Patrol Officer, Gloria Chavez, referring to “illegal aliens.”
63
 Uttered by 
a border agent with a Latinized last name, this sentiment prefaces a chapter in which a 
militarized border patrol hunts down bright bodies lit up through night vision scopes 
against the black of night. It is 1999 and Vollmann is embedded with the patrol. The 
Mexicans become “bodies” in the language of the officers. “I got an eye on your bodies, 
said the nightscope man, whose monitor made the word bodies seem chillingly 
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appropriate,” Vollmann writes, “for in the green night the aliens glowed white like evil 
extraterrestrial beings or zombies out of a science-fiction movie.” When surrounded by 
“the hunters” the “bodies, hopelessly silhouetted, resurrected themselves from the fresh 
earth, giving in to capture and deportation. They rose, becoming black on black.” The 
surreal play of bodies, landscape, and night is produced by the monitoring equipment, a 
technology of representation that makes capture possible. Stripped of any markers of 
individual, national, cultural, political, ethnic, or gendered identity, the bodies stand as a 
negative universality.  
Vollmann quickly integrates the patrol’s language of bodies, always italicized, 
into his narration, accentuating its dehumanizing mode of reference. “[T]he bodies stood 
wide-eyed in the light, all in the line, with their hands obediently behind them. Coughing, 
shuffling, they began to cross the fields.” While they walk, a patrolman insults the bad 
breath of “one of the bodies.” “The body was silent,” he writes. “In the nightscope it had 
been as white as one of the freshly dead fishes in the cool green poison (or should I say 
‘reputed poison’?) of the Salton Sea. Now it began to reveal itself to be brown—
Hispanic, sunburned and field-stained.” The humanity of the captured border crossing 
workers comes into view with their particularity. The nightscope is an agent in the scene, 
depicting their existence in the landscape in a non-neutral frame of representation. By 
abstracting to color and shape, the nightscope presents migrant workers as beings without 
lives and histories. This abstraction—at the level of the sensible—simultaneously makes 
their negative universality visible, as bodies, but the same abstraction allows Vollmann to 
establish metaphorical connections between the conditions of migrant laborers and the  
poisoning of fish in the Salton Sea by toxic waste and agricultural runoff. A single frame, 
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the nightscope monitor, that in one instance engenders control over people through 
visibility, can become, through the work of the artist, an abstraction that makes broader 
patterns of environmental exploitation and injustice visible. If “criticism is a matter of the 
correct distancing,” as Walter Benjamin wrote, the artist must risk the ambiguous cruelty 
that accompanies acts of abstraction and redescription.
64
 
Gloria Chavez’s quote, “I think we all feel sorry for ‘em,” opens the novel as a 
challenge to the liberal politics of recognition based on sympathetic feeling. It returns 
throughout the text and as part of the reprise as a transhistorical emotional posture that 
continues to play a constitutive role in the development of the region. Chavez may be 
able to feel individual sympathy (or perhaps just pity) for the arrested migrants, however 
her institutional location—her employment—necessitates an abstraction that makes her 
work possible. Where the intention of the speaker would seem to matter—is she naïve or 
merely hypocritical?—Vollmann’s inclusion and repetition of her quote in later contexts 
suggests that even if Chavez, and by no small stretch of the imagination, the reader, feels 
sorry for ‘em, it does not do ‘em much good.
65
 Firstly, the apostrophe would seem to 
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page 165, the line threatens to “silt up” his narrative flow just before the novel is 
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alongside a reference to the forced marrying and sexual exploitation of women; on page 
373, the phrase links Mexican workers with Chinese workers in 1924 as the El Centro 
headquarters of the Border Patrol are established as part of the Johnson-Reed 
Immigration Act; on page 366, “Imperial Reprise (1905-2003),” the phrase first refers to 
laborers, and then implicates the narrator: “He sold out at a fancy price. I think we all 
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deny the collective pronoun a specific reference, as a kind of verbal hand-waving. 
“Them” would already imply a collective; “‘em” apostrophes some portion of this 
collective out of existence. At times, this casual erasure of individual lives evoked in a 
statement of pity becomes a means to open “‘em” up to include the narrator, 
agriculturalists, police, and others. Secondly, the readers are primarily located in the “we” 
defined in relation to the ‘em of Chavez’s statement. We find ourselves implicated in the 
varying degrees and contexts of sympathy, hypocrisy, and institutions whose historical 
relationships to places and peoples he is interrogating. Like much of Vollmann’s writing, 
Imperial takes as a central concern the possibility of intention and the limits of that 
intention in the context of state institutions and a transnational economy. He does so not 
to criticize the tenuous warm feelings beyond the nation or group identity, feelings 
required for any lasting institutional solidarity, but to catalogue the ways that these 
feelings enable the reproduction of the cruelty to which one is opposed. 
This awareness of writing’s complicity with economy and power extends to the 
landscape itself. Here, the problem of reading texts is linked to reading the history of 
landscapes, in that both are bound up with territorializing significations of production. An 
                                                                                                                                                                             
feel sorry for ‘em. God, so that’s my life;” on page 602, the phrase is used to deflate the 
dominant memory of World War II: “And here comes a second happy ending: Japan 
bombs Pearl Harbor, and the Okies’ problems explode into bits! They can join the army 
or work in a factory… what about the Mexicans? I think we all feel sorry for ‘em;” on 
page 956, the phrase evokes sarcastic pity as ‘em is made to reference agricultural firms 
whose environmental fees for irrigation are the most expensive in the country; finally, in 
“Imperial Reprise (1901-2004),” the phrase is at this point a sarcastic counterpoint to 
naturalization of the death rate of border crossers and the “die-off” of fish, meanwhile an 
asterisk includes a 1924 quote from Dashiell Hammett: “I always feel sorry for them…” 
he says referring to “detectives who have not become callous, who have not lost what you 
might call the human touch;” chapter 207 closes with Chavez’s phrase added to an earlier 
(unnamed) Imperial narrator standing “by the grave of that infant civilization, which 
blossomed, amidst such hardships, upon a desert” (1124).  
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epigraph by the archaeologist Joan Aruz informs us that, “the main reason we cannot read 
these early [Mesopotamian] texts is the fact that writing initially was nothing more than a 
means, more comprehensive than those employed before, of recording the details of 
economic transactions.”
66
 Writing becomes, for Vollmann, a means to trace the non-
narrative, “asignifying” inscription of Imperial’s landscape into the actions and 
imaginations of the county’s residents. Various “subdelineations” chapters trace these 
economic and ecological histories through particular crops. The chapters move from 
lovescapes, bookscapes, paintscapes, and scrollscapes, to waterscapes, lettucescapes, 
cottonscapes, poisonscapes, orangescapes, and in part thirteen titled “inscriptions:” 
moneyscapes. Each subdelineation traces the material and environmental histories of the 
region through technologies of inscription, writing, and representation. These inscriptions 
of landscapes into the global economy depict processes which define the local, the 
regional, the national, and the global. 
In “Subelineations: Lettucescapes” for instance, one would not expect to find a 
graph of cantaloupe prices (Gross vs. Per Acre); as the melon has replaced lettuce in 
recent decades its price has skyrocketed. The inscription of landscapes by economic 
representations and market calculations produces as many contradictions as Vollmann’s 
own titles and epigraphic frames. Imperial Valley entered the 20
th
 century as “The Winter 
Garden of America,” but soon overproduction of lettuce led to price collapse: “in 1934, 
the equivalent of 300,000 crates of lettuce were unharvested in the Imperial Valley.”
67
 By 
1938, the combination of rich Imperial soil and Arizona’s competition drove the price 
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below cost for the entire year, effectively bringing it to an end. A classic crisis in 
capitalist production links 20
th
 century California with Jean-Jacques Rousseau of 1754, 
who interrupts the narration, remarking that “I have seen men wicked enough to weep for 
sorrow at the prospect of a plentiful season; and the great and fatal fire of London which 
cost so many unhappy persons their lives or their fortunes, made the fortunes of perhaps 
ten thousand others.”
68
 The rule of exchange value writes its material history in the 
ecology of place. The movement of crops and prices in far off locations like Arizona 
significantly shape the valley’s internal landscape, water politics, and labor relations. 
Putting human faces to these abstract processes, “Lettucescapes” closes with court 
proceedings from the late 1950s in which monopolists testify to the benefits of 
maintaining a risky market in lettuce: “[Mr. Campbell] wants lettuce to continue to be 
speculative because when you reduce your risk you invite more competition, and what 
canny agribusinessman craves that?”
69
 Bringing us to the present, “Subdelineations: 
Moneyscapes (1989-2005)” opens a survey of income inequalities in California with a 
passage from George Eliot that summarizes his dilemma: “Attempts at description are 
stupid: who can all at once describe a human being? We recognize the alphabet; we are 
not sure of the language.”
70
 Whereas Eliot’s subject was people, Vollmann’s is the 
landscape (which includes people). Vollmann’s difficulty here, as elsewhere, is in 
understanding the language—the uses—of the signs, whose “scaping” effects he is 
attempting to interpret.  
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One of these effects is the ghostly presence and absence of water. Throughout 
Imperial, the phrase “Water is Here”—often in bold—challenges the metaphysics of 
presence. When telling the history of Imperial Valley, “Water is Here” is repeated almost 
as a mantra; it is a performative utterance in that the announcement enables different 
mechanisms, whether imaginary or economic, to mobilize Imperial’s space in different 
ways. “Water is here” can be announced to signal the coming of new irrigation systems, 
the promise of untold wealth and future prosperity, or to provide reassurance when one is 
in doubt (and drought). Timothy Morton’s neologism, agrilogistics, refers to this 
obsessive need to reassert presence as a metaphysical effect of the agricultural revolution 
of the Fertile Crescent.
71
 Not unlike Imperial, those early agriculturalists were necessarily 
obsessed with water, infrastructure, and the reproduction of a class society.
72
 The 
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metaphysics that provided the philosophical foundation (or cultural justification) for 
society followed from the material relations.  
Using the text-mining program, Voyant Tools, I analyzed a digital version of 
Imperial to trace the presence and absence of water throughout the text. The word 
“water” appears 1603 times in this 1300 page book, or roughly 1.2 times per page. Rather 
than searching for the exact phrase, “water is here,” I traced the appearance of “water” 
and “here” relative to one another. If “here” refers to presence, a present place or time 
(even if used ironically), it would hold that water should follow. Yet there are extended 
passages in Imperial in which “here” appears without “water,” and where large spikes of 
“water” occur with little change in the designation “here,” suggesting that the water in 
question is referring to a different place and time: a possibility of water rather than its 
active presence (see figure 1). Water as possibility has, as Vollmann illustrates 
throughout Imperial’s history, served as motivation to colonize, to redraw boundaries, to 
transform ecologies, and to reinscribe national identities. What one finds when looking at 
the graph is that the presence of water—whether real or speculative—far outstrips the 
present in the discourse of Vollmann’s novel. While much more digital work might be 
done on the spatial, temporal, and material references of Imperial, we can see that water 
is written as a non-contemporary and discontinuous, disruptive presence in the text, 
testifying to historical efforts at controlling its material agency.  
If one is looking for actual, physical, empirical, water in Vollmann’s Imperial, 
one may have only a slightly better chance of finding it in Imperial Valley. Much 
contemporary ecocriticism recognizes the aesthetic, epistemological, and ontological 
difficulties of realism, the very kind of difficulties that Vollmann’s metafiction takes as 
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its central concern. To say that he must rely so heavily on the existence of fragmentary 
documentation and partial testimonies of historical experience, memory, desire, and 
translation, is to suggest that there was ever anything other than this as a basis of making 
a common, knowable, world. 
 
Figure 1 - Graph of "Water" (Black) and "Here" (Grey) in Imperial. 
Vollmann writes that if literature “is valuable in and of itself,” a premise he 
doubts, then “opening windows [between people’s worlds] is one of the most valuable 
things it can do.”
73
 One such world is the one built by early 20
th
 century Chinese 
immigrants to Mexico. An extended chapter on “The Chinese Tunnels” recounts 
Vollmann’s journey into the mythical existence of underground tunnels connecting 
bordertowns, created and populated my immigrants ostracized by Mexicans and 
Americans alike. His reliance on translators and oral history eventually leads him to 
restaurant basements, where letters and poetry support not only the existence of the 
tunnels and their importance in the marginalized economies of Asian America, but offer a 
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glimpse into the lives of people who lived and died there.
74
 The tunnels are not simply a 
metaphor, but a historical territorialization by a population excluded from the ethno-
national and cultural binaries dividing the space of Imperial. Its ghostly memory haunts 
the xenophobic imaginations of Mexicans and remains an unspoken trauma, “like a 
haunted house,” among workers in Mexicali’s Chinese-owned service and restaurant 
industries. As Vollmann wades through unreliable translators, racist rumors, and textual 
fragments, he affirms the importance of material memory in spite of its fallibility: 
Those old, old letters, partially rat-eaten, and the memories of old men, the myths 
of farmworkers and drunks, the lies of Mr. Auyón and the evasions of Chinese 
and Mexican business owners alike, the photographs in the Archivo Histórico del 
Municipio de Mexicali and the passages in old books, they all added up to 




The Crisis of the Knowable Community, Now 
Before they became ossified and parodied, the aesthetic innovations of 
modernism were an attempt, according to Raymond Williams, to respond to a crisis of 
experience that accompanied mass, industrial social formations, and new relations of the 
metropolis to the periphery in the late nineteenth century. Williams labeled this the “crisis 
of the knowable community.”
76
 While one can argue that modernity itself is a long crisis 
of what constitutes community and what qualifies as its knowability, the historical 
development of the novel has played a role in the effort to make social experience legible, 
to “grasp one’s time in thought” so as to transform it. “Most novels are in some sense 
                                                          
74
 Vollmann, Imperial, 451.  
75
 Vollmann, Imperial, 481.  
76




knowable communities,” writes Williams.
77
 That is, they offer legible experience within a 
believable context. “What is knowable is not only a function of objects… It is also a 
function of subjects, of observers—of what is desired and what needs to be known.” 
Thus, novels not only present new means of representing communities as objects, but 
also new forms of subjectivity, new organizations of desire and attachment that define 
those communities. The formation of this subjectivity can be itself an object of narrative. 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the uneven distribution and scale of crises from the 
ecological to the economic and technological transect borders and publics, creating a new 
need for the production of “knowable communities.” These crises have also called into 
question the practices of producing both community and its knowability, practices which 
Vollmann’s work narrates and dramatizes.   
The new expressions of global capitalism that emerged with the trade deals of the 
1990s and after produced an unknown terrain, and a need to redefine knowable 
communities in the post-Cold War world. In a 1993 interview with Larry McCaffery, 
Vollmann explains the transnational political economy that drives his fictionalized North 
American history. McCaffery gives voice to Vollmann’s concern about the power of 
multinational corporations over contemporary life, in that they “manipulate[e] different 
aspects of our country (our economy, our relationship to our natural environment, etc.) in 
ways that aren't tied to our national identity.”
78
 In response to this, new identifications 
and forms of solidarity need to be fashioned. Unfortunately, the traditional way 
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Americans have imagined self-transformation has been spatial, moving to (or colonizing) 
a new place. Transformation is thus a by-product spatial mobility, which many lack. And 
besides, Vollmann notes: “Most of this continent's transformation is over with. What 
remains can be extrapolated from forces that are now already in place.” “I'm not trying to 
make an Hegelian argument that history is coming to end,” he continues, referring then to 
Francis Fukuyama’s recently published The End of History and the Last Man,
79
 “or 
suggesting that I know what's going to happen in the future.” Rather, Vollmann argues 
that the new can be produced by recognizing the multiplicity of the present. It will come 
out of a deepened pluralism and expanded sense of belonging to a world shared with 
others. 
“People would be better off if they realized that their own particular world is not 
privileged,” Vollmann responds. “Everyone's world is no more and no less important 
than everyone else's. To have as many worlds as possible that are invested with interest 
or meaning is a way of making that point. I've gradually begun to see that I can use even 
my footnotes and glossaries and other sorts of materials to create some of this sense.” We 
can draw two conclusions from this passage. The first is that while Vollmann does not 
explicitly say what he means by “better off,” he affirms the moral, rather than 
epistemological, importance of literature. One will act in different ways, perhaps more 
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humble ways, if one does not take one’s own experience as the foundation of all 
meaning. That is to say, unlike some theories of “situated knowledge,” Vollmann is 
consistent in that he does not end up claiming that one particular location is better suited 
to “see the truth or the whole for what it really is.” As Richard Rorty puts it, “take care of 
freedom and the truth will take care of itself.”
80
 Increasing the freedom of exchange of 
worlds is a sounder way of producing both community and its knowability. The second 
conclusion is that his pluralism recognizes the material attachments and engagements 
through which social relationships are imagined and critiqued. Rather than emphasizing 
literature’s epistemological capacity for objective representation or cognitive mapping, 
literature is understood as a descriptive (and redescriptive) tool for collective engagement 
and world making. Rather than truth understood objectively as the view from nowhere, 
Vollmann, through metatextual techniques like footnotes, glossaries, and competing 
accounts, gives us truth as a greater inter-subjective solidarity about history and its 
meaning. He dramatizes the effort (and failure) of constructing an official vision or frame 
at the margins of the continent. 
Vollmann’s aesthetic is not animated by the modernist impulse to explore the 
limits of the medium. Rather, he explores the ethical and political limits of narrative 
practice that makes a “knowable community.” Critics have often compared Vollmann 
with James Joyce on account of the style—its frenetic hyper-referentiality, stream of 
consciousness, and usage of portmanteaus—but, as I suggested earlier, I believe a better 
comparison is Henry James. It is James that moves beyond a transparent realism in which 
everything is in its place. “What really matters in James,” argues Williams, “is that act of 
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signifying in which the novel becomes its own subject.”
81
 By dramatizing the act of 
signification through which the novel takes on and performs the memory it is trying to 
create, Vollmann puts forward an ethics of memory making that expands membership 
(and what it means to be a member) of an inescapably environmental political 
community. Vollmann’s referential fireworks situate him as a professional middle-class 
knowledge worker—his first novel was written while moonlighting as a computer 
programmer. As post-Fordist communicative labor intensifies the distinction between the 
communicative act and its signifying content, the material and political effectivity of 
reference and representation takes on a renewed importance. It is an example of 
literature’s singular aesthetic contribution to knowable communities in the difficult 
geography of the contemporary, a distinction Williams helps us make:  
Sociology can describe social conditions more accurately, at the level of ordinary 
measurement. A political programme can offer more precise remedies at the level 
of ordinary action. Literature can attempt to follow these modes, but at its most 
important its process is different and yet still inescapably social: a whole way of 





Both Imperial and The Ice-Shirt communicate a way of seeing—of producing the 
visible and legible—which is a thoroughly value-laden action. As he consolidates his 
own experiences and research into a meta-data archive of Imperial Valley, Vollmann’s 
metafictional historiography leaves readers with multiple frames of environmental 
memory. These frames turn our attention to the transnational materiality of our relations 
and to the violent exclusion of these relations from the political frames which seek to 
redress social and environmental injustice. Similarly, current efforts by scholars like 
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Ariel Salleh to expand left-environmentalism to include the “embodied materialism” of 
female labor in the southern hemisphere, or Andrew Ross’ work to popularize the 
concept of “climate debt” in the post-2008 financial crisis, each expand the frame of 
politics to see how power and agency are constituted through the environment. As 
Etienne Balibar writes, “all political practice is territorialized. It identifies or classifies 
individuals and populations relative to their ability to occupy a space, or be admitted to 
it.”
83
 The sheer excess of Vollmann’s writing might thus be taken as evidence that other 
experiences and memories of these matters are excluded from the public frames of self-
understanding and contestation. His self-description as a “citizen” of North America 
implies a relation to others through democratic institutions, yet the North America that he 
is a citizen of remains an entity that exceeds the narrow delineations of those institutions. 
 Fraser argues that many political theories are “preoccupied with first-order issues 
of distribution and/or recognition” and have “so far failed to develop conceptual 
resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of the frame.”
84
 By addressing the act of 
framing that includes, excludes, or otherwise recombines or reterritorializes relations of 
representation, critics can shift the focus from constituted power to constitutive power. 
The claim of ecocritics like Goodbody, Buell, and Heise, that literature can be at the 
forefront of confronting meta-issues of scale gains currency as novels mobilize various 
personal, biogeological, and collective narratives within a contested national tradition. 
Environmental memory, properly understood as a prosthetic composed out of multiple 
discourses and material contexts, serves as a “conceptual resource” for redressing 
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economic and cultural injustices both within and beyond the nation-state. Too often, 
contemporary art risks leaping to sublime global processes that seemingly have no 
discernible agent, and with it comes an equally abstract “infinite” politics—the romance 
of total and evental transformation. Vollmann does not strive for total knowledge but to 
be “better informed.” The Ice-Shirt and Imperial place readers in the difficult middle 
ground, using postmodern techniques that previous generations of politically committed 
writers and critics wrote off as a refusal of social reality. Instead, this metafiction is more 
attentive to that reality in that it foregrounds the composition and the uses of 





CODA: LABOR, ECOLOGY, UTOPIA 
 [S]o many of our intellectual efforts, though masquerading as an attempt 
to understand nature, are really anodynes for justifying our hopes and 










As Michael Denning and other historians of the American left have observed, 
people have “quarreled over the relation between pragmatism and Marxism” throughout 
the twentieth century.
3
 This project has attempted to situate a pragmatist approach to 
environmental literature, culture, and discourse, within the broadly Marxian analysis of 
late-twentieth century modernization provided by cultural studies. My hope is that these 
two approaches compliment rather than undermine one another. One of the benefits of 
this approach to environmental humanities, I believe, is that it is comfortable with the 
relative autonomy of the sciences and humanities. It is thus at ease with the abstractions 
of contemporary Earth System sciences which study what Marx identified as a metabolic 
rift in the biophysical cycles of nature and the accumulation cycles of capital—cycles 
which operate according to differing degrees in intensity, rhythm, and speed.
4
 It is at ease 
with the arguments of speculative realist philosopher, Ray Brassier, for instance, who 
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draws both on eliminative materialism in the cognitive sciences and Quentin 
Meillassoux’s mathematical cosmos of atheistic arche-fossils to affirm Enlightenment 
alongside extinction.
5
 It is at ease with scientific discourses like these because it feels no 
need to use them as a final frame of reference or absolute ground of meaning. The 
sciences exist basically to predict and intervene in the world through description, 
experiment, and redescription. The work of literature, as poiesis, lies elsewhere, in the 
making of new subjectivities, articulations, and collective desires.  
Some may argue that this project could have engaged more with the scholarship 
on environmental rhetoric, such as Brendon Larson’s Metaphors for Environmental 
Sustainability, or Killingsworth and Palmer’s classic, Eco-Speak: Rhetoric and 
Environmental Politics in America.
6
 Opening up this rhetorical dimension would allow 
for a different way of tracing the changing metaphors and images apart from literature. 
However, it would risk becoming a dissertation on rhetoric—the instrumental uses of 
language—and shift the project’s focus away from its intended object, which is the way 
that ideas of nature in literature are mediated by contemporary experiences of 
modernization and modernity. I have found that rhetorical analyses often treat language 
as more arbitrary than it is, and bracket both the larger historical contexts and the literary 
uses of language. I could also have engaged the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, philosophers of discourse and articulation, who have been influential in cultural 
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studies theorizations of rhetoric, coalition building, and hegemony.
7
 However, as Stuart 
Hall has argued, Laclau and Mouffe’s effort to escape economic determinism reduces 
everything upward, locating antagonism in the realm of discursivity rather than 
embedded in material production.
8
 My hope is that the preceding chapters have offered a 
useful frame for understanding the contexts in which writers take up certain rhetorical 
images of the environment, and the potential consequences. 
The modern novel has proven one of the most dynamic genres for staging the 
polyphonic multitude of voices and discourses within a historical setting. The novel is 
capable of incorporating, interrogating, transforming, and re-articulating, competing 
discourses across individual perspectives, highlighting the often conflicted desires and 
material interests of characters. Lukács rightly called it an “epic in a world abandoned by 
God” as it plays in the dangerous intersections opened up by the disintegration of earlier 
unified epochs. Like Guattari’s three-fold “existential territory,” the novel operates at the 
unresolved gaps between personal (un)fulfillment (mental ecology), political 
(dis)harmony (social ecology), and the metaphysical (dis)unity of the world of Nature 
(environmental ecology, or sustainability). McCarthy (chapter one) dramatizes this 
through the “death of Nature” as the locus of the good, the true, and the beautiful, 
through an exploration of a young radical’s maturing consciousness in the context of 
Vietnam War-era administration. For Updike’s aging character (chapter two), Harry 
“Rabbit” Angstrom, the energy crisis becomes a metaphor that links his life and the 
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nation together, in the absence of a future, with a metaphysically satisfying image of 
entropy and decline figured by deindustrialization in small-town Pennsylvania. The 
affirmation of disruption and irresolution in the science fiction of Crichton and Butler 
(chapter three) are articulated to two quite different sets of politics; the former is aimed at 
naturalizing free-market approaches to industry in the context of climate change while the 
latter is articulated to a politics of multiethnic environmental resilience in the context of 
emergent, un-checked corporate power. None of the writers I have studied in this project 
have explored the discursive and textual limits of the novel more than William Vollmann 
(chapter four) who, in the context of NAFTA-era transnational capitalism, attempts to 
construct a “knowable community” at the limits of the contemporary nation-state and 
novel-form. Reconstructing the environmental memory of a place requires the ethical 
interrogation of such an act, as well as the necessary inclusion of voices which, for 
Vollmann, explode efforts at reconciling the various territorializations of those who 
compose the territory. Depending on the genre, novels can provide a form that embodies 
a particular articulation of culture and politics. Alternately, they can expose the act of 
articulation through metafiction or through characters that live out the contradictions of a 
particular idea of the world.  
I argue that the most useful way of articulating “ecologies” within the conjuncture 
is by tracing them through sites of production. This is not an intuitive move for many 
environmental critics. Richard White argues that the tendency within environmentalism 
to discount or bracket work as a category of thinking about environmental relations has 
hurt the movement. In White’s mind, this leads some environmentalists to unfairly 
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criticize those whose labor is directly associated with destructive forms of extraction.
9
 
White’s argument is that labor embeds us all in the ongoing environmental destruction 
and that immaterial labor is no less culpable for the energy and resource use that is 
obscured by distributed networks. Yet White’s analysis stops short at considering the way 
that different forms and locations of labor—such as that of the knowledge-class—
generate different ideas of nature and, recalling Williams, ideas of kinds of societies. The 
emergent cultural formations are marked by both the forms of production and those who 
rise to positions of dominance with them. Work may be the difference between the 
pastoral and the georgic, but it is also the difference between utopian and practical 
conceptions of historical change. The refusal to foreground production results in what 
André Gorz calls an “abstract radicalism” that relies on normative conceptions of the 
good (ecological) society without considering what it would take to transform it. Writing 
in 1991, Gorz finds an opportunity for the post-industrial, ecological left to rethink itself 
through the transformation of work. It is worth quoting at length. 
The conception of work integrated in community life has served—and continues 
to serve—as a norm in the definition of the “good life.” That norm provides the 
basis for the radical critiques and condemnations of industrial society. But the 
reproach Habermas leveled against Hannah Arendt is also valid here: that radical 
critique remains purely abstract; its only points of reference are medieval or 
exotic models of society and it cannot draw, within our societies, on any 
experiences or practical possibilities which would enable it to be embodied in acts 
of social transformation. It is content merely to oppose fundamentally different 
cultural models to the industrial systems which currently exist. That opposition 
                                                          
9
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and Nature,” Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, Ed. William 
Cronon (New York: Norton, 1996), 171-185. Rebuttals to White’s characterization can be 
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the Pacific Northwest,” Ecology Against Capitalism (New York: MR Press, 2002).  
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remains undialectical, ineffective, “utopian” in the bad sense of the word. It 
simply calls for the whole existing state of things “to be swept away, root and 
branch.” As to who might be able to effect such a thing, or when and how, no 
answer is given; such considerations are disdainfully rejected with a “you just 
have to…”. It is this practical impotence, this abstract radicalism, which causes 
the advocates of a return to the agrarian community and subsistence economies 
ultimately to invoke in support of their case not the normative ethical and political 
value of their reference model, but the imminence of a catastrophic collapse of 
industrial civilization: radical de-industrialization is presented as an unavoidable 
necessity on ecological grounds; only the fraction of humanity converted to it 
would be able to survive catastrophe.  
 
To exist politically, an ecological Left has, consequently, an urgent need for 
mediations between the existing industrial system, its wage-workers and its jobs, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, post-industrial forms of society which comply 
both with ecological demands and with individuals’ aspirations to liberate 
themselves from work as it exists and find in work as great a potential for self-
determination as possible. We have to start out from what work is and what it 
really means today in order to transform it, reduce it and expand the scope of 





Gorz argues that efforts to pose a radically other (or older) social order to the 
present are a kind of desperate utopianism. The posing of speculative worlds (in theory) 
is shored up with a kind of blackmail in practice: the threat of ecological collapse. Faced 
with such a totalizing demand, one’s imagination drifts toward apocalyptic and 
millenarian, which is to say authoritarian, solutions. As the Russian novelists illustrated, 
there is no more modern a figure than the disappointed idealist animated by a despairing 
nihilism who sees the ongoing present as the ultimate catastrophe, yet has no practical 
way to change it. Philip Roth called the post-sixties, US expression of this the 
“indigenous American berserk.”
11
 While campaigns and movements for environmental 
                                                          
10
 Andre Gorz, Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology (New York: Verso, 2012), 64. 
11
 In Roth’s American Pastoral (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), the main 
character’s radicalized daughter blows up a post-office, killing a local post-man, in 
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justice often make their own infinite demands, they begin where people “live, work, and 
play,” and are thus better situated to perform the kind of mediating function between the 
present and future that Gorz describes. This sentiment in the second paragraph is without 
a doubt the same shared by Carolyn Merchant (to return to our example from the 
introduction), as well as a great many others who believed that a more humane, creative, 
and flexible workplace should be created, only to have those aspirations perversely 
realized in the form of chronic insecurity. Where environmental critics like Merchant and 
Gorz differ is on the question of mimesis. What Gorz describes as the freedom to 
individuate in conditions of democratic control over production, Merchant sees an 
emerging ecological form of interaction. As I illustrate in the introduction, organizational 
concepts in environmental sciences (as in brain sciences) are often influenced by 
metaphors and models from organizational imaginaries of production. These imaginaries 
are free to adopt the aesthetic forms of what Boltanski and Chiapello call the “artistic 
critique” of “1968” without changing the exploitative arrangements excoriated in the 
“social critique” that accompanied it. Considered dialectically, the liberated—which is to 
say socially secure—workplace would be composed of people who imagine the 
categories of nature, culture, and the relation between the two, quite differently. Yet this, 
I still argue, would not mean that they are any closer to the True Reality of Nature. 
Marx’s materialist interpretation of history holds: “It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and into everything that is its antithesis and its enemy, into the fury, the violence, and the 





 This is often lost on environmental critics who believe the ecological 
crisis is the effect of having the wrong idea of nature. 
Consider Timothy Morton’s astonishing claim that a cynical attitude—one that he 
associates with Marxism and modernity—is actually what is responsible for the 
ecological crisis. For Morton, a “belief about belief,” wherein one feels that one has 
exited an illusory way of seeing the world, has damaged the planet’s ecosystems, rather 
than several thousand years of expanding economies based on extraction and mass 
accumulation. “This attitude,” he writes, “is directly responsible for the ecological 
emergency, not the corporation or the individual per se, but the attitude that inheres both 
in the corporation and in the individual, and in the critique of the corporation and of the 
individual.”
13
 For liberals like Morton, environmental crises are crises of attitudes and 
affective dispositions (We should feel more ambivalent! We should recognize the 
weirdness of our bodies and the objects that compose what we used to call a world!); and 
the solutions are likewise individual or one of “corporate culture.” If there is a truth-
kernel in approaches like Morton’s it is that it speaks to the experience of young, 
culturally-literate and environmentally-conscious people who are recognizing that the 
stable background of Nature and consumer society are have disintegrated, and who are 
distanced enough from its effects to take a certain aesthetic pleasure in this derangement.  
The triumphalism of some environmental critics over past ideas of nature is not 
altogether different from the modernist “attitudes” from which they wish to break. 
                                                          
12
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Frederick Buell, for instance, argues that, “the idealized natures of the 1970s lost their 
claims to ontological status, becoming, at best, specific, progressive nature-cultures to be 
cherished and reinvented and, at worst, reactionary ideologies to be dispensed with.”
14
 
However, Buell’s “idealized natures” have been replaced by a new idealization in 
boutique eco-modernist, sidewalk-crack and garbage-pile ecologies that appeal primarily 
to the environmental (and design) sensibility of young urban creatives, or “yuccies.”
15
 It 
is a de-industrialized, vibrant ontology for rust-belt romantics, which offers more 
immediacy than the transnational flight of capital that created so many inner-city farming 
opportunities for the children of the white middle class.
16
 The belief that today’s 
“natures” are any less idealized, any less idyllic in their melding of the natural and the 
cultural, or any less traditionally liberal in their individual-scale fixation on ethical 
consumption and in the special appeal of “community” felt by those who are mobile, 
conceals a shared habitus between the academic and activist worlds.
17
 Given the 
indebted, precarious employment situations of many recent graduates, and the eclipse of 
the professional-managerial class (that they might have joined in previous decades) by 
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 A direction I have gone with my research outside of this dissertation is to look at 
the “peripheral industries” surrounding energy production. In a 2015 paper I presented at 
the Association for the Study of Literature and Environment (ASLE) titled, “Oil with a 
Human Face: Energy Democracy beyond Neoliberalism,” I drew inspiration from the 
transnational organization, Trade Unions for Energy Democracy (TUED).
19
 This is an 
organization of energy-industry trade unions from around the world, facilitated by the 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, organizing for democratic control over energy 
infrastructures and production. Their argument is that through asserting their materially-
specific power as energy workers, they are capable of transforming the economic and 
environmentally-destructive practices of energy companies and, thus, redistributing 
privately-concentrated power over the life and health of society. As Timothy Mitchell has 
convincingly illustrated, there is ample historical precedent for their beliefs.
20
 As I was 
writing that paper, the United Steelworkers were engaged in one of the longest strikes in 
decades over working conditions at US oil and gas refineries. Over five thousand oil 
workers went on strike at refineries in “California, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas and 
                                                          
18
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Accessed 6 June 2016.  
19
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20






 As friends of mine who work in the steel industry prepared for the strike 
to spread through Indiana, I recognized similar “immaterial” demands for safety, 
community health, and environmental responsibility, in both USW and TUED. The strike 
was not over threatened cuts to wages and benefits, but for transformed working 
conditions in which worker exhaustion and low industry standards in technology would 
cease to threaten the health of workers, communities, and the environment. I turned to the 
depictions of financial labor in Teddy Wayne’s novel, Kapitoil, and the depiction of 
industries surrounding fracking in the Smithsonian Channel reality-show, Boomtowners 
(e.g. concrete and sand, trucking, road building, welding, housing, education, and 
policing), to argue that these “peripheral industries” are necessary components to the 
“main event” of resource extraction.
22
 If it is true, as Mezzandra and Nielson claim, that 
the period of post-Fordist deterritorialization is being replaced by an emergent set of 
crises defined by the reterritorializing operations of “extraction, logistics, and finance,” 
these texts may help illustrate or illuminate this shift.
23
 
For instance, Kapitoil (2010) is set in 1999, and its main character is Karim Issar, 
a young computer programmer working for the hedge fund Schrub Equities, who moves 
from Doha, Qatar to New York City to prepare their systems for Y2K. The novel’s 
hyper-reflexive and sincere narration are modeled on International Business English. It is 
                                                          
21
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composed out of a series of first-person journal entries that tell the story of Karim’s rise, 
and subsequent exit, from the social scene of high finance in the late nineties. Kapitoil is 
a petrofiction centered on virtuosic labor at the highest levels of finance, where 
production based on computer-modeled speculation and immaterial networks of personal 
relations is simultaneously predicated on violence in Middle East oil producing states. 
The novel’s epigraph is a quote from Marx’s Capital: “There is a definite social relation 
between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.” 
Readers are thus primed for a materialist interpretation whereby increasingly 
commodified and “refined” forms of social exchange are understood as the reflection of 
economic and power inequalities between characters and nations. 
 On the other hand, Boomtowners expressly avoids politicizing the environmental 
effects of fracking in order to trace the various industries and people who are struggling 
in the context of the ongoing recession by “making it” the Bakken Shale boom. The 
reality show may be “character driven,” but the characters are driven by economic 
uncertainty. An air of gold-rush naturalism is the prevailing mood of the series, as lives 
hang on the volatility in the price per barrel of oil. The pioneer spirit quickly becomes an 
entrepreneurialism taken up out of desperation. Even the people who are making money 
are struggling emotionally to put down roots, find partners, and create lives outside of the 
rhythms of industry. The show depicts how individuals and families adapt to the 
overburdened domestic infrastructure of cities like Williston, ND and Sidney, MT, as 
they are overrun by the massive influx of labor the industry requires, and as oil 
companies gain increasing hold over the affairs in local government. In this, 
Boomtowners follows the “social critique” of fracking in documentaries like Oscar-
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nominated, White Earth, and The Overnighters. The show was filmed summer of 2014, 
when oil prices were high. By the last episode its singular fracking company, Liberty 
Oilfield Services, is laying off over six hundred workers and shutting down drill sites 
after the price per barrel of oil dropped fifty percent over a sixth-month period. One of 
the laid off workers consoles himself saying, “when you’re in a boom you’re one day 
closer to a bust and when you’re in a bust you’re one day closer to a boom.” For many 
“Boomtowners” who live in the cities and employed on the periphery of the oil industry, 
the states of boom and bust exist simultaneously. The show’s strength lies in its depiction 
of the extended social infrastructure that makes fracking possible.  
I have periodized the works in this project as existing “after Fordism,” which up 
until quite recently could have been another way to say post-Fordism. Debates still 
continue on whether post-Fordism is (or was) itself a coherent period or regime of 
production. We will only know once it is over and we will only know when it is over in 
hindsight. One cannot wait for a transformational event or new “disruptive” idea of 
nature to change everything. Rather, it will develop immanently, through the sites and 
narratives of production: nature industries. If history and nature are to have any meaning 
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